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A.  ORIGIN AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
(a) The Commission of the European Communities  found that industriaL '  cooperation between firms is far from having fuLfiLLed the hopes
pLaced in 'it and therefore Launghed a thorough, long-term
investigation of the main constraints encountered in this .fjeLd.
The folLowjng study, which forms part of thjs investigat.ion,  deaLs
excLusiveLy with the obstacLes found in the ACp countries them-
setves and does not examjne those which may exi5t wjthin the
countries of the European Commuhity.
(b) The foLLowing study is mainIy, but not exctusivety, concerned with
the ACP countries, European SfilEs and the manufacturing  sector.
It  Looks at a[t the main forms of cooperation between firms -
direct investments, joint  ventures, management contracts,  Licence
contracts, sub-contracting and product-in-hand  contnacts.
(c) It  is based on an analysis of a large number of surveys already
run in the countries of the EEC, on intervjews wjth European
businessmen and on many working sessions with the ma.in European
industriaL promotion bodies, internationaL organ'isations and
financiaL jnstitutions.  It  aIso ref[ects the work of a speciaLLy
.  convened group of experts.
The anaLysis of the constraints is ittustrated by 50 cases of
industriat cooperation between firms, which are set out after the
main body of the report.G.
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B" SUMMARY  OF INDUSTRIALIZATIAN  IT THE ACP COUNTRIES
A brief  summary shows that,  in  spite of a few successes
jrr some countries and sectors, both the quanity anfl quality
of  ACP industria,l-ization  is  poor.  The summary, based
essentially. on what happens in Africa,  which conta:ins 43 of
the 64ACPs, highlights  the very small degree of  industrialization
irr these countries at all  levels.  There are fou:n main f,indings:
ia)  The value added in *an@
ca represents Darery
L% of the world figure  and it  is  growing more slowly than
the figure  for  any other region.  It  also represents the
smallest percentage (less than 1O%) of GlF, afdro€h
the per. capita figure  is  better.  Lastly,  the more
el,aborate the products, the more Africa's  share of world
production decreases.
ib)  There are few iobs in  industry
In spite of a sharp increase between 1960 and 1979 (7L%),
the industrial  share of the labour-force is  still  modest (L2%).
However, there are strong dlfferencea between the countries.
(c) Capacities are Poorly used
Almost everywhere, African industry under-uses its  installations'
The average rate of utilization  has been,estimated at  less than
.  5A%.
i d) There is  a high proqorlion of  foreign inlestments
The ACP countries nearly always have a higher percentage  '(x 3-6)
foreign lnvestments in  their  GNP than the average for  their
region-]11-
c. IIPILOGY OF THE PXINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS  ON INDUSTRIAL
COOPERATION BETWEEN  FIRMS
Thinty five principal constraints were recorded and analyzed. They were subjected to an initial  crassification
-  by type - 
and then an atternpt was made at further
classification, this time in the light  of five main criteria:
(a) Nature
The constraints faII  into  aeven categories:
-  structural,  the most important one here being the
narowness of  the market.  This is  followed by the
cost of input,  the shortage of  foreign exchange, the
shortage of  local  businessnen, of rneans of  financing
and industrial  fabric.  AII  these obstacfes lead  to poor internationaL attraction,  which is  in  itseLf  a
factor  of constrai.nt;
-  politic-a],  Iargely due to the host Governments, failure
to  take any clear stand on foreign investors.  This
category includes a  false  priority  on industrJr  a
fail.ure to respect commitments, restrictions  on
employment and returns on  capital,  protectionist  measures,
restr:.ctlons attendant on economic policy,  bans on the
buying up of  Local firns,  forced assignment of  capital
and, Iastly,  nationalization  and expropriation;
-  cultural,those  resulting  from the ACp lack of  industriar
habits,  which is  reflected  in  a certain confusion between
industrial  cooperation and technicar assistance, short-term
views of things,  a misunderstanding of the demands of
industry, wariness about non-tangibre contributions from
investors and a certain preference for  prestige investments;-1V-
institutional.  The countries of  the South are
""u"iit  ."pr"ached for  having institutlonsi  that
are not sufficiently  transparent and far  t;oo
unstable;
administrative, which are of  four kinds -'  those
connected with slow and arbitrary  decision-making'
a lack of coordination, interference in  ttre firms
and coruption;
legal.  If  the law is  to be brought in  lirre with
the demands of  industry,  then the ACP countries
have to adapt th'eir legislation,  provide better
protection for  property, be less legalistic  and
accept foreign arbitration;
technical.  More practically,  the ACP countries
ruff.r  f"orn a shortage of skilled  labour' poor local
input and communications problems.
Irnportance
If  the constraints are taken by degree of  importance'
the principal  ones would appear to  be struc,tural and
political  and the adninistrative,  Iegal andl even technlcal
ones relatively  secondary.  The constraint;s  can also be
divided into  two negotiable  and non-negotierble, i.e.
according to the degree to which they obstr:uct an
industrial  cooperation project.
Type of  agreement bgtween tle  firms
A distinction  has to be made here with foreign share-
holding.  In agreements involving holdingr:, the main
constraints  are structural  and politlcal'  tuhile in  the
others they are technical and legal.  Generally speaking'
sensitivity  to the constraints increases with the size
of the foreign capital  hoJ-ding.
f
(b)
(c)b
(d) Stage of  implementation of  the project
There are more and stronger constraints during the
period of exploitation.  The phases of negotiation
and construction are also affected,  although to  a
l-esser extent, while the study phase is  fairly
problem-free.
(e) Sector of actlvity
It  is  not possible to produce a precise classification
of constraints by industrial  sector.  At best,  one
can say that  sone congtraints are specific  to  some
industries  (politically  sensitive staples, .mining
industries subject to nationalization,  the chemical
lndustry subject to  legal constraints and textiles
sensitive to manufacturing  coets).
( f)  Host country
There are four criteria  here:
-  tf,"gattg!,  which is  a fundanental constrai.nt for  more
than 80% of the ACP Group;
-  geographical situation,  which hlghlights  the strong
constraints in Africa  and the way the Caribbean  and
the Pacific  are isolated from Europe;
-  level  of development.  The least-developed countries
tend to be worse off  than the rest,  as the constraints
there are greater;
-  econornic and social  system. It  is  by nomeans clear
that  countnies with market economies have less
constraints than thosewithplanned economies (of  which
there are in  fact  very few in  the ACP Group).a
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]i,  RSCOMMENDATIONS
'I'h..:r'e are three series of  recommendations:
(a) For the host countries
Emphasis  must beplaced on the need to  remove or reduee
.  most of  the political  constraints - 
which are'
ultimately,  surmountable - 
and the administrative and
institutional  ones.  More practically'  it  would be a
go<.rd idea to set up suitabl-e structures to recei.ve the
investments.  A strong, long-term drive must be made
to make the'authorittes  and the local  industrial. promoters
.  aware of what industry involves.  Lastly,  the Legal
framework has to be brought into  line  with the rreeds of
i ndustrial cooperation.
(tr) For the European partners
The firet  recommendations are for  the Conmunity,  which
is  invited  to:
-  continue and expand the work it  has aLready bergun (with
the CID, aid for  industrial  promotion offices  and one-off
schemes);
-  set up a funil to  finance feasibility  studies;
-  work more closely with the financial  instituti.ons  in  the
Member States.
Secondly, it  is  recommended that  the Member Stat;es
-  set up or expand their  industrial  promotion bcrdies;
-  create study and project financing funds;
-  increase their  technical aesistance to the ACF' countries.I -vrl-
Lastly,  the European firms should be encouraged to:
-  ensure they have suitable structures for  lndustrial
cooperation;
-  nealize how much effort  is  called for  with information;
-  call  in  experts, in particular  to draft  their  cooperation
contracts:
-  maintain regular,  personal contact with the host country;
-  only send their  best staff  out to the ACP countries;
-  provide a strong, but flexibfe  financial  structurel
-  decentralize their  management.
(c)  For the promotional schemes
The five  suggested llnes  of  action here. are to:
-  discard bad projects,  i.e.  run proper feaeibility  .studies;
-  develop project  follow-up;
-  move towards company rehabilitation;
-  be alert  about technological changes;
-  devize a new pronotional stratggy.
*tf-1-
I.  INTRODUCTION
1.1 Origin of  the study
Industrial  cooperation, in  the broadest sense of  the term,
has been a major topic of  discussion in  the field  of
economic development over the past few years, to the point
where it  has become one of  the main demands of  the countries
of the Thj.rd World.  It  is  a complex concept encompassing
many types of North-South cooperation and its  success varies
considerably from one industrial  sector, one region and one
type of activity  to  another.
Generally speaking, industrial  cooperation has not always
neached the anticipated degree of  intensity,  in particular
because of the many obstacles it  has to  contend with.  The
developing countries of Africa,  the Caribbean  and the Pacific
(ACps -  Annexe I),  whlch are associated to the Community,'
seem so far  to have been even less involved in  i-ndustrialization
and the flow of  investment from the North than the rest  of  the
developing world.
This is  why, when renewal of  the Lom6 Convention  was being
negotiated, the Conmission of  the European Communities  decided
to investigate the main constraints in  the ACP-EEC industrlal
dialogue, with particular  reference to an analysis of
industrial  cooperation between firms.
1.2 Aims of  the study
lhe terms of reference of  the study said it  was to deal with
the internal  constraints and obstacles that  hamper or prevent
cooperation  between firms in  the developing countries
themselves.
1n particulan,  bhe coneultant was invited  to produce a detailed
typography of  these obstacles, to be backed up by examples or
rrc tual  cases
Lastly,  solutions were to be isolated,  in  the tight  of  the
results  obtained, in particular  so that  certain  industrial
promotion schemes could be reoriented.-2-
r ..J  Methodology
1'he consultant  worked, as available means allowed, with
the main European industrial  promotion bodies and
tlervelopment  banks and with certain specialist  international
organizations.  European flrms that were parlicularly
representative  were asked about their  experience of
lndustrial.cooperation.  Some 50 cases of  industrial
cooperation between firms were identified  and analyzed alL
told  and they are set out in part  two of  this  report'
The preliminary versions of tfre report were put before a
group of high-Ievel experts (see Annexe II)  r whcr met twice.
Many of thelr  comments and suggestions have beerr included
here.
Alongside this,  a lar.ge number of studies and'documents on
the problems of industrial  cooperation were exanrined'
1.4  Outline of the st-udy
I.  4I  Constraints  investigated
The study deals exclusively with the obstacl'es encountered
in  the developing countries and not with any blpckages originating
in  the countnies of Europe.  It  can, perhalps, be seen
as a first  .stage of a more generai piece of  research into
all  the constraints on industrial  cooperatlon i:n both North
and South.  It  makes no assumptions about the breakdown of
responsibility  for  the difficultles  encountered in  cogperation
between, firms in the EEC and the ACP Group
Nor should it  lead one to overlook the fact  that there are
successful cases of  industrlal  cooperatiOn in  the ACP countries
which have made non-negligeable (but not alrrvays effective)
attempts to attract  European  investors.-3-
1.42 Geographical scope
The study deals with cooperationbetween European
firms  (from the EEC essentially)  anA ACp firms.
However, it  is  not confined to any partlcular  area
and some significant  exanples have been taken from
non-ACP couhtries.
I.43 Sectoral scope
Priority  has been put on manufacturing in  the
broadest sense- of  the term, although, here again, the study does'not deal exclusively with this  sector
and one or two examples  frorn mining and the tertiary sector have been included.
l-.44 Firms covered
The firms investigated 1n the North are essentlally
medium-sized ones.  This concept.is difficult  to
describe with any precisionr as the term rlsmall and
medium-sized enterpri_ses (SlrtEs)" covers things which differ  widely with country, sector and so or,.  For piactical  purposes, the term here means firms that
do not come under the usuailmurtinationar'  heading, in  spite of the fact  that their  industrial  cooperation
activities  do in  fact  give them an international
character.  Thjls category of  firms is  virtually  the typical  clientdle  of  European industrial  promotion
agencies 
-  although there are many exceptions to this  rul"e.  They are large enough to be interested
in  industrial  cooperation, but lack the structures to go in  for  it  unaided.
The size of the Southern firms involved in  cooperation
was not seen as a criterion  likely  to make any noticeable difference to the data under scrutiny here, st  flrms of all  sizes have been taken into  consideration.
ln practice, .all  the Northern firms are privateJ-y owned, while the Southenn ones may be private,  mixed or under ptrblic ownership.-4-
r.45 Types of  indr+stlial cooperation
The study deals excl.usively with cooperation between
firms,  excluding any outline  State agreements and
constracts financed from bilateral  or multilateraL  aid
funds.  It  i.s therefore concerned so1ely with private
legal agreements involving two industrial  partners and
aimed at commercial and financial  profitability.
The different  forms of industrial  cooperation are . described irr $3 below.  .  t
1.5 Plan of the report
The study defines the concept qnd different  methods
of  implementatien of  industrlal  cooperatlon and .bhen
goes on to analyze the main constraints  encountr:red
in  each type.  This constitutes a basic typo.logy
which will  be used as a support for  other classi:fications
based on:
.  the degree of  importance,ofthe constralnts;
.  the form of  industrial  cooperation;
.  the stage reached in  the agreement between the firms;
.  lh"  sector of activity;
.  the host country.
Lastly,  solutions for  some of  these problems are set out,
on the basis of the typologies produced, and practical
recommendations about industrial  promotion are merde.INDUSTRIALIZATION
I
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2.  SUMMARY OF
This anaLysis does not aim to prroduce an exhaustive account of  industriar-ization in  the ACp states.  That wourd be beyond the scope of  the etudy.  The idea is  simply to point up some basic data to make for  a better grasp of  the context of  industrial  cooperation with these countries.
There are two preliminary remarks;
-  fndustrialization  in  the ACp states over the past 2,.-25 years has been rather disappointing both quantity-  ano quality-wise, in  spite of  a number of national and sectorar successes.
-  There are not nearly enough statistical  data avair.abr.e for  a cl-ose analysis to be made, which is  why the ACp situation  has been assessed pnimarily through the countries of Africa,  which contains 43 of  the 64 members of  the ACp Group ( incruaing aii-- the biggest ones).
2.L  Added value
2. 1l_ Afri ca ' s share
Africa  represented  r% of  the added- varue in  world manufacturing in  r98o, as against o.g% in  1960.  The figure  for  south-East Asia rose from zYo to  3. g% and that  for  Latin America from 5% to 6.1% over the same period (Table I).
So Africa  (and the ACp countries, therefore) is  lagging far behind the other regions as far  as industry is  concerned and the same thing is  true of other criteria  of  assessment ( industry,s share of GNPr growth of  added value in  manufacturing etc)  too. 
i
2.1"2
Added value (manufacturing) as a percentage of  GNp has been constantly 10wer in  the countries of Africa  than in  trre re'st or the developlng regions of the worfd 
-  ress than Le% in  r_9go, as compared to  Lg% in  south-East Asia and 26% in  Latin America. only west Asia, with just  over lo%, has a comparabre rate  (Tabre II ) .-6-
TABLE I -  DEVELOPING  REGIONS' SHARE OF ADDED VALUE IN
-
WORLD MANUFACTURING IN CERTAIN YEARS (%)
Year AFRICA W. ASIA S.U. ASiIA
2,0
2rr
2r2
2,3
2r3
2r4
2r4
2r6
2r8
2,9
LATIN AMERICA
5'0
4r8
5r2
5r4
5r6
5 ,6'
5r8
6ro
5r9
5r9
5r8
5r9
6rL
1960
1965
1970
L97 L
L972
1973
L97 4
1975
L97 6
L97 7
1978
r97 9
1980
0r8
0r8
0r9
0r8
0r8
0r8
0rg
0'9
0r9
0r9
rr0
0r9
1r0
0r4
0r5
0r6
0,6
0r5
0r5
0r6
0,7
0,7
0r7
3r8
3r8
3r8
Soureej UNIDO, World industry in  l98O
TABLE II  - ADDED VALUE (MANUFACTURING)  AS A PERCENTAGE  OF GNP
IN THE DEVELOPING  REGIONS, 1963-1980 (%, constant
.
DEVELOPED
REGIONS
26 ,62
28,19
29,L9
27,50
28 t52
28 ,69
21,47
ATIN
_ryE3-ig{_
2L,4L
24,22
26 ,03
25,8r
25,78
25,95
25,98
:tttt:1:
-';:;;'1-
8,5r  I 9.,2L I 9,62 | 9,35 I 9,55 I
--1:!l-J-
-------I-
t- Year 
I -------t-
Le63  | 1e7o I
1.e7 3 
| 1975  |
le78  | rs7s  I
i:::-__L
I
---  ---  J;--;;  - - --  ---
DEVELOPING  REGIONS
w.ASrA  I r.r. ASrA
I ----t---- 8,79  |  L2,75
10,45  I  14,00
10,35  |  15,22
L0,42  |  15,65
10,98  I  18,23
10,25  |  19, 10
10,25  I  19,94
----L---
grew mgre rapidly
Africa  than in
:)91:I9e: UNIDO data bank.
't'abl-e ll  shows that  the manufacturing Bector
in Asia than in Africa  (but more strongly in
i-atin America over the period 1973-1980).-7-
2.I3  Added value per capita
If  we look at the industrlal  added value per capita,  then
Africa's  posi,tion seems better,  particularly  over the past
decade, when it  came into  second place behind South East
Asla and well  ahead of  Latin America (Tables III  and IV).
TABLE III
cRowrH oF AppEp VALUE (MANUFACTURTNG) By REGTON, 1q62-82 (%)
1963-1973 1973-1980 ]973-1982
DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
.  Least developed countries
. Africa
.  West Asia
.  South East Asia
.  Latin America
mJIVIRIES  WIXTJ PI.AIV{ED ECIUI,IIES
qJNIRIES  WTTH MARI{ET  ffi\MTIES
8.O
5.8
7.2
9.4
7.6
8.L
9.8
5.5
5.8
3.O
5.6
6.3
8.5
4.4
6.6
2.4
Source: UNIDO data bank.
2,).4  Added value in  each sector
An analysis of  the different  sectora shows that  the more
elaborate the product, the mone Africa's  share of world
production  decreases.
The figure,  around 2% for  food products and textiles,
drops to below O.3% for mechanical construction, the
electrical  industny and transport  (Annexes III  and IV).
Figure I  shows the trend in  lndustrial  structures,  by
.  region, j.n time.  Africa  is  clearly  in  phase one of  the
industrialization  proceaa (smalt workshops and factories).
2.2. Jobs created
Industrialization  in
record when it  comes
of Africa,  the share
Africa  seems to have a more positive
to  employment. In 39 ACP countries
of  the industrlal  labour force rose-8-
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FIGURE I  _ TRENDS IN THE SIZE OF INDUSTRIAL UNITS IN TIME
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Source: Smal"l industries  in
-  Dennis Anderson -
developing countries: Some issues
World Bank.
- 
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TABLE V -  ACP COUNTRIES  OF AFRICA -  INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT 1960-1979
prncnwrAcE oF LABOUn N'ONCT EMPLOYED IN
semi-arid countrieg
l.  Chad
2. Somalia
3. MaIi
4. Burktna
5. Gambia
6. Niger
7. .Mauritania
other
8.  Elhiopia
9. Guinea Bissau
IO. Burundi
il.  Malawi
12. Rwanda
13. Benin
14. Mozambique
15. Sierra Leone
l6.  Tanzania
L7. Zaire
I8.  Guinea
19. CAR
20. Madagascar
21. Uganda
22. Lesotho
23. Togo
?4. Sudan
COUNTRY
Low-incone countries
INDUSTRY
1960 1979
lrp
18p
16
26
18
IO
7
10
L7
39
P = weighted average.
development in  Af'rica south of  the
5p
5p
.2
4
3
5
7
I
3
6p
5
9p
7p
7
I
5
L2
lo
3
q
9p
7
I
5
5
2
l6
L7
19
6
13
11
4
4
6
4
15
10
i1-importi countries with
intermediate incomes
25. Kenya
26. Ghana
27. Senegal
28. Zirnbabwe
29. Liberia
30. Zambia
31. Cameroon
32. Swaziland
33. Botswana
34. Mauritius
35. Ivory Coast
rop
.i-rr bermediate incomes
116. Angola
it7. Congo
:18. Nigeria
39. Gabon
3
3
I
'g'
8
L2
4
9
6
2
2
4
2
8
6
I\-,I
20
l0
l5
L4
11
7
9
5
24
4
7p
5
L4
5
11
10
7
5
4
?
26
2
L2
L7
10
7
Sub:Saharan Africa
Al.1 low-income countries
All- intermediate-income countries
Industrialized countries
i  plus Angola and Mo.zambique.
'i,::uree :  \rtbr ld Bank, Accelerated
Sahara,1981.
p
p
p
p
12p
14p
23p
38p_II-
from 7% to  12% between 196o and 1979, a 7r% increase (Tabre v).
Note, however, that  this  increase is  stronger in  the more
advanced; oir-producing countries than in  the row-income ones.
2.3 Capacities used
The capacity of African industry is  considerably under-used, with
sworlen prodruction costs and, in  many cases, negative proflt
margins as the obvious result.  rn all  but rare cases (breweries
particularly) 
'  African factories  turn over slowly and some of  them
have beenciolng so since they were set up in the sixties.
Take the example of Tanzania, where the average utilization  rate
of  industri-al capacity is  onLy 45% (Table VI),  Similar figures
were also recorded in  Zambia and Ghana (Annexe V).-L2-
TABLEVI-INDUSTRIAI!CAPACITYINUSE-INTANZANIAINtgT9.}98o
Sugar industrY
Cashew nut Processing
Brewing
Tobacco
Textiles
Leather
Bicycles
Motor vehicLes
Cement
Ferti 1 izer
Rolting mills  (22 OOO t)
Plastics
Tyres
58
53
76
70
49
49
I5
25
45
30
50
20
50
Source: UNIDO
There are a number of reasons for  this  under-utilization:
*  -capacity that  is  too large in  the first  place;
-  a shortage of raw materials and energy;
.- inadequate outlets;
-  a shortage of qualified  staff;
-  a shortage of conponents, sub-sets and apare parts;
-  a questionable  choice of  technology in  Eome cases'
Tiris alas fairly  common situation  in Africa  explains the
importance and the urgency of  running company rehabilitation
n"tg."t*""  (S 5.22).-13-
2.4 Share of  foreign investments
An anatysis of  the relationship  between direct  foreign investment
and GNP in  the developing  countries  shows that  it  tends to be higher'  overall,  in  the Acp Group than elsewhere.  rn each of the major regions in  question hereGfrica, the caribbean  and the Pacific),  the ACp countries armost always have a higher than
average percentage of  foreign'invdstments in  their  GNp (Table VII
and Annexe VI).
Tabre vlr - AcP couNTRrES - DrREcr FoRErcN TNVESTMENTS  AS A
REGION ACP
COUNTRY
OTHER
COUNTRIES
At  r NLL
COUNTRIES
Africa
Caribbean
Paci fic
7.3
6l_.3
40.4
2.A
oo
11.9
5.4
ro.8
30. o
*  See details  in  Annexe V.
Source: Weltwirtschaftsinstitut,  Hamburg, 19g2.
This tendency is  particularly  noticeable in  the caribbean,  where foreign investments amount to more than 61% of  GNp, and in  the Pacific,  where the fi.gure is  4O%.  In Africa,  which gets more than 55% of  direct  foreign investments  in  the ACp Group, the figure is  only 7.3%, but it  is  stirr.  substantiarty larger than that  for the other countries of  the region (Z,g%)
This is  an apparently  interesting  finding,  a),though no final
concrusions  can be drawn from it.  perhaps it  goes part-way to explaining the defensive attitude  that  sone ACp countries  adopt to foreign investments  (see $ 3.21).-14-
3. THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN  FIRMS
3.1  Definition
There are a number oi  controversial interpretations  of
this  term, which ie quite natural for  somethi.ng so new.
Without wishing to justify  the way it  is  used in  this
report,  it  is  fairly  general in  scope so it  can take in
all  the (traditional  and other) forms of  industrlal
cooperation without entering in  to any philosphical
,  'controversy on the extent to which it  contribrutes to
ebonomic development.  This is  why we have deliberately
brought in  UNIDO's definiti6nrhere
International c.ooperation  between firms,  it  says, covers
alf  types of  long-term industrtal  inter-action  between
a firm  in. a developing country and a foreign firm with
complementary activities.  This inter-actlon. should
result  in  a community of  interest  taking pra,ctical shape,
i.n the form of a specific  project  and ln the light  of
Iasting cooperation.
So we can deduce that  the following things must be present
if  we are to talk  about cooperation between firms:
-  a contractual link  between the firns;
-  a common interest  and joint  schemes that will  meet a
given econoinic objective  ( in  joint  venture agreements  at
least);
-  complementarity and coordination of both firms  )
-  long-Iasting relations  between the firms.
Ae is  mentioned in  the following paragraphs, induetrial ' cooperation also covers firms from the North buying capltal
in firms from the South and those non-holding agreenents
which the OECD also calls  rrnew forms of  investmentil (NFI).
;-UNiDO; Industry in  the year 2OOO, new perspectiv,es, 1929.-15-
3.2 Direct investment
Direct investment'is  the most conventionar form of  i-ndustrlar_
cooperation 
-  although the cooperation,  properly speaking, tends to be very poorly developed.  Under tnis  neaO:.ng, wl find'  essentially,  the subsidiaries  which European parent firms set up in  the developing countries.  The subsidiary remains the exclusive property of the parent firm  and so often 
-represents
an investment of  1oo% of  the capital  of  the new unit.  However, there  is  deemed tobe effectivecontror  when an economic unit constituted w  reeidente of  a.-forelgn'.countcy  has at  leaat zs% of a company's shares (a blocking minority).  In splte of  this rel-ative flexiblJ.ity,  direct  investment  is  tendin! to lose ground in  industrial  cooperation relations, giving way to  formurae ln whichforeign holdings are replaced by other methods of control.
3.3 Joint  ventures
This means firms whose capitar  is  shared (in  varying proportions)
by the foreign investor and a rocal promotor.  Both parties  are entitled  to inspect the way the firm  is  managed and either  may
have the job of actually running it.
Direct investments and joint  ventures differ  from the other
forms of industriar  cooperati.on in  that  they invorve hording
capi tal.
3.4 Management contracts
These are contracts under which a foreign firm provides management services for  a 10ca1 firm  in  return for'a  pre-arranged sum of money.  such contracts may be integrar parts of broader (key-in_hand for  example) agreements  or be concluded independently  once the project has become operationar.  They are often,  but not necessarily,
concluded for  a long period.
The definition  used here covers contracts to run firms as werl as to provi-de administrative or technical management.
3.5 Product-in-hand and market-in hand contracts
In this  type oI'agreement, the
including the actual producti.on
as welL as the building of  the
supplier provides a set of  services
and even marketing of the product
factory,  all  to pre-arranged  objectives.-16-
This is  in fact  a key-in-hand operation tied  to  the
a4hievenent of a given objective.
i3.6 Glanting licences
With this  type of  agreement, the issuer (the  issuing
country) authorizes the concessionnaire (the host country)
to exploit  a given technologtrr or serries of  technologies for
remuneration.  It  may cover patented intentlons on non-
patentable industrial  know-how; What makes the granting
of  licences a forn of  industrial  cooperation i3,  above all'
the importance of the technical assistance that  goes with
it.  Such technical aseistance is  usually fundamental  when
it  cones to getting  the local  firms to  assimilate the
imported technology.
The same rules apply to  franchising  as to  the granting of
L icences  .
3. 7 Sub-contracting,/co-production
Sub-contracting is  defined as the manufacture of parts,
elemehts or semi-finished  products by a sub-contractor
to the specifications of the person
giving the order.  In the industrial  cooperation J'ramework,
it  is  undergtood that the person giving the order and the
sub-contractor are geographically.  separate ( in North and
South reepectively)  and that  the firms involved are
legally  and operationally distinct.  For the OECD, the notion of
internabnal  sub-contracting (ISC) also covers bontracts
between rUbgldtanlcs of tranrnetlonals and Looel flrml  and
between subsidlaries of different  transnationals  and
wrthin a given transnational.
Co-production here is  understood to be a more sophisticated
and nore egalitarian  form of  international  gub-corrtracting.
It  often leads to a form of joint  venture.-r7-
This study is  such that  there is  no need for  a closer
definition  of  the various forms of  industrial  cooperati6n,
nor for  other forma 
- 
generally variations  on those already
mqnliensd -  to be included.  The above list  fairly
faithfully  covers all  the cases that  occur  in  the analysls
that  foll-ows.
l'he definitions  given in  $ g,a and $ 3.7 correspond to what
the OECD calLs the new_forms of  investment (NFI). Eut the
firms do not always see them as investments, so the examples of
cooperation  between firms set out in part  two of  thls  report
are essentially  of direct  investments  and .joint  ventures.-18-
THE PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS  ON INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
4.L Structural constraints
4.1L Poon international  attraction
Clearly, the European firns  that  are intereste,d in
industrial  cooperation find  it  difficult  to  choose
between the l5O or so developing countries, not to mention
the often greater attraction  of the industrialized  countries
themselves. The investor is  the subject of  fierce  competition
between the'potential  host countries; only"Botne-of. which  are
really  attnactive pnopositions.  AII  but one or two of  the
developing countries that have signed the Lom6 Conventiors  are
at a particular  dlsadvdntage here, as will  emerge later  on.
More than two thi.rds of  the ACP Group are African and Africa
seiems to offer  fewer comparative advantages to the potential
investor.  Without confusing cauge and effect,  it  is  perhaps
useful to analyze the pattern of  investment  between the
industrialized  and the developing  countries  in  spite  of
the inadequacy and imprecision of the .statistics  available.
conclusions emerge from the OECD figures  (Tables VIII  and
Africa  is,  overall,  a zone.which is  far  less sought after
by investors in  the developed count.ries.  Only thefive  big
investing countries in  lhe OECD and France and the United
Kingdom attach any' eort of  importands'to .Afiica,  although
they put America in  the lead (Tab.le V-I'II)
More than half  the flow of  investrnents between the members of
DAC (The Development Assistance  Comnittee) and the developing
countries is  channelled into  the II  new industrial  countries
(NIC -  Table IX)*.
Two
IX):
* Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, Portugal,
Greece, Hong-Kong,  The Republic of  Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Taiwan and Yugoslavia.-I9-
T.ABLE VIII  -  GEOGRAPHICAL BREAKDOWN  OF NET DIRECT INVESTMENTS
FROM THE MAIN INVESTING COUNTRIES, T979-I981T(%)
I* The figures in brackets represent the country of origin's
share of  total  direct  foreign investrnents on the continent
by the five  investing countrles.  The baeic data include
support from the  sector.
-  Excluding investments in  the oil  sector.
Source: OECD, Investing in the Third World, IgB3.
France
Germany
Japan
Urlited
Kingdom2
USA
Europe Afri ca Anerica As ia Total
33 (34)
2L (18)
1 (4)
10 ( 13)
s (31)
z3
5
9
( 16)
(3)
(16)
30 (2s)
e (40)
39
59
29
36
69
(6)
(7)
(r1)
(7)
(6e)
5
15
6L
(2,
(4)
(4e)
24 (e)
17 (36)
100
100
100
100
100
Totel
(100) ( r00) ( r00) ( 100) (100)-2o-
More than a quarter of  the investments go to the so-.ailed
intermediate-income countries (only 19 of  the 73 are in  the
ACP Group -  Annexe VII)  and onLy 4% -  5% to the low-income
countries (the majority of  these, 37 out of 61' are ACPs).
Even taking account of  the fact  that  two ACP oil-producers'
Nigeria and Gabon, are in  the OPEC categorY, there is  no doubt
as to where the pref€ren€os ef..se  intennational-  irrvestors lie.
TABLE IX -
Source: Investing in  the Thlrd World, OECD' 1983.
This analysis is  confirmed by thp various classifications
established by specialized bodles (Business trnternational,
Institutional  Investor etc) rwhose conclusions are along the same
lines.  Overall, Africa -  i.e.  two thirds  of  the ACP countries
and the biggest of  them - 
comes in  last  behind the five  other
big geographical  regions of the world (Annexe VIII,).  And its
relative  position ie deteriorating to the benefit of  more
attractive  regions such as Asia and even Latin America.
According to Business International's  rating,  Africa has been
NET FLOW OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTII{ENTS  FROM DAC
Couttrhtns - snmn-or rgu vnnrous cBoups otr' DEVELoPTNG
couNTRrES -  1977-198r.  (%)
COUNTRIES L977 19t79 L981
Low-income countries
Intermediate-income countries
( inctuding off-shore centres)
New industrial  countries (11)
oPEC (13)
8
I9
(7)
5L
22
5
31_
(le)
61_
3
4
27
( r5)
44
25
TOTAL 100 100 roo-2t-
declining constantly since 1974 because of  its  politicar instability  and economic dj.fficulties  (trade deficits, inflation  and external debts).  Compared to other regions, Africa  is  a high risk/rimited  advantages zone as far  as the investors are concerned  (Annexe IX).
Without going in  to  this  concept any further  here, it  is cl-ear that,  overall  (the exceptions are rare),  the foreign investors do not consider the ACp countries to be the most attractive  in  the present economic situation.  This is obviously the outcome of a series of  inter-acting  phenomena, but it  is  also, given the results,  an additional  cause of waning interest  from the North.  Here we have the vicious circle  of under-developrnent,  from which it  is  very difficurt to  escape.
Similarly,  in  the analysis of structural  constralnts below, there often appears to be a narrow margin between those due to under-deveropment as such and those which can from certain points of  view be considered to be autonomous.
This report, obviously, ig  concerned with ipvestigating  the latter.
4.12 Narrowness  of the market
Two thirds  (aS countries) of  the ACp Group, including all the countries of  the Caribbean and the pacific,  have populations of less than 5 milr.ion.  Thirty  ACp countr:ies
have populations of  less than r  mirrion.  rn absolute terms, that  is  to say, independentry of  the national income of  these States, the potential  markets in  ,the ACp Group tend.to be very limited.
Alr  the surveys run ih  the industrialized  countries confirm the fact  that  by far  the biggest motive.of firms investing
abroad is  to maintain,  expand or geek new commerciar-  outlets for  their  products (Annexes X, Xf,  XfI,  Xfff  and XIV).  This makes it  easien to understand their  lack of  enthusiasm when it  comes to the ACp countries.  onry a dozen or so of  the ACp Group reach the .criticaf  nass of  ro mirrion prus inhabitants
whose purchasing power is  stirr-  very modest.  only Nigeria (with its  8o-too mir-ri.on inhabitants) ana zaire (zz mitt:.on) stand out as offering  rearly  important domestic markets. This-22-
analysis is  taken further  in  $ a.5 below
So the narrowness of  the market is  a genuine constraint, 
'
. a fundamental one which is  very comrnon in  the ACP countries.
But it  is  not always obvious to  foreign investors, whd often
realize all  too late  that the outlets  are inadequate to
ensure the economic vi-,ability of  their  projects.  This is
because a narrow market is  often due to'a  number of factord
which may not be apparent to the unwary investor.  The
notion of market, in  the countries of Africa  espei:ially,  must
be seen from vr.arious angles:
-  Size proper, measured in  number of inhabitants and in
pu"ch-gnower.  In many cases, even the most elementary
of, statistiea  data are lacking and those that  are available
may not be reliable.  Population, income and consumption
are all  key items of data for  which we have no precise
figures.  Estimates of Nigenia's population, for  example'
range from 60 million  to  lOO million  inhabitants.
-  Permeabillty of the market.  This is  something'which official
ffitics  tend to  ignore and the authorities  tend to be very
careful not to mention contraband  - 
which isr  1n factr  an
economic reality  of  considerable importance in  many countries,
particularly  in Africa.  But,'bV definitioh,  it  is  difficult,
-if  not imposslJale  to get the size of  it. At best, the
prudent investor can ask the host country for  protection from
official  imports, but the risk  o$ ctandestine imports remains.
Africa has more frontiers  per km-  than any other negion and
these frontiers  are very easy to get across.  An example of
the problerns such a situation  can cause a local  firm  is
given in  Case No 26.  The absenbe of  any proper customs
protection is  referred to in  Cases Nos 9 and 17.
-  Fragility.  Southern markets have often been devetoped
a;Tm;IaIIy  on the basie of exotic consumer habits.  This
is  why consumption can often drop in  an unexpectedly spectacular
manner if  the economic situation  alters  -  as happened in  Ivory
Coast, for  example, where beer consumptlon dropped by 30% in
a couple of years.-23-
-  Inconsistency of  the regional market.  One of  the main
arguments of  ACP industrial  promotion is  that  the
investors have the possibility  ofexpanding their  outlets
by capitalizing  on a considerable regional market. The
ECOWAS market, for  exanple, is  commonly presented as a
rrmarket of  2OO million  inhabitantsrr that would be
available to any firms inr'say,  Senegal or Benin.  But all
investors agree that,  although the regional market is  there,
it  is  very difficult  to penetrate.  Practically  speaking,
trade between the countries of Africa  (and South-South trade
in  generaL) comes up against countless non-thriff  barriers
disgui.sed  proteo?ion, absence of  tbansport facilities,
currehcy fl-uctuation between dlfferent  zones and so on - that are often imposslble to get round.  And the rlsk  of
these economic groupings collapsing are not negligeable
ej.ther - 
l-ook at  the East African Community, which left
over-sized firms in  each of  the member countries once it
broke up (Case No l9
-  The power of the importers.  The commercial structures of
most of the ACP countries were inherited  from the colonial
era and therefore import-oriented - 
hence the economic
(and political)  power of  the importers,  whose influence is
felt  at many levels.  More than one investment project
has foundered due to pressure from the importers (Cases Nos
L7, 29 and 33).  Note also that  the import profit  margins
are far  higher than the usual industrial  margins.
-  Atomization of the market.  This again is  a sitution  found
especially in  the large but under-populated  countries of
Africa.  In Mauritania, for  example, there is  not just  one
market, but several- - 
Nouakchott/Rossor".Nouadhibou/Zouerate,
Kaedi and Nema -  with no communication between them.  The
I'nationalil market is  therefore all  the smal.ler.
To sum up, the constraint'due  to narrowness of  the market is  a
fundamental  one.  It  explains the failure  or non-completion
of a very large number of projects  (see Case No 12).  Some of
them, indeed, are offered to investors year after  year, with
no chance of  success when the outlets  are confined to  the
domestic markets alone.-24-
4.1-3 Costs
After a market, firms interested in  industrial  coopenation
are seeking lower production costs than in Europe.  This
is  something aII  surveya  those which the IFO ran of
German firms  (Annexe XI) - 
show.
In the case of what we call  industrial  redeployrnent  or
resettlement (the transfer of productive units  from the
industrialized  to the developing countries),  production costs
are a key elenent in  the decision.
But in many cases,  and contrary to accepted ideas, production
costs in  the developing countries are often high and may be
even higher than in the  industrialized  countries.  There are
two'reasons for  this:
-  The low putput of  the labour force, whlch loses the investor
the benefit of far  lower hourly rates of pay than in  Europe.
And there are considerable differences  between the developing
countries here, the ACPs (particularly  those in  Africa)  being
parti.cularly badly off.  Take Senegal, where'labour costs
are 2.5 times what they are on Mauritius and industrlal
producivity is  lower (Table X):
TABLE X -  MINIMUM MONTHLY  WAGEE, I  APRIL 1982
Source: P.Queyrane -  ZFID -  Bitan et  analyse de la  requ6te de
financement,  November 1982.
FRANC ZONE MINIMUM  WAGE
Net PIus contributions
CFAF CFAF Index
DAKAR
TUNISIA
MAURITIUS
39 040 
(2)
42 328
19 L40
48 800
53 816
20 288
IOO
rto
42-25-
-  The size of  extra-contractual costs, which becones a key
factor in  investment declsions.  These costg, which are, by
definition,  difficult  to put a figure  on, are to a large
extent due to the series of  constraints described in  the
rest of  this  study.  CIearIy, any delay, extra procedure
or new demand by the host country results  in  what can often
be very considerable 
- 
and non-recuperable 
-  extra
expenditure for  the foreign firm.
In addition to these two sets of  expenditure,  there are the
costs of transport (of  goods and staff),  which penalize some
countries, although  this  is  not a deciding factor  (see the
success of Mauritius and certain countries of Asia with European
investors).  Case No 8 is  an example of  this.
4.14  Shortage of  forej.gn exchange
This brings us in  to the field  of constraints due to under-
deveropment itse).f, but nonetheress a basic obstacle to industrial
cooperation. Few developlng countries do not have a more or
less structural  deficit  in  their  trade balance.  This applles to
even the most dynamlc of  them.  The ACps are not exempt 
- 
wlth
the notable exception of the countries in  the Franc zone, which
are relatively  well-off  when it  comes to availability  of  foreign
exchange.
There are two main consequences:
-  Import restrictions,  which often paralyze 1ocal flrrns by
depriving them of  input or equipment vital  to their  operation.
These restrictions  may be of many kinds:
.  import bans pure and simple;
.  deposits required;
.  particularly  high customs duties;
. obligation to use local  input etc.-26-
The IFO study already mentioned in  fact  shows that
German firms  put this  type of constraint'  which
can result  in  anything from a'eirnple cost increase
to a complete breakdown'in production, in  third
place.  .See Case N9 23.
-  The implementation of export-oriented projects that
are of no interest  to the local market'  Investors
who take this  attitude  restrict  the possibilities  of
industriaL cooperation considerably,  os there j's
clearly  only a restrlcted  nunber of  echemes solely
devoted to  exports.  And they asaume that  the
exporting firms have all  the requisite  facilltiea  and
ftcxlbillty  required in  the management of  the forelgn
exchange theY need
Experience has shown that  these conditions are not
always met --  even where there is  no del,i.berate
Government policy.  Take Mauri.tius, where even firms
with free zone status have to go through exchange
control.  This is  leadlng the international
financing organizations increasingly to  demand that
an external account (foreign currency) .be opened to
ensure servicing of the loan and avoid any interferenee
by the host governments -  but see Cases Nos 46 and 47 '
4.  L5 Absence of  comPetent local  businessmen
Industrial  cooperation is  using direct  investment  - 
i'e'
large lf  not majority capital  holdings plus effective
control over managenent -  lese and less.  The formula
is  usuarly repraced by co-investment (3oint venture) '
whlch means, by definition,  that  there are at  least  two
partners' one from North and one from South'
But industrial  partners in the ACP countries are rare.  In
most cases, the local project promotere are invesbrs
interested in placing their  capital  in  the hopes of  making
a quick profit  at  low risk.  A spirit  qf  industry,  however'
calls  for  short- or even medium-tgrm sacrifi.ces, a constant
effort  arxthigh risk.  so many ideas for  projects founder
for  lack of promoters with real  lnaustrlal  ilrotivatdon.-27-
And many projects put forward by the goverments of the
host- countries are never even , studied because there
is nl local partner.
This tack of local businesemen  (and even industrial
representatives) becomes very apparent at industrial
meetings like  the one ln Dakar.  Many European participants
(heads of firms) deplore the fact that they did not meet any
counterparts  there, only civll  gervants.  And often when a
Local agent is found, applications and proposals get no
answer for lack of motivation.  Cases Nos 37, 42 and 43
illustrate  this
In other cases, a European busineBaman  flnds a local partner
who does not have the relevant induetrial skllls  but expects
to have considerable powers of declsion (note here that some
African regar systems glve theee powers to the holders of a particular
title.'  particularly that of Managing Director).'
4.16 Lack of financial- means
This constraint covers all  the problems an investor (and his
local  partners) may meet when trylng  to rnobilize funds to
set up and operate the projected business.  The unfavourable
economic situation  in  almost all  countries 1g resulting,  in
the ACP Group  particularly,  1n a  tight  credit  squeeze at
all.  levels.
Most financers think that  there has never been a shortage of
means for  a good flrma cooperation proJect.  The problem
arises with the definition  of  I'good proJectrr.  Doee this  mean:
-  a project that  is  bound to be profltable?
-  a project that  gets enough funds of  its  own?
-  a project  involving credible or influentlal  partners (the
Government,  for  exampJ.e)?-28-
Although the first  of  these criteria  Beems adequate to
the businesamen,  bankerB are more concerned with the others
and many economically viable projects faIl  to meet them and  11
so ir'ever see the light  of day for  lack of  flnancing.
In most cases; the Governments of  the host countri.es frown
upon local banks giving loans, patticularly  long-tern credit,
to  foreign firms.  Such credit  is  very often only granted in
return for  what are gometimes deemed to be exorbitant
guarantees  involving the foreign investorrs goods and perhaps
going beyond his capital  holdlng (Caee No 7).
If  we add to  these restrictions  the high coet of credit  in
most of the ACP countries (except those in  the Franc Zone,
perhaps), the size of the problems that  may. face lllrms seeklng
to set up there can be  gauged.
There are two other constralnts linked to proJect flnancing
that are frequently mentioned. They are:
-  The inadequacy of  iunds for  project  studies
There is  an important link  missing in  the chain between.
identification  of  an investment opportunity and project
financing and that  is  financing for  feasibility  or pre-
feasibility  studies.  None of the three partners usually
involved can provide this:
.  The ACP promoter generally does not have the nneans and
hesitates to take the riek.
.  Any European partner who ie  approached will  only agree to
finance studies (and carry them out hlmeelf) lif  he is  very
sure about the proJect.
. The financial
type of study.
be reimbursed
project is not
inetitutlon does not have the ft.rnds for thls
At best, there may be a etudy credit to
from the proJect financing.-  but if  the
run, then there are problems of repayment.-29-
As thlngs stand, the CID, the UNDP and one qs two
development banks (African ones, in particular) have
study funds, but the procedures and conditlons that go
tith  them considerably Limlt thelr effectiveness:
..  CID  - only 50% of the study flnanced;
ceiling of around 25 OOO ECU (average in
1983 = 15 600 ECU);
- daily rates of consultancies restricted;
-  lengthy approval procedures.
On the plus side, the CID always makee lt  possible for
an ACP national to submit an application without going
through the Government.
.. UNDP - ::::ff1:: ffiiled 
for the least deveroped
-  Iong and complex procedures;
-  apptications  as a matter of priority  from
financlal lnstitutions.
-  The inadequacy of the development banke' proJect evaluatlon
faci li ties
The'caseof the African Development Bank (ADB), which concerns
43 ACP countries, illustrates this point.  Between its  creatlon
(in 1974) ana l9aS,  the ADB approved credits for an amount
that was almost three tines the slze of the loans actually
granted ($ a.e billion,  as agalnst $ 1.65 billlon).  This is
not a shortage of funds.  It  is a failure to identify and
evaluate viable projects and promoters capable of making a
success of them.-30-
4,L7 Absence of any industrial fdbrlc
one of the structural constraints still  to be mentioned
is the lack of any induetrial support prior to final
production.
This industrial fabric, which businesEmen find as a matter
of courge in ttre developed. countriee, cqnprlses a whole
set of facilities  which tend to be mieeing ln the developing
world. They are, in Particular:
- baslc infrastructure such as adequate watBr and energy
supplies and suitable communications and telecommunications;
-  maintenance and repair eervices for industrial equipment;
-  sub-contractore who can supply a factory with components or
serni-finished products (domestlc taxation often penalizes
sub-contractors ) ;
- industrial supplies of all  kinds (tools, spare parts etc);
-  industrial information about sourceB of supply, standards'
prices etc.
Many of these activities,  which are consldered to be eemi-
industry or even craft,  get very llttle  encourag€ment in the
ACP coUritries.  Investment codee often only exempt lmportant
projectb (of more than CFAF 6O mtlllon in Maurttanla' for
example).
A11 the investors agree on  thls shortage of industrial
backlng - 
which is aIEo linked, to a very large dxtent' to
the state of under-development.  It  strikee partlcularly
hard in that the import restrlctions mentioned earlier ($ 4.L4)
often make lt  very difflcult  to purchaee the requisite input
abroad.-31-
4.2 Politlcal constraints
4.21 The domestic debate on the role of foreign investments
One of the fundamental  obstacles to industrial cooperation is
of a political  kind.  ft  has to do with the very nature of
the debate in a large number of developing countrlee in wbich,
consciously or not, the partisang and the adversaries of a
foreign economic preBence are on oppoeite sides.  The problem
is rarely stated in such unambiguoua terms, but it  is clear
that, in these countries, moet of which (and virtuqlly  all  the
ACPs) have only been independent for a short while, these two
diverging tend'encies  occur at all  levels of political
di scussion.
We know that the economles that emerged from the colonial
system have left  the domlnated countries of the South in a
state of dependenee on the ex-metropolie  and generated  a
feeling of rejectlon in the early years of theee nationsl
political  independence.  Conversely, excesslve  economic
nationallsm, often conmltted ln the name of a temporarlly
donlnant political  ideology, hae led to the opposite reaction
and a certain economic llberalisrn.  Whenever there is a
change of direction, the State's attitude to ite  foreign
industrlal partners also changes, which is why -  with the
exceptlon of a small number of countries whlch clearJ.y opted
for a glven system ( Ilberalism in Ivory Coast and a state
system in Mozambigue, for example) on independence  and have
stuck to it  ever sinc  the vast majority of the ACP Group
is developing between these two extremee, gtvlng the $otential
investor the impression of dupllclty.  Even in countries which
seem to have firmly gone ln for one system or another, sone
trends along opposite lines appear under economlc pressure
(in Tanzania or Congo, for exanple, whlch are gradually
opening up to the private sector).-32-
This discussion is even taken up by the authorities and
reflected in contradictory  meaeures often taken against
foreign investor6 and even in a certain lack of coherence
in laws and attitudes (see Case No 30).  Eut tt  j's
interestir.rg to see that these defenslve measures introduced
in relation to foreign investments haveusually been bought
in to deal with major multinationals tdhose activity  is
frequently the subject of political  discussion.  they 
-
rarely take account of the situation of the SMEg which, often
with the aim of promoting forelgn investment, find themselves
faced with a series of rules destined to control the big
trans-national groupB. This ls perhaps lese the case wlth
direct investnentgd.arwith  the transfer of technology.
This ideological debate is behind many other politlcal
constraints.
4.22 Low priority  on industry
The policies of the developlng countries, those in the ACP
Group in particular,  put very low priority  on industry.
These countriesr prime concerns are' essentially' reliable
food supplies  (agriculture thenefore),  their  economic
infrastructure (roads and dams) and their social infrastructure
(schools and. hospitals).  These prioritieo  cone across
clearly in their derlelopment plans, in which lndustry is very
much the poor relation. 
i
In Afrlca, for example, 'four out of every flve people work 1n
agriculture, which represents between 3O% and 6O% of GNP and
even more when it  is properly assessed at natlonal level. So
it  should come aB no surprise that the rare resources of these
countries are not channelled lnto induetrial cooperation - which gets only marglnal attention from the G6vernments, at
best.
For the majority of ACP countriee, the real priorities  are
rrutside industry.  Only 5.7% of the neanly $ I blllon credits
i:hat the African Development Bank approved ln 1983 went to
industry (Annexe XV).-33_
So sone obeervers think the Lom6 Convention gives too
much room ( a whole chapter) to industrial cooperation.
From a more technical point of vlew, the secondary  importance
of industry is illustrated by certaln of the admlnistrative
structures in the ACP countries.  very often the Minibtry of Industry wlll  also be reeponslble for trade, but the
two are rarely of equal weight.  The oplnion of the tradesmen, parlicularly the importers (see $ 4,IZ) is important in
government decisions.  Sometimes the inveators are even
represented on the inveetment approval comnlttees  and this
resurts ln a number of doesiere belng blocked (casee Nos 17,
18 and 29).
4.23 Fqilure to respect contractual  commitments
European industriar cooperation partners often complain that
the host countries fail  to meet thelr commitrnents to the
investors.  A firm can cope with strict  rures provided they
do not change in mid-strearn.  Many albeit economically  viable
projects have failed because the Governnents in the host
countries were unwilling to meet theif'formal commitments to
the forelgn firm.  There are two series of reasons to
explain why Governments adopt such attitudes:
-  The importance of internal political  preeeure.
In extreme cases, tnrs can reeult ln escalation of the debate
refemed to in $ a.zr, although the usual outcome is short-term
or structural  economic and social difflculties,  A classlc
examBb ofthls  is the question of price approva| (Cases Nos
21 and 26). 
I
This is a probl.em whlch occurs frequently in elrica where
the domestic prices of everyday coneumer  goods lhave to be
approved by the authoritleg.  But although ttie authorities
are committed to respectlng the firms' flnanci{I balance,
they sornetimes, under pressure of public opini{n, postpone or
turn down price rises that rising costs have m{de inevitable.
One variation on this problem  whlch also efrdangers  the
firms in the end -  ls the suppreeslon of govefnment  eubsidies
without an accompanying authorization to incredse eales
prices (Case No 49)-3e
- Under:estlmating  the effect of these declsions
The host Goveinments often under-estimate the effect
of failing  to respect contractual  conmitmdnts' The
decisions are taken by authorittes  which are not really
au fait  with industry and its  condtraints  and their
consquences - 
which ari badly asseesed or not assessed
at all.
In the most benign caae€, there are (always exprensive)
delays in the implementition of projeqts if  the host
country adopts this klnd of attitude.  But the firm's
equilibrlum  can be upaet for a long time (Cases Nos 19
ana ZO) orthe project may fail  entirely (Cases Nos 13 and
24\.
In the end, the most serious effect of failing  to respect
commitments is,  obviously (indivldual cases apart), that
investorg lose confldence ln the word of the host country.
This attitude makes a bigger contributlon than others to
deteriorating the climate of inveetnent to whir:h the
businessmen attach eo much importance.
4,24 nestric
,n"ooffi-"ptershoutdinc1udeoneofthemainpractica1
consequences.of nationallsm  a restriction on the number
of expatriate staff the foreign firm may emptroy' This is  a
vital  issue for many lnvestor:s and the host countriee also
under-estimate its  imPortance. The Union of IndustrLes of
the European Community  (UNICE) even made this  one of the
subjects of the negottatlons for renewal of the Lom6
Convention. Restrictions and constralntE on expatriate staff
are of varylng tyPe:
-  quantltative restrictions laid down ln abeolute terms for
each firm  (as in Nigeria) or as a'percentage of the total
number of emPloYeesl
- restrictlons on salary transf'ers'  one of the many consequences
of the foreign exchange shortage ($4.14) i
-  complex exlt visa procedulee -  there are 28 f'ormalities to
complete if  an expatriate  wlahes to Leave cameroon' even on
a temporary basle- (for a business trip,  holidays or sick leave);-  the as$imilation of heads
with the result that they
oases of dispute with the
any special difficulties
etc);
-35-
of firms to social representatftves,
can be used as rrhostagestr in
Government and where there are
(delayed payhent, bankruptcy
In almost all  cases (Zaire, Nigeria, Kenya etc),  firms
complain about the extremely long time it  takes to obtain
the requisite authoriaations. Iley think these procedures
(or-policles) are partfeulqFfli r-r+-"onbeived as they
already keep their expatrlate etaff to a minimum because of
the very high costs lnvolved.
Although needs seem to be catered for overall, there are
rnany individual cases that pose insurmountabLe problems for
small and medium-sized businesses  (Case No Ib).
4.25 Restrictions on retunns on - foreign caoital
The polltical  discussion about the foreign economic presence
crops up again when it  comes to paying earnings on foreign capital.
Although foreign capital  ie  welcome, the developlng  countries
obviouely try  to contain  outgoing foreign exchange, with a
whole series of  restrictive  measureg as a result:
-  Maximum rates
Some groups of  developing  countries have taken a deliberate
stand here -  the Andean Pact, for  example,  whose melbers
Iimited the paynent crf retur.r.lsrorr.foleign,oqiE  L,*o Id%, (Iead'ne
the wlthdrawal of Chile, which wanted to attracted  investors
at all  costs).
Measures of  this  kind are seen as particularly  restrictive
by the firrns, which are unwilling  to run the risk  of  investlng
in'a  developing country unless they can hope to  make
proportionally high profite.  The developing countries thus
seem to be giving themselves the rtght  to  lnspect what they
consider to be rrfalril  capltal  repayments, using criteria  that
have nothlng to do wlth any industrlal  logic
_ ffqgessrve- tax on trangfers
These transfers are equated with personal income.
to-36-
Manipulation of the exchange rate
This teads to (sometimes heavy) penalizatlon ofl
repatriated profits.
Blockaee of total tranefere
- 
beyond the amount of capltal invested plus a dividend
fixed by the Government.
The officially  authorized transfers are also blocked, de facto,
by the ldck of forelgn exchange. the ACP countr5.es, particularly
thoge ln Afrlca, are often nentioned in thi.s connection. It
is,  for example, more than IO years since any divldends have been
able to be transferred out of Zaire.
The IFO study mentloned earlier puts the constraints linked
to the 'transfer of dividends in tfitrA place in L2 countries'of
Africa (including'tO ACP- couhtfies).Theee  sarne constraints only
get into 7th place'in Latln America and lSth place in Asla
Annexe XVI).
4.26 Protectionist  measures
The presence br absence) of euch measures may work against
productive  Local firms.  The probleme llnked to the absence.
of adequate protectionist measures or to a failure to apply
them properly have already been investigated ($ 4.12). Polltically
speaking,'  certaln  protectiontst measures are intended to
encourage local production by llmiting imports of foreign
equipment or raw materials.  The aim of the policy is laudable'
but it  is not always,'appl*6d,n&rthe requisite flexibility  and
often penalizes local lnduetry as a result.
One classic measure ls to ban irnports of products that are
rrsimilarrr to tt,rose made locally (bs in,  for example' Kenya).
The interpretation of euch. a text ls often subJect to debate
between the businessman and the Government and j.t is not easy
to furnish proof one way or the other.  General-ly speaking'
inVestors conplain about the poor quality of local input and
equipment that people try to force on them -  or about their
unsuitability for prodtrctloli deniahils {Annexe XVII).-37-
Clearly, the firmsr degree of sesitiviff to  this problem
will  depend on the particular specifications of their
area of activity.  But thle type of constraint still
comea in fourth, eapecially ln Afrlca and Aeia (and only
in lOth place in Latin America - 
Annexe XVI).
4.27 Restrictions due to economic policy
This type of restriction can take various fonms of unequal
importance as far as the firm is concerned. It  is nonetheless
seen as an obstacle to industrial cooperation by potential
investors in that it  conslderably restrlcts the foreign firm's
potential fleld of interventlon.
The main restrictions under thls headlng are the linitcl
which  the national development  plan places on the activity
of foreign firms.  They may be of two kinde:
- geographlcgl,  ln whlch case foreign investors are channelled
into certain regione whlch'the Government, for purely political
reasone, considers to have prlorlty,  atrthough, economically
speaking, they offer only medlocre opportunltiee  for development.
This is a fairly  common eltuatlon in the countrbs of black
Africa where the Presidentrs vlllage and the surounding area
are often privileged tn defiance of any economic logic and
foreign firms are sent regardless of any preference for another
zone. In other casec, the oppoeite policy obtains and whole
regions are virtually  out of bounde to foreign firms (usually
when they offer particular\y  attractive development  prospects).
Free zonea are worth partlcular attentlon here.  The rnany rnaterial
advantage  tax conceesiong, exemption'fnom  customs duties,
credit facllities,  lnfrastnu,cture and  offered to
investors in these zonea conatitute a real, but not decislve,
attraction.  But they often force investorg to set up in what
is a geographj.cally  rather unfavourabl-e  area that may be a long*38-
way from agricuftural or minlng zones (the Dakar f:nee
industrial zone, for example), or short on infrastructure
(as in Sous, in Tunisia, where the land agency wanted to'
force an investor to set up before the requisite facilities
were available);
- sectoral.  Economic policy, generally the Development
Plan or the Investment Code, can also help encourage foreign
firms take an interest in certain ar€aa 
- 
otr at least ban
entry to certain sectore (heavy industryr for exanple'
the arms trade or external trade).  In Eorne cageg' the ban
wlll  apply to the only sectors that are really a profltable
proposltion as far as foreign lnvestors are con4erned (as with
uranium in Niger).  It  should come as no surprise in this
situation (which nay be polltlcally  Justified) to see that
the area left  free for industrlal cooperation is considerably
reduced.
I,rjhatever the type of restriction'  the reeult ls usually the sane
the constraints lead to foreign capital betng channelled to
sectors and regione where its  social producivlty is  thought to be
.ihe greatest.  For the investor, on the other hand, the marginal
effectiveness  of capital in these places ig deened to be below
tkre acceptable ninimum.
4,.28 Eglorce4 assi.gnrnenl of capital  :
-eome developing countries  but not, apparently' the ACPg '-
ha'.re adopted lawe rlhereby aII or part of the foreign capital has to
-"oe assigned to nationals (or the'Government) after a'certain
period hae elapsed.  This is the pollcy of the Andean Pact and
some countries of Asia and the Middle East.
$uch measures have two different kinds of consequences for
j. ndustrial cooperation :-39-
-  fmplementation of the policy
Foreign investors are often faced with many problems:
. assignent prices fixed arbitrarily  by the
Government, generally to the detrlment of the
seller;
. bans on selllng capltal on the free market;
. impoasibility of flndlng a taker, ln which case a
flrm which had planned lte  flnanclal affairs in the
tight of a sale (enforced by the lnveetment code)
will  be in difficulties.
- Attitude of the investors
This policy often conflicts with the ains of heatthy
industrial cooperation, as tt  forces the foreign firms
to think in terms of short-term profits rather than
long-term growth. One busineaa aummed up the effect of
these measures as follows:  "They force an investor with
a policy that Is favounable to the host country to adopt
an attitude that is unfavourable to itr'.
4.?9 Bans on firms asslsting each other
There are often penalties for and sometimes bans on foreign
firms already in existence taking shares in other foreign
or national firms in'the same host country.
Restrictions of this type frequently  .prsvent" (national or forelgn) firmsexpandlng  (see Caee No 6) or or put them out of business.
4,2gI  National-izatlon,/exoropriation
Contrary to what one might expect, the risk of a foreign
firm in a developing country being expropriated or nationalized
is in fact rather small  and it  j"s seen,as such by the firms.
It  comes in last (L7th) on the .Iist of constraints to
industrial cooperation which the IFO drew up for Africa and
Asia and in 13th place for Latin America (Annexe XVI).  After-40-
the wave of nationalizations that followed the independence
of many of the developing countriee in the 60s, most of
which concerned mining and agriculture (Case No 1), industry
has, generally speaking,  been free of such State intervention
against private interests
Hbwever, all  investors are still  very keen on the idea of
guaranteelng their capltal..  The professional organizations
(especial"Iy UNICB) reflect their memberg! concern and
particularly deplore the fact that Lome L and II  did not
'include any ACP commitment to protect prXvate European
investments  (Annexe XVIII),  Undeniably' the refusal to
make such a commitment  has had a negatlve effect on industrial
cooperation.  UNICE places a great deal of inportance  on
investment prbtection clauges being included ln the new
Convention and it  is to be hoped that Lom6 III  will  assuage
the fears of the European Lnvestors on thie point.
. Note that the Pisani memorandum of 4 QCtober  19t13 also
proposes that there be agreement  on financial arrd legal
' provisions to provide backing and guarantees to reassure and
encourage the private investor and put the host country in a
safer position.
It  is also worth noting here that the risk of nationalization,
whlch is already fairly  small in the ACP Group, is  apparently
diminbhing even fufther, wlth the current trend  to
privatize public firrns that are often in dlfficr.rlty.
4.3 Cultural constraints
Thie general term covers a serieg of conetraints atfendant
on .a certain misunderstanding  -  or under-estination -  of
induetry on the part of the ACP countries.  Thie difference
in  approach between North and South may'take on a
number of forms, all  of them conetltutlng constraints on
industrial cooperatlon.  .
4.3L Confusion between industrial coop_eratlon  and technical
assistance
Technical assistance is  defined here as providing a
Government or a firm with advieory staff  (generally  as part-4L-
of bilateral or multilateral aid programmee).  Seen
from the South, thls assistance can sometines be
confused wlth industrial cooperation,  with the European
businessmen being seen as the securar arm of deveropment aid.  The confusion is often matntained by the techni.cal
assistance officers themselves, who do not always have
the requisite industrial skills  or are acting from ideological convictlons.  Whether consciously or not,
many of the authoritles of ex-European col0nies tend to
see industrial cooperation.aa fair  returns _  or even a degree of compensation -  that rebalancee the international
economic orden without wlshing to deny the value of this argument, the firms have quite another way of looking at. it.  Their services depend on stringent management,  in line with the demands of the economy rather than ideology.
To put it  plainly, a firm, even if  it  is involved in industrial cooperation,  must make a profit  and it  cannot, in the long term, give more than it  gete back.
In practice, a forelgn firn  whlch succeeds in a developing
country is all  too often seen as an endless source of tax lncome or a non-profit-making  vocattonal training institute.  In the long run, exaggerated  government
demands harm the management of the firm.  They place an indirect burden on it  and they can put it  in difficulties  and they are always a brake on expansion  and can dlscourege potential investore.
4.32 A short-term view
rndustry usually demands short-term sacrlfices  for  long-term
benefits,  but this  is  not always obvious to the developing
countries, where there is  a tendency to look for  a quick
proflt  in  both public and private  sectors.
This attitude  is  reflected  in  the crlteria  for  approval of industrial  projects at national level.  Most of  the ACp countries (particularly  those in Africa)  have established  an industrial  project  approval procedure whlch decides on the granting of the advantages offered by the investment  code. fn most cases, approval is  glven or refused more in  the light  of a failure  to bring in  rmmedlate earnlngs (particularry
in  the ehape of  customs dutiee) tnan ofany long-1u"r beneflts-42-
to the economy.
In the private sector, all  European operators regret
that partnerg'in the host gountries tend to be
invesiors (usually from the lmport trade) who are
seeking quick profits with no rlsk and no effort -
which ls at variance with a proper lndustrial approach.
4.33 Mieunderetanding of what indugtry meang
This section on cultural congtraints  ehould include the
local authorities' minsunderstandilS of what an industrial
project ie.  Formally, apeaking, maintenance and' repairs
are-services and not the subject of particular incentives'
but they are vltal  to any industry and the key to
survival in many cages. Some developrnent  banks (the CCCE
and DEG, for example) lnelst that the lndustrialists are
the only people who can make a proper Job of maintenance
in industry.  So certain investors have spent months on
costly manoeuvres  and negotiatlons trylng to convince
certain Governnents that their proJect is an industrial
one and therefore eliglble for the advantagss of the
investnent code (Case Nos 29 and 30).
Al.though it  is not poesible to put'a figure on the
attendant loss of earnings, it  l.e clear that a large
number of projects have not beeri implemented  because they
were not recognized as industrlal oh€a. Free zone
atdug,igrefused  (ln.Tunisla' for example)to repair and
maintenance firms, although the activity is an essentlal'
one which helpe butld up the lndustrial fabric'
4,34
foreisn Partner
Ttedevelopment of what ie ueually called the transfer of
technolog5l  in the broadest Benae of the tsrrn - 
over
the past year or two has aroused (sonetimes well-founded)-43-
suspicions in  the developing countries as to the real
value of what is  being transferred.  As a resuft,  there
is  a fairly  general wariness about paying for  any
'rinvisible"  contribution from foreign firms'  whether it
be holdings in  a joint  venture or servicds provided as
part of  industr'ial  cooperation.  This is  aimed at  dues
for  licences and franchises in particular,  but the cost
of studies and management and payment for  industrial
know-how are also included.
This wariness is  reflected  in  a whole battery  of  l"aws and
regulation ranging from  very strict  control of  the dues
(as ln Mexico) to taxing of the cost of assiSance  and
studies bitled  by foreign companies  (ln  Carneroon' the
tax is  I5%).
Even the private sector in  the host countries does not
escape and Northern firms often find  it  difficult  to get
their  Southern partners to admit the value of  these non-
tangible contributions  (Case No 1-4).
This is  a fundamental constraint'  for  SMEs especially'
for  they depend nore than the big firms on technology
and know-how they have spent a long time perfecting and
which ie often their  main worth, lf  not their  subgtance.
Many of  them hesitate to set up in  countries which
contest the value of  this  technolog5r and fear that  they
will  not be properly paid and lose their  control as well.
The possibi.Iity  of making up for  any losses by overcharging
for  equipment is  not very satisfactory  and does not solve
the basic problem (study costs are commonly incorporated
in  the oost of  equipment).
4.35  Preference for  prestlge investments
The developing countriesr view of  industry is  often distorted
by the best-known examples -i.e.  the very big companies.
In both national and private  sectors' there is  a strong
temptation to go through the various stages of  industrialization
with arnbitious ideas -  whlle the market is  smalt (see $ 4.f.2)
and there is  often a lack of  lnfraetructure  and human resources.
Workshops  and small factories,  whJ.ch play an esgential part  in
the industrialized  countries'  are rather looked down on in
the devel"oping countries and their  importance is  certainly
under-estimated.-44-
When it  was set up and for  seven ydars after  tha!'  the
Dakar industriat  free zgne lay down employment thresholds
(2OO and then IOO jobs for  Senegalese) and minimum
investment figureb (Cnef 2OO million  and then CFAF 1oo
mitIion)for'peop1ewantingauthorization.Inspiteof
the disastrous record of  firms settling  in  the 'zone' i!
was difficult  to convince the Government to do away with
irt.  irrt""ttolds because it  did rrot want Senegal to  become
an industrial  rrflag of conveniencerr.  In nrany of  the
odt-|t""i"i"",  European investors have been led to build 
-
bigger factories  than they needed under pressure from their
p.itnut"  or the Governnient of the host country'  In
Mauritania, for  example, the lnvestment code stipulates  a
minimum of FF f.3  million,  wh,ich- often forces investors to
over-estimate tnir';-;:;;iJ"i  atiit b-enal-izes small proj ecss too )
As weII as  going in  for  over-Iarge industrial  projects'
the developing countries also tend to privilege  jobs in
administration and management (offices)  ra'ther than in
production (workshops).  This is  another example of  a
nisunderstandlng  ofl industrial  realities  due to  cultural
factors -  but it  results'  very practically,  in  decisions
that are often coStly if  not fatal  for  the industrlal
proj ect.
4. 4. Institutional cons-tra:!n'!g
4.4L  Inadequate  transparency
Northern firms seeking to cooperate  wlth partners in  the
South often find  it  aifficutt  to get a clear picture of
whichinstitutionswillmakeworthwhilecontacts.Unless
theyalreadyhaveathoroughknowtedgeofthehostcountry'
businessmen can easily feel  lost  when faceld with a large
number of  instituttons  with ilI-defined  functions and
sometimes speaking a different  language' There may be' for
exanple:
-  a foreign investment promotion bodyi
-  a MinistrY of  IndustrY;
-  a promotion body for  small industries;'
-  a DevefoPment  Bank;
-  industrial  free zones;
-  btc-45-
It  is  even fairly  common for  there to be a certain
amount of  competition between these organizations.
At best, the businessman will  find  his way about at
the expense of  a great deal of  time and energy.  At
worst,  he will  glve up, discouraged by the dlfficulty
of getting the requisite  information and the vital
support of  the loeal authorities.
This situation  is  not just  a manifestation of  econornic
under-development. Contrary to what onemight think,
it  is  not the least  developed countries that  display
this  lack of  institutional  transparency.  This is
something that  crops up more in  intermediate  countries
like  Egypt.  Countries which have realized they have
a problem have brought in  what is  called the 'tsingle
windowil, i.e.  a body that centralizes all  the
formalities  a foreign investor has to complete and
serves as a focus.  The best example of  this  is  no
doubt API, the Tunisian lnvestment promotion agency.
European investors often mention API and sa3r they would
Iike  other countries to set up sonething along the same
I ines .
4.42 Instability
The developing countries are young states and, generally
speaking, their  institutions  are changeable. This
instability  is  not without iits consequences for  industrial
cooperation 
- 
which demands a certain contlnuity  (particularly
as far  as legislation  and taxation are concerned),  which is 
, often lacking.  Thj.s instability  is  felt  at  two levels:
-  General policy
Legislative insecurity,  largely  due to institutional  changes,
came second on the list  of  constraints for  Gernan businessmen
in  the IFO survey (Annexe.XVI).  European firms are unanimous
in  saying that,  although they are willing  to accept
investment restrictions  (provlded they are clearly  laid  down
in  advance), they find  i.t  very difficult  to cope with changes
after  their  project has been implemented.-46-
The firms'  main complaints  here are about taxation'
It  is  by no means rare to see the rate of  tax in
force when, the flrm sets up suddenly shoot r.rp a few
years later  (Case No 38).  When the profitability
of many industrial  cooperation projects is  only
marginal, few firns  can cope with tax increases of  this
kind without endangering their  financial  baXance.
This instability  also occurs with custons drrties,
exchange .rate regrrlrii.one, recruitment and the
employment of expatriates and sdlaibes. In  extreme
cacies, it  leads to the non-fulftlment of  government
connitments (see S 4.23) or the dropping of certain
projects (Case N' IO).  At the llmit,  local
Iegislation  may pnohibit a firm  frorn pleading against
the Government (as in  Somalia).
The projects
Instability  is  reflected  in  the industrial  projects
themselves by one-off measures, Buch a8:
.  changes in  status I
.  approval of a competitive project,  in  spite  of
assurances to the contrary;
.  refusal to approve Prices;
. a failure  to respect contractual  commitments;
.  constraints  on the employment of  local  o:r expatriate
staff;
.  etc.
These are discussed in various sections of  this  report.-47-
4.5 Administrative  conetraints
4. 51
No country has a monopoly. on bureaucracy,  but the
developing countries have far  more red tape than the rest.  In industrial  cooperation, this  results in  extra costs for  the firms,  not to mention
administrative probLems.
In the IFO survey nentioned earlier,  the constraints Iinked to relatione with the authorities  are put in firstplace  in all  the regions of the South (Annexe XVI). There seem to be two reasons for  this:
-  the relative  inexperience of  authorities  that  are still  in  their  infancy and subject to considerable political  pressure;
-  a failure  to graspthe nature of industry,  for  cu,l,tural
reasons (see $ 4.3).
As time goes by, the problems  encountered with the authorities  seem to  increase.  During the negotiating period, the talks,  which are at a fairly  high level, take place in  good conditions, but the further  people
go into  detail  and down the hierarchy 
-  the harder the decisions are and the longer they take.  The firms complain about the time the attendant procedure takes, as two or three years may often be needed to negotiate with different  departments  to get approval.
These delays are often due to nothing nore than organizational problems.  In Cameroon, for  example, the approvals conmittee should, in  theory, meet lwice a year to  Look at applications from foreign investors
which is  not much.  But in  fact,  as it  is  difficult to get the many members of this  committee together, it only meets once q year, so a project  may have to wait a year for  an approval decision.  This country also requires applicants to  submit ZO copies of their  approval dossier 
- 
which increases the danger of  inforrnation being leaked to competitors.
During the operational phase of  the project,  administrative delays are particularly  common with:-48-
-  input import authorizations;
-  price approval (see $ 4.23)i
-  the employment of expatriate staff.
Cases Nos l,  34 and 44 illustrate  some of  these constraints,
4.52  Lack of  coordination
The authorities  in  the developing countries sometimes  seem
to implement contradictory policies.  This is  the result  of
the politi.cal  debate between the partisans and adversaries
of foreign investment (see $ 4.21) and of a certain  lack of
organization as well.
The Ministry of Industryrs authorization  may well be refused
by the Ministry of Finance when it  comes to  importing
eguipment, for  example.  Two ministries  may disagree as to
the form' an lnvestment should take (Caee No 45).  . The
Government may. even agree to two competitive  projects when
the market can only handle one (Case No l2).  In other
cases;. the Goverment  may deem unacceptable something it  in
fact  asked for  previously (Case No 39).  Industrial  promotion
organizations  often encourage projects that  capitalize  on
natural resources without bothering about whether these
resources are available  (Cases Nos 3,4 and 50).
4.53  Interference in  the firms
Ci"vil servants in  the developing countries  sometimes
interfere  in  the management  ofafirm  set up locally,  against
its  wishes.  They may do this  because they are over-zealous,
because they are unfamlliar with the realities  of  industry or
because of political  considerations.
This attitude,  ealled real  interference, is  entirely
unwelcome to foreign investors, who find  it  runaceptable and
dangerous for  the life  of  their  firms
Interference may be of  many kinds.  For example:-49-
-  demands as to the composition of  the board (in  Kenya,
for  example, the State is  a minority shareholder, with
2O% of  the shares, but demands to chair the board);
-  untimely approaches to  the management to criticize  the
way the firm is  being run (Case No 41);
-  restrictions  on the directorrs  powers (Case No 31);
-  I'advice'r to take on unskilled staff  ;
-  barriers  to the controls requested by the foreign
partner (access to  informati.on,  meetings of the board).
The management  of  any firm  must be the firm's  affair  alone
and can in no case be shared.  Any outside intervention
(particuLarly of an administrdive  nature) is  roundly
condemned and it  loses the host country a great deal of
its  international  credit.
4.54  Corruption
Coruption,  in  the broadest sense of the term, is  not
confined to the developing countries, but they, nore than others,
tavetteconditirns for  it  to develop - 
and at all" levels.
Because of all  the red tape mentioned earlier  (S 4.51),
many decisions and authorizations cannot be obtained
without rrcompensationrr,  particularly  since the civiL  service
pay is  often so poor.  These itlicit  payments ultimately
become the oil  that  is  vital  to  the workings of any firm.
While they are acceptable and able to be coped with on a
smal-l scale, they become a real millstone when failure  to
pay causes a firm  to seize up, because they have become,
in  a way, institutionalized.
Corruption also opens the way for  all  sorts of interventions
from,,(foreign  and local)  competitorsr as Case No 33 shows.F1GURE II -
Tctal potential. flow
of direct  investments
-50-
TOTAL FLOW OF DIRECT INVESTMENTS  TO HOST COUNTRY
BY DEGREE  OF RESTRICTION  ON ENTRY
hlgh
Degree of restrictlon
on entry of direct
investments
P = Point beyond which potential  investors begin
to see other investment opportunities in  a
more favourable light.
Source: Jos6 De'La Torre -  Foreign Investment and Econornic
Developmgnt; ConfLict and Negotiation -  1981.-51-
4.6 Legal constraints
4.6L  Unsuitabl.e legislation
In many cases, the laws of the developing countries
do not seem to fit  in  with the context of  industrial
cooperation.  . Investnent incentives and restrictions
are often too legal  in nature and do not always meet
the needs of  an industrial  firm.
The SMEs, in particular,  complain that  this  legislation
has been brought in  to contain the power of  the
transnationals and that  it  i.s unsuitable for  small and
medium-size.d businesses I
From another point of view, as we saw earlier,($  4.33),
investment codes often ignore industrial  services.  The
same goes for  used eguipment, which is  often refused
the usual exemption, in  spite of  the fact  that  it  can be
perfectly  suitable  for  conditions in  the host country.
Generally speaking, it  is  true to  say that  the more the
Government  restricts  the freedon of the foreign investor,
the less that  investor will  be attracted by the country
i-n question.  His degree of  interest  in  a given country
will  depend on the balance between constraint and
attraction  (FigureII),  The more comparative advantages a countny has, the readier the foreign firns  will  be to
accept i"estrictions.  The ACP countries as a whole
have to be seen as not very attractive  here, so the
degree of constraints and restrictions  ought by rights  to
be fairly  small.  But in many cases, it  is,  in  the eyes
of  the businessmen themselves, out of all  proportion
with the interest  of  an industrial  cooperation project.
4.62  Inadequate protection for  property
In spite of  the low risk  of nationalization  or expropriation
($ a.Zg),  there are still  attacks on land and buildings and
industrjal  property in  many of  the developing countriee.-52-
The attaoks on land and buildings may be macle in  a
number of ways, but they usually involve  the priqe of
what is  provided being  fixed  in  a manner that  is
both arbitrary  and a disadvantage to the firm.  This
problem is  particularly  acute in  that  in  mos't cases
there are no properly equipped industrial  p1ots.
When a firm  is  attracted by the free zone status,
it  often has a plot  forced upon it  at a prir:e which
does not always bear any relation  to its  ac'bual value.
In other cases, it  may be a qLrestion of  disguised
expropriation, with the Government putting  the buying
price so high that the firm r*anting to  take it  cannot
accept it  (Case No 5).
!
When it  comes to industri.al property, dialogue can be
hard for the firms,  for  which it  is  veritable  capltal,
and the Governments,  which contest its  value (see also
S 4.34).  The SMEs, in particular,  are very attached
to  their  know-how, which in  most cases cannot be
patenled, but which is  their  real  asget.
This fear which firms have of  seeing their  industrial
property poorly protected or not protected at all
is  a strong brake on the transfer of technology.  Many
firms,  even very-big ones, prefer to lose a market than
Io,ee control over their  product  (Coca-Cola preferred
to lose the vast Indian market rather  than give its
manufacturing secrets to a local  firm).
4. 63  Excess_ive  legaliF.m
Because they.very often lack the relevant technical
knowledge, the authorities  in  the developing  countries
deliberatej.y hide behind a veritable  barrage of  Jaws
and regulations destined to protect the host country from
any abuse from.the foreign firms.
This attltude  often leads to excessive legalism, resulting
in  a pointless obscuring of the texts or,  in  many cases,
to a restrictive  interpretation  of  them (Case No 17).-53-
Texts that are lacking in precision or difficult  to
understand are certainly  open to  any interpretation
which is  flne  for  the authorities,  which are
calling  the tune, but not for  the firms.
Without wishing to criticize  the developing countries
here, the texts  are interpreted generously  and
favourably for  the firms  while the project  is  being
promoted (so as to attrac,t the investor)  and
restrictively  once the investment decision has been
taken.  European firms involved in  industrial
cooperation thus often get the impression that  they
have been caught in  a trap.  The negative effects
(counter publicity  and a loss of goodwill) of this
attitude  are, clearly,  sizeabl,e and lasting.
4.64 Refusal- of  foreign arbitratign
The question of arbitration  is  not a fundamental  one,
but it  signals  a certain difference in  the conception
of  industrial  cooperation between North and South.
In practice,  it  can be said that,  if  an industrial
cooperation scheme gets to the arbitration  stage, then
it  has had its  day.  It  is  unthinkable  for  partners
who have stood on opposite sides of the court to
collaborate again.  So the aim of  arbitration  can only
be to share out what remains and to obtain recognltion
for  each partyrs rights
Psychologically speaking, however, arbitration  clauses
have their  importance for  Northern firms during the
run up to and negotiations for  an industrial  cooperation
project.  But many investors are shocked at  the attitude
of  many developing  countries, which is  to refuse foreign
arbitration(as  in Algeria),  to refuse mernbership  of  the
International  Convention on the settlement of  investment
differences (as in  the countries of Latin America) or to
refuse to include investment protection clauses (as with
the ACP countries and the.Conventions of  Lom6 I  and II).
There is  a symbolic but important value attached to  the
countries of' the South agreeing to international
arbitration  and the investors take notice of  it,  even if
it  is  not their  prime concern.-54-
4.7 Technical constraints
4.7L  Shortaee of skilled  labour
Most of the firms asked about industrial  cooperation
with the developing countries mention the shortage of
workers who are qualified  or meet 'their  partlcular
specifications.  This ls  a problems that  occurs in
both production and management.
In production,  the biggest shortage is  of  foremen and
skill.ed workers.  The ACP countries, partidularly  those
in Africa,  seem to be far  less productive than the countries
of Asia and Latin Arnerica in  this  respect.  Generally
speaking, a firm which. sets up in a developing country has
to dount with the sort  of productivity  that  is  far  lower
than in Europe - 
'which means there has to  be a considerable
dlfference in  wage levels to  compensate.
Take Tunisia, where productivity  is  among the highest in
Africa.  In  cornparison with the parent firms in  Europe'
the productivity  of 44 firms there was an average 66% in
textiles,  8.t% in electronics and 61% elsewhere in  1982.
The difficulty  is  that  this  low producfi-vity is  not just  a
que.stion of qualifications.  It  also has to do wlth the
cultural  and social environment.  One firm  trained
Senegalese workers in  France and obtained  very satsifactory
reSults (about 8O-9O% of  the output of a European worker),
by the end of the course' but six  months after  the trainees
returned to Dakar, their  output was down to  about 3O%.
It  is  also common to see workers trained by a firm  abroad
thinking they are over-qualified for  their  jobs and
refusing to accept the post for  which they were trained  (Case
No 24).  Lastty,  absenteelsm ls  a maJor constraint in
management  in  the developlng countries.-55-
4.72  Inadequate quality  of  local  input
The fact  that  firms are often forced to get their  supplies
locally  was mentioned earlier  (S 4.26).  This poses what
can be very serious probtems with production, as input
(raw mat,erials, semi-finished products, tools and other
equipment)  bought locally  does not always meet the firms'
specifications.
using this input may lead to poorer quality and more expensive products.  This situation is particularty serious when it is  destined for export.
4.73  Communications problems
Major communications problems at different  levels  cause
extra-contractual costs for  industriat  cooperation schemes.
They are:
-  Transport
Distance  and even access to the host country rnay
problematical if  that  country is  a long way away
poorly served.  This is  the case, obviouslyr of
countries of the Pacific,  which are a long way
but it  also applies to  some of the countries of
-  Post and telecommunications
Postal services and even the tetephone and telex  do not
always work reliably  in  the developing countries.
In both these cases, there is  often a high risk  of  delay,
l-oss and theft  in addition to the other problems a).ready
mentioned.
be
and
the
from Europe,
Africa  too.-56-
5.  TYPOLOGY  OF CONSTRAINTS  ON INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
5.1 Bv importance of constraint
5.1-1 Relative importance
The analysis of the 35 constraints set out in  the basic
typology ($ a above) can be classified  initialty  according
to relative  importance.  They seem to  faII  into  two
categories - 
major and Secondary.
-  Major constraints
This group. contains slightly  more than haff  the constraints
detected.  2o of  them can in  fact  be considered as serious
obstaicles to  industrial  cooperation and some of  thern are
even totally  disuasive (see 5.1-2).  These 20 rnain
constraints  can only be classified  in  an approximate  manner.
Table XI beLow gives a rough list  (in  decreasing order of
importance) - 
which is  not absolute and which may vary
from one country, period or date to  another.
Three constraints, which are important because they are
fundamental-, do not appear on the list  because of  the
difficulty  of quantifying their  effect  on the foreign
investorsr decision-making.  These constraints are:
.  weak international  activity,  which is  both the cause
and effect  of. the small flow of  inveStment to the biggest
number of  devel-oping countries, particularXy.the  ACP
nations;
.  the internal  debate on the role of  foreign investors and
on the attitude  to be adopted towards them;
. the low priority  on industry.-57-
TAprE__Il -  rNpusTRrAL  COOPERATTON BETWEEN  FrRMS _
MAJOR CONSTRAINTS
-  narrowness of  the market
-  cost of  input
-  lnstitutional  instabllitv
-  shortage of  foreign exchlnge
:  Lack of  loqal businessmen
-  shortage of  skilled  labour
-  failure  to respect contractual  commitments
-  shortage of  means for  financing
-  protectionist  measures
-  absence of  any industrial  fabric
-  slow, arbitrary  decision_making.
-  inadequately transparent institutions
-  inadequate quality of local  input
-  employnent restrictions
-  restrictions  due to  economic policy
-  wariness about non-tangible contributions
-  interference  in  the life  of the firms
-  unsuitabLe legislation
-  inadequate protectlon of property
-  comnunication  problems
CONSTRAINTS-58-
The effects of  these last  two political  bonstraints may
hare a great deal of,  little  or no influence on the
climate of  investment in  any given country.
Overall - 
and this  is  no surprise - 
it  emerges that
the main obstacles to  industrial  cooperation are
structural  and economic and the administratlive,  legal
and, to a certain exten! technical constraints are
secondary.  This analysis is,  generally speaking,
confinned by the IFO eurvey (Annexe XVI).
Secondary constraints
l/tore surpriFing are some of  the other L5 constraints
not Iisted  in  the previous cbtegory  and which are'of
far  less importance in  the eybs of 'the inverstors.
But they are there, nonetheless, and in  some cases they
have been the main cause of fallure  or con$iderable
diffictr.lties  for  European firms in  certain  countriea
(Cases N"s I , 3, 4, 29, 30 and 45).  But they are
still  far  less important.than  might at'fir$t  be thought
and, in any case, they occur far  less often in  the
businessmen's statement of  their  concerns. It  is  more
likely  that this  type of constraint has been typical  of
one or two countries at a specific  time in  their  polilical
and economic history -  but it  leads to real  trauma for
many investors.  The main thing is  the fear of  the
nationalization or expropriation that  has hit  some European
firms'in  sensitive sectors of  the economy (energy, mining
and ggriculture).  The fact  that operators now mention this
type of constraint far  less often poi;nts to a certain
improvement  in the tndustrial  sensitivity  of the ACP countries,
if  not in their  political  proclamations, wlrlch often'lag
behind economic reality
Table XIf  givcs the secondary constraints,  although it  has
not been possible to put them in order of pr:Lority.-59-
The table omits two sorts of constraints which are
difficult  to classify  because of  their  very nature.
They are:
-  the corfusion between industrial  cooperation and
technical assistance;
-  the host countries'  short-tern view. of  things.
The cul-tural nature of  these obstacles clearly  makes
them difficult  to assegs and their  respective influence
on investment patterns j,s impossibfe to measure.
TABLE XII  -  INDUSTRIAL  COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS _
SECONDARY  CONSTRAINTS
-  ignorance of what lndustr.y involves
-  restrictions  on returns on  foreign capital
-  forced assignment of capital
-  bans on take-overs
-  nati onal- ization/ expropri ation
-  preference for  prestige investments
-  poor coordination between different  authorities
-  corruption
-  excessive  legalism
-  refusal of  foreign arbitration L I-60-
5.I2  Degree of obstnuction
The different  constraints on industrial  cooperation
seem to be able to be divided into  three categories
according to effect  bn the.attitude  of  foreign
investors.
The degree to which they obstruct the cooperation
process varies on a scale of 3:L (considerable'
average or small, in  decreasing order -  Table XIII).
fhis  classification  cannot be absolute and some
constraints  may figure  in one, two or even all  three
categories, according to their  importance in the eyes
of  the investor.
- 3rd desree -  prohibitive  constraints
This group contains obstacles of different  types' but
mainly structural  ones.  The absence of a big enough
(domestic or regional) market is  clearly  a cause of
total  blockage of a proj,ect of  any sort,  regardless
of the climate of  investment.  And the same may go
for  the cost of  input,  particularly  with export
schemes. Institutionally  Speaking, instability  (be
it  politic.al,  administraive or leqal)  will,  if  it  is
a constant, have a similar  sort  of effect.
-  2nd degree -  dissuasive.constraints
A greater number of obstacles can be considered to  be
dissuasive or discouraging.  They . are  mainly
structural  and political  in kind.  Shortages of  foreign
exchange or local  businessmen are typical  of  these
constraints,which obstruct  cooperation to an average
degree. One or two technical problems (connected
with local  labour and input)  are fairly  typical  of  this
category.
-  Lst degree -  limiting  constraints
This group contains all  the other constraints recorded
the majority of  them, ln  fact.  Their effect  on
the investor's decision wilI  depend on his particular-61-
TABLE XIII  .  INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS -  CONSTRAINTS,
BY DEGREE OF OBSTRUCTION  IN THE INVESTMENT  DECISION
(3 = considerable, 2 = &Verag€r I  = small)
CONSTRAINTS
].. STRUCTURAL
I.1  minimal international  attraction  x
I.2  narrowneger of  the market  x
I.3  cost of  input  x
I.4  shortage of  foreign exchange
1.5 shortage of  Local businessmen
1.6 shortage of  'project  financing  means
I.7  no industrial  fabric
POLITICAL
2.1 internal  debate on foreign inveBfments x
2.2 low priority  on industry
2.3 failure  to respect commitnents
2.4 restrictions  on employment
2.5 restrictions  on returns on capital,
2.6 protectionist  measures
2.7 restrictions  due to  economic policy
2.8 enforced assignment of capital
2.9 ban on take-overs
2. 91 nationali zation/expropniation
CULTURAL
3.1  confusion between industrial  cooperation
and technical assistance
3.2  Short-term vierus
3.3  ignorance of what industry involves
3.4  wariness about non-tangible contributions
3.5  preference for  prestige investrnents
INSTITUTIONAL
4.I  inadequate transparency
4.2  instability
ADMINlSTRATIVE
sJ--T"",  a"bTtrary decision-making
5.2  lack of  coordlnation
5.3  interference in  the firms
5.4  corruptlon
LEGAL
6.1- unsuitable legislation
6.2  inadequate protection of property
6.3  excessive legal.ism
6.4  refusal of  foreign arbitration
TECHNICAL
7.L  shortage of skilled  labour
7.2  poor quality  of  local  input
7,3  difficult  communications
z.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
J.
4.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
6.
.7
Source: P.Qrre.yrane (estjmate).-62-
criteria  and partly  on the sector of  activity  in
question ($ 5.4) or the host country ($ 5'5)'
Contrary to what one might expect at first,  although
Iegal,administrativeandevenpo}iticalconstraints
do a great deal to deteriorate the climate of
investment, they arB rarely  such as to obstruct a
project entirely  1f the b6sic condtions.(economic
ones mainly) are right.
The above typologSr reveals another plassification,  making 1t
possible to affect  certain obstacles (whether or not the'yseern
insurmountable) in the long run.
5.13 Possibility  of negotlating
strgctura] coEtraigts (aI1 structural constraints in the
Uasic Wpology except the shortage of means of financing :
Table xIV).  The key constraint in this category is'  of
seen from another angle, the above-mentioned cons'braints on
industrial  cooperation  can also be divided into  two categorles
in the light  of whether ttrey are negotiable or not -  i'e'
whether or not they depend on the will  of  individuals  in  the host
country.
Before going into this  classification  in  detail,  ite  relative
nature must be emphasized:
. a problem may be negotiable in  some cases'and non-negotiable
in others.  For example, a market may bp too narrow for  an
automobile factory but not for  a brewery.
.  A conslraint whichr. on the face of  it,  is  negotiable may cease
to be so if  it  is  combined with a number of other constraints
(shortage of qualified  labour plus employment restriction,  for
example).
-  Non-negotiable conetraintq
This group contains all  the obstacles that people can do
nothing  about and that pertain to basic data that  cannot
really  be altered,by any incenti,vs policy.  'fhese obstacles
are, essentially'  of  two kinds:-63-
TAELE XIV -  INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS -  NEGOTIABLE AND
NON-NEGOTIABLE  CONSTRAINTS
Sourqei P.Queyrane (estimate).
t
NON-NEGOTIABLE  CONSTRAINTS NEGOTIABLE CONSTRAINTS
.  STRUCTURAL I.  STRUCTURAL
I.I .small interrntiorat attracticn  T6-.@e  of project finarcing rneans
1.2 narrcruness of the narket
I.3 cet of irput
L.4 stpntage of fueign er<cha1ge
I.5 $ortqge  of lmal hsinesgnen
I.7 no irdustrial fabr.ic
2. POLITTCAL
2.L fnternal debat m foreign irvestnents
2.2 lov priority cn industry
2.3 failure to reqpect ccnfiftrents
2.4 restrictisrs cn erployrent
2.5 restrictians cn c4ital rettrrs
2.6 protecticllist  neasuu"es
2.7 r estricticrrs dre to ecdronlc pohcy
z:3ffimtof 
c4itar
2. 91 natianatizatiuy'erqprcpriation
3. qJLTJRAL
c..r- ccrnr.rstcn  oeqreen  lnousE]-€u
cocperaU.cn  & bchnical mistarae
3.2 shrt-term viqls
3.3 ign race of utrat ind'tsby  irnrolves
3.4 vrarirress abort rrcrrtangible cmtri-
buticre
3.5 prefercnce fcn prestige jrvestnents
4. II{ TTIIITICNAL
4.L  inadecptate trwrsarency
4.2  irstebili$
"  5. ADMINISIRATI\/E
5.1 sffiitrary  decisiqrnrakire
5.2 lad{ of ooordinatiqr
5.3 intenfererce  in the firns
5.4 co:n4pticn
6. LEGAL
6.1 rnsuitable legislation
6.2 lna@uate protecticn of prcpenty
6.3 excessive  legaliglll
.6.4 nefusal of foeigrl arbitratior
.  'IECTINICAL
7.1 shrortqge of skilled l&of
7.2 Wr  quali$l of lrcal irput
7.3 difficult ccrrnrrricaticns-64-
course'thenarrownessofthemarket,whi.ch'aSwe
have seen ($ 4'12),  on the face of  it  cuts a
;;;;"-"rtu."  of  ACP countries out of  the international
fight  to host foreign lnvestments'  The fact  that  there
4."  no adequate  domestic markets is  :ln itself
enough to  put an.investor off  a given coruntry'  The
search for  more conmercial  outlets  is  still 
"in 
fact
priority  number one for  practically  all  thB firmq'
This is  afso true,  but to a lesser extent'  of  the cost
ofthefactorsofproduction(lowproductivity).This
may have a definitive  effect  when the industrial
cooperation schene in  question is  export-oriented  and
the producing country has, of necessity' to  be
competitiv" "itn 
other potental host countries'
A study of a certain nirmber of cases has also shown the
.importance of  local  businesemen and how their  absence
can put off  the investor seeking an indtrstrial  partner
(Case No 42)
The nain concluslon to be drawn from this  analysis is  that
these obstacl.es,  which cannot (because of  their  nature and
tneirimportance)benbgotiatedrareallfact'orsofabsolute
blockage of  industrj-al cooperation between firms'  No ACP
countfy oan hope to alter  this  type of constraint  in  the short
ter.m, however much it  maY want to',
Nesotiable constraints
It  is more interesting  to note that  the majority of  the constraints
recorded seem to be silrmountable' some in  the short term and
others in  the longer term (Table XIV) '
.  Ip the (relatively)  short term' most of  the constraints
in  the:
institutlonal;
..  administrative;
..  legal  ,
categories could be overcome piovided leaders in  the host
country made it  clear they wanted to do sio'  The industrial-65-
successes of countries like Taiwan, Singapore
and Malaysia are largely due to a deliberate
policy of encouraging free enterprise and foreign
investments.
. In the long term.  Because of the nature of the
::T:;:':,":i,::lH'iii"fi 1;:":;;,:n;::,"::, 
o'
indeed, the foreseeable future.  Once again, it
will  take a thoroughgoing,  voluntarist  approach if
the ACPs are to achieve any industrial  sensitivity.
But the path ie  clear for  those who are really
anxious to  do eo (see S 6.1).
5.2 By type of  agreement  between the firms
It  is  usual now to make a distinction  between two major groups
of  industrial  cooperation agpeements -  those involving  a
Northe4n firm holding sharee and those involving other forms of
cooperation.  This distinction  is  a proper reflection  of  the
real  situation,  to the extent that  the constraints fall  fairly
neatly either  side of  the line  between agreements with and without
capital  holdings.
Generally speaki-ng, the more the European firm wants a holding
(majority or not)  in  the Southern firm,  the more strongly the
constraints will  be felt.  The risk  is  obviously greater.  The
new forms of  investment, as the OECD has it,  i.e.  without any
capital  holdings, are less susceptible to the different
constrai.nts (Table XV).-66-
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5,2L Agreements involvlng ehare-holdlng
There are two things to note about this type of agreement:
- Sensitivity to the cg4etraints  inqreases with the size
This is a logical conBquence of what was said earlier.  It is fairly  clear that a direct investment (i.e.  one in which
the investor holds 100'fr of the s-beidiay or  owned company)
involves greater risk than a joint ventune,- first  of all,
since the capital is shared, the Northeminvestor is less
lnvolved in the hogt country and, eecond, since he is
associated with a natlonal of the host country, he expects
to get a certaln amount of protectlon.  Table XV cleanly
shows that the maJorlty of constralnts whlch the foreign
investor seea as strong are in the firet  two columns (direct
investment  and joint  vbntures).
-  The main constralnte are stryctural and political
Invegtore place their capital with the *rategic aim of industrial or commercldl diverslflcatlon or of spreading
their risks geographically,  eo it  is natural for them to be
worrled about the structural and politlcal  constraints first
and foremost.  They attach far nore importance than flrms
involved in new forms of investment to such things as:
. the internal debate on the role of foreign investments;
. the low priority  which the Government puts on industry;
. the restrictione attendant on the economic poligy;
. lnstitutional instability.
And' of course' they are the onry ones to be sensltive to the risks of nationalization  and expropriation.-68-
5.22 Agreements not involvinq ehare-hol,9ing
Three findings have been made here:
Agreements thql  do not involve share-h919i{}g  arg legs
senditive than direct  investments and ioint  veltures
to the constraints emanatlng from the host countries.
This is  in  U.ne with the analysis made under $ S.ef.
However, there are one or two dlfferencee in  the degree
of sensitivity  to the constraints ln  the four new forms
of  investmCnt  under" investlgatlon here.  They eeem to  be
(in  decreasing order of sensitivity):
(a) product-in-hand contracts;
(b) management contractsi
(c)  licence contracts;
(d) international  sub-contracting.
This last  form of  agreement  involvee by far  the smallest
risk  for  the Northern parlner  (some speclafists  j-n tacu
fail  to include it  as a form of  industrial  cooperation).,
The main constraints are ,technical an4 iegal on€.
The t'newrt investor ls  legs concerned with strategic  considerations
ahd concentrates  more on the barriers  to  the everyday running
of the scheme he has devised.  There are two main types of
obstacle affecting non-ehare-hol<iing agreements:
.  technical constrainte, malnly involvlngi  '
..  management  contracts;
..  product-in-hand contracts;
..  international  sub-contracting.-69-
Although the first  two are mainly hampered by red
tape and restrictions  on the employment of  expatriate
staff,  international  sub-contracting is  often at
threat from:
..  poor quality  workl
..  high input costs;
irregular  deliveriesl
.  legal constraints,  affecting,  in particular,  licence
concessions.  This is  due to the importance of. the
(obviously'complex) lqgal  framework in  which. the licence
to manufacture is  issued.  tsut licence-holders' fears in
this  respect are also due to  the increasingly  restrictive
legislation  (limiting  dues, questioning the value of
technology, banning commercial restrlctions  etc)  being
adopted in  the developing  countries.
-  The SMEs are more sensitive than the bigger companies to the
constraints  This emerges, in  particular,  from an IFO study
TErnffi'fXt.  Almost 75% of  firms with less than 2oo staff
which were interviewed during a aurvey 1n Federal Germany said
that,  when making their  inriestmerit decisions, they were to  some
extent affected by measures.which the developing countries took
to promote non-share-holdlng cooperation to the detriment of
direct  investments or j.oint ventures-  The corresponding
figure  for  firms with  10OO-5OOO staff  was 54% and,for firms of
50OO+, 66%.  Experience suggests that,  although this  1s true
overall,  the SMEs are often more flexible  than the big
companies.
what has just  been said 
- 
particularly  the correlation  between
degree of constraint and share-holding as it  is  perceived by
European firms -  is  confirmed by these firmsr  preference for:-70-
-  minority rather than equal or majority holdings;
-  cooperation without rather than with share-holding
when the host country is  a developing country'  .However'
when it  cones .to the newly industrialized  countries and'
to  an eve.n greater extent, the industrialized  countries,
the majrerity of  these same investors hold some (and
preferlutv  hr)  of  tf,re capltal  of  the new firm  (Table XVI).
Even European transnationals have an increasing preference
for  minority holdings in their  own sulsidiaries  in  the
developing countries (Annexe XX).  Note that'  although
Japanese transnationals  seem to be adopting the same
policy,  American  conPanies do not.
A uNrDo study (Annexe xrr)  cllarry  shows the French firms'
preferences as being (in  order):
(f)  tne supply of  equiPment;
(Z) tne sale of  technologY1'
(3) sub-contracting;
(4) key-in-hand  projects;
(5) licence concessions;
(6) joint  ventures;
(7) direct  investment.
However, Ch.A.Michaletrs survey already mentioned (S 4'12)
shows that there are more majority-holdlng operations in
black Africa -  unlike what happens in  the other regions'
It  would still'appear  that preference is  iil  inverse
proportion to the financial,riek.-7L-
TABLE XVI _ STRUCfUEE OF THE CAPITAL  OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES
OF GERMAN FIRMS
(n = number of  firms interviewed)
DCs = diveloping countries
NfCs = new industrial  countries
ICs = industrialized  countries
Sourcg: Deutscher Industrle-und Handelstag, IggL.
5.3 By phase of  implementation  of the project
There are four  phases in  the running of  an industr.ial
cooperation scheme:
-  the study;
-  the negotiations;
-  the construction;
-  the exploitation.
There is  a certain number of  obstacres at  each of  these phases
and it  will  rise,  overall,  as the project  develops.
5. 3t  Thr: strrdy
There are two main constraints hampering the running of studies of  investments  in  the deveroping countries.  They are:
-  the shortage of financi'lg  for  the studies themselves.  None of the three main agents involved in  an industrial
cooperation scheme is  in  fact  pnepared to r:isk its  funds
PERCENTACE  OF CAPITAL
iELD BY PARENT  COMPANY TOTAL
n%
FIRMS
DCs  i
n%
NICs
n%
rw-
nV^
IOO%
majority
equal (SO:SO)
minority
no reply
349  56.5
L37  22,2
36  5.8
80  12.9
16  2.6
19  27.6
24  27.3
4  5.5
38  43.2
3  3.4
I28  5t.8
65  26.3
16  6.5
33  73.4
5  2.O
202  71,.4
48  L7.C
16  5.7
9  3.2
a  2.e
Total 618 100.o 88  100.0 247 100.O 243 100.C-72-
on studies whose results  are deemed .-  rightly  or
wrongly -  to be not very promising at  the outset
(in  view of  the minimal attraction  of  the l\CP countries
described under $ 3.L):
.  the ACp'promoter often lacks the means and enough
motivation;
.  the European businessman often firils  to consider
himself as an aPPlicant;
.  the banker thinks he need not replace the industrial
partners. 
l
only official  bilateral  and multilateral  aid funds can bridge
the gap between finding and implementing an'  investment
project - 
by financing the relevant studies;
-  the shortage of  information, often a key problem during
the study phase.  However, it  is  worth noting that  the vast
majority of Europgan firms aeeflg on the face of it'  to prefer
information to  come direct  from the Governments of  the host
countries  (88% of  firms interviewed  during a survey in  1976).
However, as Table XVII shows, and unlike the other phases
of the projects,  studies are very little  affected by the-various
constraints tistea  earlier  ($ 4)  only one or two general political
(lack of clarity  in guidelines,)' and administrative (Iack of
coordinatlon and efficiency)  constraintg related to  the local
industrial  promotion bodies are felt  at  this  stage'
5.32  Negotiations
when a potential  lnvestor starts  negotiating with a partner in
the host country and with its  Government,  his  rnain obstqcles
are political,  cultural  and administrative ones (Table XVII).
But the key constraint at  this  stage is,  undeni,ably, the shortage
of. local businessmen  ( $4.15) .:7y
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(Degreeof eergitivibt: +iHeh,  o=u/ed(, -=none)
1. SIRrc1URAL
lJ.  stBll intematicnal  attracticn
1.2 narrq,ness of thsnrket
I.3  cet of irput
1.4 shCI"tage of foreign erdrilge
1.5 sffftqge of local hsirnssrcnt
1.6 Ehcntage of pruject finarrciqg nwrs
L.7 rp irdrsb.ial fabnic
2. PC)LIrICAL
2.L intemsl d€bate m foreign irvestrents+
2.2 L(r{ Prrioriwonirillu6b-y  +
2.3 failur,e to rcspect comttnents
2.4 restrictiqrs m aploynrrt
2.5 rest'icticrs cn cryital returns
2.6 protecticrlst  neaswEs
2.7 reetricticrc d.le to eccrrcmic policy
2.A enfcced ruqigrrEnt  otr c4ital
2:9 ban cn takrcvera
2. 9L natiqnl-izatian/oprcpniaticr
3. qJLI1'RAL
gJ  ctrfirsicn betrleen furnrstriaf cocp-
eraticn & tecfrrical esistance
3.2 stprt-term vierm
3.3 igrrcnance of utnt indst'y irnrolves
3.4 ura'inesa &ort rrrtalgible
sn+ribrrticre
3.5 prefererrce  fo- nrestigB irnrestnente
 . SWTI[qtsL
4.i  :inaOeqnte trsrffar€ncy
4.2 irstabiliQr
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5.2 lack of coordlnatiqr
5.3 interference in the firre
5.4 corrtption
+
+
6. 1 unsritable legislatiql
6.2 inadeWate  protecticn of prcpenqy
6.3 excesive legalisn
6.4 refl:sal of foreign abitation
7. TECFIIICAL
7J  ehor'tage of skitled labqnr
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7.3 di.f,ficult ccrm,.nicatios
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5.33 Construction
In the first  phase of project  implementation, i.e.  while the
factory is  being built,  there are a number of  constraints on
progress.  They are structural  (to  do with  the lack of
industrial  fabric,  in par^ticular)  above all,  but there are
technical (,shgrtage*of skilled  labour) and administrative  ones
(slow decisionlmaking) too.
As far  as the Gernan firms are concerned, the mrain problems
encountered during the construction phase are,  .in order of
importance (Table XVII and Annexe XVI);
-  red tape;
-.customs and currency  problems;
-  protectionism  and xenoPhobia;
-  Iegal constraints and instability.
TABLE XVIII -  GERMAN FIRMS THAT HAD PROBLEMS  WITH AVAIL+PILITI-OF-'- _- 
SKILLED LOCAL STAFF DURING THE CONSTRUCTION PHASE  OF
AN INDUSTRIAL PROJECT IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY
Source: Deutsche Auslandinvestitionen  in  Enwickl-ungsldndern' G.Kayser et
al.  -  Band 3 Forechungsberichte des Bundesministeriums fiir
Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, 1981.
* A survey of  industrial  redeployment opportunj.ties in  Switzeriand -
P.Queyrane & ts.Simma -  ICME -  1976.
COUNTRY
No employees in the firm
ry  1ffi3
INDIA  IOOO
IO00
INDONESIA  TOOO
looo
CoLOMBIA  1OOO
-  lo00
MEXICO  TOOO
1000
TUNISIA  IOOO
TECHNICAL
STAFF
61
50
12.5
33
100
25
,25
39
100
36
COMMERCIAL
STAFF
13.5
--.-
27
100
T7
L7
25
67
L2-75-
5.34 Exploitation
Practically  all  the constraints identified  in  the basic
typology ($ 4) clearly  recur,  to varying degrees, in  the
operational phase of  the industrial  projegt.  It  is  not
until  this  stage that  the project  is  fully  exposed and,
when he moves on to the exploitation  stage, the investor
often discovers many obstacles that were hidden or onlv
vague before .
Table XVII shows that  23 of the 35 constraints are
felt  strongly during exploitation  (as against Ig  during
negotiations, 16 during construction and five  during the
study period -  Figure III).
FIGURE III  -  INTENSITY  OF CONSTRAINTS BY PHASE OT THE PROJECT
NUMBER OF
CONSTRAINTS
FELT
STRONGLY
Study  Negotiation
PHASES  OF
Construction Exploitation
THE  PROJECT
Source: P"Queyrane (estimate).-76-
5.4 B! sector of activlty
t-ge  of precise data on the wide range of
individual situations,  it  seems difficult  to make any
definite  conclusions about the relative  sensitivity  of  the
different  sectors of  industry to any given constraint'
However,  one or two indications can be given :for certain
specific  sectors.
5.41- No epecifi-c trend
-  Pattern of  investment bY sector
Look at the generat patterns of  inveetment from the
industrialized  countries to the Third world and it  emerges
that the chemical industries  (petro-chemical, in  the main)
are clearly  in  the lead, cLosely followed by mechanical
construction,  the food and agricultural  industries'  the
'car industry and electricals  (Table XVIII).  But the volume '  of investnents required for  these sectors of  industry mean
that they tend to be the province of  the big transnationals
rather than the SMEs. In{ernational statistics  are inadequate to
show the effect  the constraints on industrial  production
have on the flow of  investments to the deve.Loplng countries'
particularly  since each firm  follows a strategy all  of  its
o\rJn.
CoryPanY strategies
The potential  investor will  react diffenently  to  the obstacles
facing him in  the developing countries according to whether he
is  pursuing a short- or a longer-term strategy,  whether he is
interested in the doncstia narket of the bost country or in
exports and what sort of  flrm-to-firm  agreenent he wants.
There is  no doubt that,  in  industry in  genera-L - 
and particularly
in  those sectors most susceptible to PolitiCal  risl<n for  example
the developrnent of new,forms of  investment;  ($ 5.2) is  a
protection.  The OECD' says, 91!€i1!,Si'bgst  '
1 N." forms of  international  investment  in  derreloping countries
-  Charles Oman -  OECD -  1982.-77-
that  the new forms of  investment  seem to be more important
ln  firms and industries mainly geared to the domestic
market in  the host country (particularly  when the technology
involved has reached maturity)  than in  industries working
for  the export market or concerned with  advanced technoJ-ogy.
Although the degree of  technologicar  development influences
the degree of sensitivity  to constraints,  one or two
hypotheses can be advanced for  certain specific  branches of
industry.
TABLE XIX -  PATTERN  OF DIRECT INVESTMENT  TO THE DEVELOPING
r978
(as % of  investments  in  the secondary sector)
INDUSTRY INVESTMENTS TROM ...
USAl ^2 Liermanv UK3 Netherlands4
Chemicals
Mechanical  constructio
Food & agriculture
Electrics  & electronic
Automobile
27
23
IO
11
23
l_0
I
16
L2
27
11
32
J
q
40:
360
20
'Sub-total
i Otfrer industries
7L
29
62
38
73
27
96
A
Total too 100 100 100
Sources: United States Department of  Commerce,
Survey of  Current Business
Bundesanzeiger
(L977) Bueiness Monitor
De Nederlandeche Bank N.V., quarterly statistics
including mineral and petroJ_eum  exploitation
including eiectrical  i-ndustries
Z
3
4-78-
5.42 Constraints ,specific to ce.rtain induetrieF
-  Politically  sensitive products
Most essential products (staple foods above all)  are
politically  very sensitive, .particularly  in  the
developing countries.  So selling  prices  (and often
the manufacturer's marglns too)are regulated.  De1ays,
whether deliberate or not,  ln  implementing price rises
attendant on increases in production costs often put
firms in  dramatic situatlons  (Cases Nos 21 and 26).
. The following products are particularly  sensitive:
.  food products: bread, sugar, flour  and oil;
.  other Droducts: soap, fertilizer,  textiles  (pagnes
in Africa.) and energy.
These products are sensitive as far  as prices aBd
the natlonal economy are concerned. Many governments
find  foreign presence, or .even forelgn dominationr in
the food and agriculture  sector politically  unacceptable.
Hence the (considerable, in  the long term) risk  of
pressure to increase national (or State) holdi,ngs in  the
firm or even of nationallzatLon.
At the moment, there are signs of a certaig  industrial
maturity in  the ACP countries, as there is  a move
to privatize  State firms  (in  Guinea, Tanzania  and Congo'
for  example).
Mining ind.ustr:ies
The risk  of nationallzation  or expropriatiorr is  greater
here than in  an;1 other sector of  industry.  A study run
Ln 1977 shows that manufacturing  is  far  less threatened
than mining by nationalization  (Annexe XXI).-79-
Chemicals
Because of the large number of technology  transfer
contracts in the chemlcals industry, the legal
constraints imposed by the Governments of the host
countries constitute a major obstacle for investors.
The industry is also affected by environmental
protection rneasures.
Textiles
The ACPs only account for  a tiny  part of world textile
production (Africa,  L.4%, as against 1.3% in  1974).
This is  nainly because of poor productivity  and the
high cost of input,  which rule  out the export market
('rnlike what happens in Asia) and threaten rocal producers
on their  own market.  This sector is  more sensitive than
others to high production  costs, which is  why, in  spite  of
the advantages  which the ACp countries get under the Lom6
Convention, they have been unable to capitalize  on their
privileged  access to  the European market.
5.5 ljy nost country
A systematic typology of the donstraints on lndustrial
cooperation by host developing  country would represent  an
enormous task of doubtfur usefulness.  A synthesis of  these
constraints according to four main criteria  is  perhaps more
helpful.  These criteria  are the:
-  commercial outlets;
-  geographical situatlon;
-  level  of  deveLopmentl
-  economic system.
of  the host countries.  We have only considered the ACp
countries here.-90-
5.51 By outlet
The irnportance of the "marketrr factor  in  the mind of  the
"oop.""ting 
European firm was analyzed-earlier  ($  'L2)'
rnis  is  even a fundamental  criterion  which may .have a
definitive  influence on the investment decision'  so it  is '
to be expected that  there wfll  be a profound gap between
twb groups of host countries -  those with adequate
domestic markets or accesst to a bigger regional market and
those which are too snall  to offer  any economic justification
for  an industrial  scheme.
-  Inadequate domestic or regional market
.  Domestic market
One or two figures suffice  to  sum up the situation  of
the domestic rnarkets.  only nine of the 64 ACP countries
have populations of more than 1O million'  They are:
..  in West Africa:
Nigeria
Ghana
..  in Western Africa:
Zaire
..  in East SfrI:ai
Ethiopia  :
Kenya
Madagascar
Uganda
Sudan
Tanzania
28 million
3O milLion
L5 milllon
9 million
13rmillion
17 million
17 mlllion
80 million
II  million
There are populations of less than 5 milllon  Ln 44 ACP countries'
for  an average per capita GNP of around $ 3OO p'a'  And 21 of
the oroup (lncluding'almost  all  the l}lands  of  the car:tbbean and
the Paciflc)  have populations  of even less than I  million'
The figur-qs for  per capita GNP are no lese eloquent - 
12 of
the ACP Group go past the $ IOOO p.a.  mark :rnd only six  paet
$ 15OO (Annexe I).-8Lr
To put this  data in perspective,  rememben that  the GNp of Nj.geria (with 80 mitlion  inhabitants, by far  the biggest market in  the ACp Group) is  much the sarne as that  of Austria (with less than g miltion),  Zaire,s (27 miltlon) is  the same as that of  towna like  Munich and Cologne
(which have about 2 million  inhabitants)and  Senegal,s to Poitiers  (35O OOO).
The whole of West Africa  (ZOO mittion  people) has a GNp the size of  that of  the Netherlands (f   mittion).  So roughly, the ratio  of  European to  ACp GNp is  between 1:IO and 1:3O.  Those markets which allow for  the economies of' scal-e that  an indugtriar  unit  must have are thus rare in the ACP countries.
To sum up, only the nine countries mentioned above (all  of them in Africa  and six  of then in  Eastern Africa)  reach the right  critical  mass for  many industriee.  Seven countries.with populations of  5_lO million  (Mali,  Ivory coast, Guinea, Senegal, Malawi, Zambia and cameroon)  are suitable for  sel-ective industrialization.  Lastly,  the 4g remaining countries have practically  no domestic markets to offer  and even import substitution  is  carried out in economj-cally debatable  conditions.
Figure rV iltustrates  the unfavourabre rerationship between population  and GNp in  Black Africa.
Regional market
several regional economic units  aimed at creating customs unions (the CEAO, ECOWAS, UDEAC,  CARICOM,  SpEC etc)  have been set up by the ACp countries.  Unfortunately,  access to the regional markets is  st1lr  an uncertain business and. integration  is  going very slowly in  these economic communities.  Although the regional markets exist  in  theory, they are very linited  in practice and only accessibre to firmsa a
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already familiar  wlth the ground.  Experience has
shown that a European firm which is  already present,
through its  exports (from its  country of origin),  in
a given region has a good chance of keeping its
markets if  it  open6 a branch in  a country of  this
region and makes that country an exporter to  the
neighbouring  states (whether or not they are members
of an economic community).  Without this  prlor
knowledge of  the regional markets, a firrn wiLl  come
up against many obstacles (to  do with transport,
getting  the product accepted, non-tariff  barriers  and
safeguard clauses).
SmalI countries
As we saw earlier,  'three quarters (42 out of 64) of the ACp
countries can be considered as having rnarkets that  are
smaller than the basic minimum required to set up a viable
industry.  They fall  into  two sub-groups:
.  Exporting countries
These are countries where the cost of the factors of
production (wages especially) are lowest and productiuity
highest.  There are in  fact  very few such countries in
the ACP Group.  Only Mauritius fiulfils  the requisite
conditions and enjoys a certain  amount of  success in
international  sub-contracting  (particularly  textiles  and
toys).  Barbados also Iooks as though it  could do the
same, as do one or two other islands in  the Caribbean,
although international  sub-contracting has not been
developed very much in  the ACP countries of  this  region
yet.
.  Other countries
This group comprises  inore or less all  the 47'Small"  ACp
seunlriss 
- 
practically  all  the countries of  the pacific,
more or less aII  the Caribbean and the 27 countries of
Africa not rnentioned above.  A]1 we can say here is  that
the prospects for  industrial  cooperation seem very small
in countries'of  this  sort  and that  it  can only be done on a
very selective basis.-84-
5.52  By geographical sitggtion
If  the three regions involved in  the Lom6 Convention are
taken separately, a numb€r of characteristics  sprecific to
their  geographical situation  energes:
-  Africa
.  The negion in general
It  is  agreed that Africa is  the contlnent which is
Itraving the greatest difficulty  overcoming its  under-
development, as any analysls - 
or  ordinary
observation -  will  show.  The ICF says that'  when
there was inflation  and recession in the world economy
inthemid-Tos,nowheqedidthecrisishitharderthan
in  sub-Saharan Africa'.  And the World Bank said that'
between 196O and lg7g, the per capita income in  19
(Rfrican) countries rose by less than 1% P'?'r  while'
oVer the past decade, 15 countries have seen their  per
capitaincomedecrease...Percapitaproductionincreased
more's]-owlyinsub-SaharanAfricathanan}wher'e.else.in
the world, particularly  in the 7O9, and it  increased
slower in  the 7Os than in  the 6Os-'  The World Bank
also points out that  even countries which had an
"u.""i. 
growth of2.7% between 1960 and 1979 (Kenya'
.  Malawi anO Ivory Coast) had to reorganize their  economies
because of the crisis
Furthermore, there are many constraints on industrialization
in Black Afr:lca.  In addition to the size of  the markets
meritioned above, the-world Bank lists  the following  obstacles:
..inadequatepopulation4grsitypreventingamortizationof
ffiiastructure.  A cement works, for
example, .only serves an area of  3OO-5OO km round about'
Andheavytransportcostsprotectsomeindustries'but
restrict  economies of  scale;
tivlty. African wages are high
An ILO study shows in Asia.
fow
comparison  with those
I  rrcrs five-year program FY 84-88, October 1982.
in  Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for  Action' Accelerated  DeveloPment
World Bank, August 1981.
3 tl,o Bu]Letin of Labour Statistics'  2nd quarter l98O'
\-85-
the average wage of workers in  the textite  industrj_es of
10 African countries is  50% higher than in pakistan and
more than double what it  is  in  Bangladesh. productlvity
ie  also lower in Africa  than elsewhere.  A comparison of
six  African spinning mills  and four south-American  spinnlng
mills  financed by the IFC shows that the average number of
workerg per loom was twice as J.arge 1n Africa;
management  costs.  African industry is  far  more dependent.
on  expatri.ate managers and technicians than other regions'.
According to the World Bank, the wages of  expatriate staff  in  Ivory Coast
represent 25% of the added value.  Middle managers and
technicians cost twice or three times higher in Africa  than
in Europe.  In the example of the spinning mills  mentioned
above, the IFC says that  the South American factories  had no
expatriates on their  staff,  while expatriatee pushed up the
African wage bill  by 25-50%;
cost of equipment and infrastructure.  The World Bank says
that an industrial  inveetment in Europe costs around  25%
more than it  would in  a developed'country and in  some countries
it  may go as high as 60%.  This is  because of  the traneport
costs and delays in congtruction and to what is  generally
inadequate infrastructure  which, moreover, is  not as good as tinfrastructure  in Asia and Latin America.
West Africa  and Central Africa
The m{ority  of  the least-developed'countries  of..the cont*nent are in
western'and central-  Africa,  particularly  in  the Saher.  There
are two categories  of country in  this  heterogeneous group:
rand-locked .oJnt"i=g  (Burkina, Burundi, Mali, Niger, cAR, Rwanda
ffien  countries are unfavourably placed 
- because of  their  geographical situatlon  and iri  eome casea
because of  their  low population densi,ty 
- 
lahgn it  cornes to
industrialization.  The obstacles risted  earlier,  which are
1 -  Accelerated  DeveJ.opment  in  Sub-Saharan Africa -  op.cit.t
-86-
characteristic  of Africa  in general, appear more strongly
in this  type of country, particularly  as regards lnfrastructure
(transport) and donestic and regional outlets.  These countries
are aleo relativqly  short of natural resources (except mineral
ones,. which do not generate much industry).  Three countries
--  Senegal, Mauritania and Cape Verde - 
which have climatic
and economicconditions  nore like  Sahelian than coastal states,
should be added to the seven landlocked  countries;
..  coastal stateE (Nigeria, Bgnln, Togo, Ivory Coast, Ghana,
Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Gambiar Cameroont
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Zaire and Sao Tom6 & Prlncipe).
These 16 countries are all  in  very different  situations'  but
as they have a certain amount of homogeneity as far  as natural
resourcec (tropical  products egBentially) are concerned' the
differences centre on two factors from which only six  of  the
grorp benefit:
...  large countrien  (Nigeria,  Zaire and Ghana d  see S 5.51);
...  oil-producing  countrieq (Nigeria, Gabon, C'ameroon and
Congo). By coneiderably boosting the incomes of both the
State and the private sector, thls  manna, oil,  has created,
in-these four countriesrconditions  that are more favourable
to industrialization  and encouraged foreign investments.
The importance  of oil  earnings is'such that  even a market
of 8O mitlion  people, as Nigeria has, loses much of  its
.attraction  once the price of black gold drops.
TtEprospects of  industrialization  in  the 11 coastal countries
remaln nodest -  although they are better  than those of  the
landlocked natione.-87-
-  Eastern and Southern Afri-ca
There are three sub-groups in  the equally heterogeneous
group of countries of  Eastern and Southern Africa:
. nedium-sized and large countries (Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania,
Kenya, Uganda, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Zambia).  These
eight countries offer  a certain potential  market, either
because of  their  sizeralbeit  with poor purchasing power
(Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania and Madagascar),  or because  an
intermediate level  of  development nakea them relatively
attractive  (Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia);
.  small and leas@  (Diibouti,  Sonalia,
ractically  no
industrialization  potential ;
.  exporting countries, which divide into  two groups:
..  Mauritius, which is  the only African ACP to want to
export industrial  products outside the region and to  do
so with a certain  amount of  success ($5.51);
..  the satellites  of South Africa  (Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho
and Swaziland), where industrialization  can only be
envisaged within  the framework of the South African
market.  The last  three countries are, with South Africa,
indeed members of a customs unj.on which is  the only thlng
that keepe the economies of  these three landlocked
countries alive.
Note afso that  there is  a large difference when it  comes
to transferring  income between countries of  the franc zone
and elsewhere.  The former enjoy the relative  confidence
of  foreign investors because their  eurrency is  convertible,
but few of  them have anything else to  recommend  them.  This
goes for  countrieg in  the rand zone and, to a certain
extent, to Liberia  (in  the dollar  zone) too.-88-
To surn up,then, and in  order to give a global
picture of  indugtrial  cooperation in Africa *
without reflecting  any individual  situations  - only 19 countrie$ out of the 43 members of  the
ACP Group on the continent offer  any serious
prospects.
The Caribbean
Two main constraints in  the region itself  hold'back
industri.al cooperation between the EEC and the caribbean
ACPs.  They are:
. The naryownees of  the dornestic-malk€tg
The total  population of the islands is  about 6 million
and 40% lives  on Jamaica a19ne.  There is  an obvioug
problen of outlets  and there is  no point in  seeking to
industrialize  unless with a view to export qr unless proper
regional integration  can be achieved.
.  Distance.from  Europe.
ffi;ribbean  has certain potentiat as far as
international  sub-contracting is  concerned (see the success
of Porto-Rico, Haiti  and central America on the American
market),  European firms have made very few investments in
this  part of the world.  Of the 59 foreign industrial
unlts which the oECD listed  in  the whole caribbean region,
onty 13 (22%) are of European origin -  {r  British  (Table
xx).
Botswana
Cameroon
Congo
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Lesotho
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritius
Nigeria
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Uganda
Zaire
Zarnbia
Zlmbabwe-89-
TABLE XX -  PLACE OF ORIGIN OF FOREIGN CO},IPANIES IN THE CARIBBEAN
HEADQUARTERS  OF
PARENT  COMPANY brarlns sr-bsidlries jolnt
verrU"u€g
natlcnal
conDades
foreign
)cnn€nies
total
United Kingdom
Canada
United States
Other countries o the Caribbean
Japan
Hong Kong
New ZeaLand
Unspecified
I
3
I5
I
:
3
2
2
I
2
5
5
I
3
2
1
1_
l_
3
4
1
I
10
22
6
4
1
1
I
Total 20 10 20 7 a 59
Source: OECD (Sub-contracting, a new form of  investrnent).
This disenchantment of  European firms with the Caribbean  can only
be put down to distance  (and the attendant ignorance of  the
environment), since North Anerican firms  (from the USA and
Canada) make up nore than half  the regionrs  foreign industrial
;r:.".",  the caribbean  seems generally to be more open to
foreign firms than do African countries, for  example, as there
are no  restrictions  on employing expatriate staff,  there is
Iess tendency towards nationalism, forelgn share-holders are
encouraged  and Bo on.
The importarrce of  the Carlbbean Basin Recovery Act,  an American initiative  that
took effect  in  August L983 and is  better  known as the Caribbean-90-
Basin Initiative  (CBI),  should also be emphasized here.
This law provides for  all  duties on imports to the USA of
almost all  the products with at  least  35% value added in  the
beneficiary countries (15 points may be constitutted  by
components  of American origin)  to be done away with for  12
years.  AIt  the Caribbean signatorles of  the Lom6
Convention are covered by this  system - 
which is  of
undoubted interest.  only the Bahamas,  Guyana and surinane
remained to be formally designated in  May 1984.  The CBI
could mean a real  industrial  take-off  ln  the countries
concerned.
The Pacllic
What applies to the Caribbean
to the Pacific  members of  the
.  High cost of  input
Hourly wages in  the Pacific  are,
higher than'those in  South-East
1-  ILO Yearbook.
also applies, even more stronSly'
Lom6 Convention.
1 the ILO suggestsl 50-360%
Asia.
Narrowness of the narkets
The Pacific  countries offer'extreme  examples of  this.
The total  population of the eight ACPs in  the region
is  no more than 4 nillion  - 
and 3 nillion  of  thoee live
in Papua-New Guinea.  Ihe natural restources are also very
I imi ted.
SEgrtage of local  businessmen
This is  particularly  acute
Distance from Europe
This is  extreme. The Paclfic  islande are on the opposite
slde of tfie world and they are apllt  up (FiJi,  which totals
20 OOO krn<, ts  made up of  844 islands) and spread over
thousands of km.  The only regional markets are those of
Australia and New Zealand" which are far  frorn offering  the
same potential  as the USA offers  the Caribbean.  There are
considerabl.e  communications problems (lines  are rare and
services are held up when there are cyclones etc).-91-
In 1976, New Zealand in  fact  set up a preferential  system
for  the countries of  the pacific,  with a view to promoting
their  industrialization.  rt  is  called  the pacific  rslands fndustrial  Development  Scheme (pIIDS) and all  the pacific
signatories of  the Lom6 Convention aie  covered by it.  The
Scheme provides:
-  incentives for  New Zealand industrialists  to set up j_n
the Pacific  countries;
-  help to enabre the recipient  countries to deverop their
exports;
-  privileged access to the New Zearand market for  firms set
up under the Scheme.
By December 1983 ,  44 projects had already been run with
PIIDS help in  seven countriesr thus creating gOO jobs.  Of
these, 3i- were in  five  ACp countries (12 projects in Fiji,
eight in western samoa, seven in  Tonga, three in  the solomon
fslands and one in Vanuatu).  These results  seem to be of
more importance than those obtai.ned from cooperation with
firms from Europe. 
\
so the caribbean and the pacific  are, overall, .in a particurarly
unfavourable  position when it  comes to  industrial  cooperation
with Europe, as they are both geared to other,nearer
continents.  They also have  coordination problems,because
of  the large number of small states  which make them up.  some industrial  projects fi.nanced by a European development bank were
held up by the abnormally long delays in  implementing lnter-state
transport agreements  ( the purchasing of planes for  a regional
airline  in  the caribbean and  the formation of  a navigation
company by seven States in  the pacific).
5.53  By level- of  development
The typology of constraints on industrial  development by
level  of  development of the host country is  given here simply
as a token, as it  is  obvious that,  the more economically
advanced a country i_s, the more it  will  attract  foreign
investors-92-
The classification  of  developing countries by flow of 
1
investrnent from the oECD Countries'in 1981 is  as follows'l
%
1. New industrial countries (NIC)
2. Intermediate-income countries
3. OPEC countries
4. Low-income countries
2+,
25
4
TotaI
1'  Investing in  the Third World, OECD' 1983.
including l5% for  the off-shore centres.
As annexes I  and VII  show, more than 6Q% of  the ACP Group
(4O of the 64 members) are in  the low-incone categorY (with
GNPs below $ 600, according to the OECD def,initi"on).  That
leaves 24 countries (two members of  OPEC plus Ni.geria and
Gabon) which  are'developed  enough to be attractive  to the
foreign investor.  And 13 of  these countries are in  the
Pacific or the Caribbean, which, as we have seen, get very few
private investments from Europe. So we are lef1; with  11
African countries in the low-incorire category, silx of which
are on the list  of countries with industrial  potential  given
in  $ 5.52, i.e.  Nigeria, Gabon, Botswana, Swazitr-and'
Mauritius and Zimbabwe.
The firms'  choice of  forms of  industrial  cooperation confirms
this  analysis.  Although the above data are for  direct
investments (tfrb only ones that  can be frdasueed properly as
things stand),  all  the analyses show that  European firms go
systematically for  new forms of  investment, i.e..  those
involving no capital  hotdings' in  the poorly developed countries
($ 5.2).  Clearly,  firmswiLlseek  tominimize a risk  that  is
deemed to be inversely proportlonal to the leve.L of  developrnept
in  the host country.  Overall, it  is  reasonab.Le to  say that
under-developrnent is  a deteriorating  factor  with all  the
constraints to industrial  cooperation recorded rrnder 54.-93-
5.54 By economic  a,nd social  system
There seems to have been no formal study of  the foreign
investorst attitude  to the developing  countries according
to  their  political  system -  or,  more generally,  according
to their  economic  and social System.  Although this  is  not
a decisive criterion  for  the ACP countries, certain  comments
are not without interest.  There are two main categories  of
country:
-  Counti"ies with market economi.eS
This is  by far  the blggest group and it  is  apparently
increasing.  About 58 ACPs fit  into  it  categorically  and
there is  a certain move towards liberalization  of  the
econony in  the others (Ghana, Guinea, Ethiopia, Tanzania,
Congo and Mali).  The ACP countries should, in  theory, be
more open to private  enterprise, be it  national or forei-gn,
but,  in practice,  _there are many legal and political
constraints there to protect local  ( industrial  and commercial
too) interests,  to the detriment of  the foreign investor.
So a market economy is  by no means synonymous with an actual
welcome to  foreign firms.
-  Countries with planned economies.
These, in  the true meanlng of the term, are rare in  the ACP
Group and six  (Ghana, Guinear' Ethiopia, Tanzania,  Corigo and
Mali) at most can be classified  here.  And, over the past
few years, there has been a change of  direction  in  these
countries under the pressure of  domestic economic problems
and foreign debts.  Mali and, more recently,  Guinea has seemed
to want toprivatize  its  economy, as  has Tanzania. There is
no doubt that  investors are put off  by this  type of  economy.
However, this  judgement should be refined in  that  the Staters
authority means it  can grant exaggerated  advantages to  a
foreign firm  if  it  wants to,  without having to  cope with
opposition from a private  sector that  has been reduced to
craft  and small business concerns. To sum up, industriaf
cooperation  wi.th countries with planned economies is  limited,
but it  can be particularly  fruitful  when the host Government
is  in  favour.-94-
6.  RECOMMENDATIONS
Therecanbenoquestioninthisstudyofmakingexhaustive
recommendations to solve all  the problems facing industrial
cooperation  between firms.  At best we can make one or  two
highly prac'tical proposals for  action.
They bear essentially - 
and quite naturally  - 
on the
constraints we called  negotiable in  the classification  in
$ 4.  There is  not,  on the face of  it'  any immediate
solution for  any other type of constraint.
some recommendationa are general and others more precise,
according to the nature of the obstacle in question, and
they are intended, first  and foremost, for  the host countries
covered in this  study.  one or two provisional remarks are
also put forward for  consideration  by the European partners
in  industrial  cooperation,  pending a speclfic  study on them.
Lastly,  there are proposals for  action ln  respect of  ACP
industrial  prornotion.
6.1 For the host countries
6.11 Remove or reduce political  constraints
of all  the negotlable constraints,  it  is  the political  ones
that the ACP countries should deal with as a matter of  priority.
Their removal is  a sirnple question of  someonens will  and the
recommendations can be summed up in  a single sentence - 
give
the foreign investors more freedom.  More precisely'  the
following proposals  can be made to the ACP countries:
-  Clarify  the options taken in relation  to foreign  investments
Creating a climate that  is  favourable to foneign investments
should be a priority  in  any ACP country tha'b is  really  anxious
to develop induetrial  cooperation between firms.  If  this  is-95-
really  what they want, then they have to say so clearly
more through practical  action than statements of
intention or rules and regulations that  may be
unreliably applied.  ff,  on the other hand, foneign
investments are not looked upon as a priority,  this
must be obvious from official  att:i.tudes and texts.
Equivocalness  will  not serve the cause of  industrial
cooperation.
Give industry itts  DroDer place
The ACP countries often place excessive i.mportance on
industry in  comparison with their  real  priorities  (1.e.
agriculture'  public health,  education and conmunications).
It  would be better,  in  many cases, to  abandon the
requisite  panoply of  aids to industrial  prornotion
(investment codes, promotion organizations,  Iists  of
ambltious projects etc)  and to provide one or two specific projects with the means of implementation.  Industrial
policy  should be harmonized wlth economic pollcy.
Fulfil  commitments
This means not maklng a foreign investor commitments
(in  the matter of  the repatriation  of profits,  imported
raw naterials  and spare parts,  government subsidies or
infrastructure)  ttrat cannot be fulfilled.  A more realistic
agsessment of  the countryfs situation  and awareness of  the
disastrous effect  of  faillng  to meet commitments would
greatly  improve the climate of  investment in  many ACp
countries.  The damage done by unilater.al,  unjustif,ied breach of
contract with a foreign firm  for'purely  political  reasons
is  considerable and takes years to repair.  The authorities
in the host countries have to realize  the importance of  the
effect  their  decisions have on the life  of the firme and on the
attendant l-oss of goodwill.-96-
Do away with gratuitoue cogstraints
This means congtraints which give no obvious  advantage
to the host country.  The category lncludes obstacles
involving:
.  employment (restrictions  on the recruitment of expatriate
"  staff;
. paying returnson capltal  invested (ceilings  on repatriable
profits);
.  economic policy  (prohibited sectors);
.  attacks on material property (natioaAltzatlon and
exproprlation)  and on intellectual  property (taxation of
non-tangibles, refusal to  recognize patents and licences)'
Give greater freedom to  industrial  sub-sectors
Economic dirigisme may be justified  in basic industries  and
infrastructure,  but not in  the llightindustriers that  are
concerned in  the vast rnajority of  SME cooperation projects'
The Governnents of certain  ACP countries have to realize
that a little  more liberalism  can only be a stimulus to
the industrial  sector as a whole and that  most regulations'
ultimately,  are more of  a discouragement  than an incentive'
Put ional ration  into ice b customs
and economi-c integration agreemenls
These are all  too often dead letters,  although they are
usually the only way of creating the
justify  an industrial  investment.
political  will  that  can otercome the
tendencles.
6. L2
other'constralnts rllso depend on will  and they can, therefore'
be considered ae negotiable - 
which meana they can be overcome.
What we have here are institutlonal  and adninistrative  obstacles
sort of rnarket that
It  is only regional
will
inevitable Protectionist-97-
which the European SMEs complain about particularly.
One or two recommendations 
- 
some fairly  general and
others more precise 
- 
can be made here:
-  Stabilize  the institutions
The ACP Goverrunents  have to realize  that  a minimum of
stability  in  their  institutions  is  vital  to a sound
climate of  investment.  There has to be continuity
as far  as the organizations and, as far  as possible, the
people are concerned.  A foreign investor wiII  always
be more sensitive to structural  changes thqn nationals
who are, on the face of  1t,  better informed.  Just a
change in  the name of  an institution  (this  happens a
Iot  in  the ACP countries) can put the European investor
on his guard if  he does not know what the new title
involves.  Leaving experienced staff  in  their  posts is
also a major asset when it  comes to establishing a
climate of confiden:e  between the host country and the
foreign investors.
Create the right  structures
0n a more practical  level,  ACP countries seeking to
promote industrial  cooperation should be encouraged  to
Iook to structures that have proved their  worth in
sone countries.  Here are three examples:
. Single windows
These are organizations that  combine al1 the departments
a foreign investor has to  deal with if  he wants to
implement his project.  The commonejst example of  this
is API, the Agence tunisienne de promotion des
investlssements.  Not only does this  body promote
Tunisia as a host country for  foreign investors  -  it  is
also  .empowered  to issue the relevant authorizations.
And it  may help the potential  investor complete the
necessary formalities  (set up a company, obtain land,-98-
get a building permit, conneqt to services, obtain
an impot licence and so on).  Thls means the foreign
businessman needs only one contact -  the API '
Things move much faster  as a result  and the average
time between making an application and receiving
the authorization is  no more iltan eight weeks'  The
law even says the authonities  must reply wit;hin 3O
days  and, if  the promoter does not receive a reply,
he is  authorized to  implement his project  anyway'
This formula has proved efficient  and it  cor:ld well
be used by the ACP countries - 
which have nothing
like  it.  A first  important step could be made by
enabl,ing the promotion bodies to grant authorization
(which is  usually the. work of  the Ministry  :for
Industry, which is  badly placed when it  comes to
promotion).
What the investorrs want is  to talk  to civil  servants
who have the power to take decisions as well  as
provide information.
Shelter plans
These (generally private)  structures,  also called
shelter programmes, have been formed in Mexico (Nogales)
and Ha1ti.  They get a general authorization from the
Government to manufacture  certain groups of products
(teitites  or electricals,  say) and they can then
accept any forelgn company interested in  international
sub-contracting  and offer  them workshope,  equipment,
administrat.lve and technical services and labour at
an all-in  price  (usually based on an hourly rate) '
The foreign company brings in  its  technicians to  train
the workers and has to take care of quality  control
(some units  even offer  contracts that guarantee quality) '-99-
If  necessary, it  can import the relevant equipment
and/or raw materials under flexible  temporary
import arrangements.
This system has many advantages:
..  Manufacturing can get under way very quickly,  as
no authorizations are neceasary (a few hours' notice
may be enough if  the equipment and raw materials are
already there).
..  The risk  to the foreign partner is  minimal.
..  Operation is  very flexible.
It  is  a step towards the foreign firn  settlng  up if
,it  is  successful  .
This approach to  industrial  cooperation obviously
concerns the exporting industries above all  - 
which
neans that the cost.of  input and productivity  must be
conpetitive from hhe word'go'  But sone ACP countries
could in  fact  develop an export lndustry from these
sheLter plans,  However, it  is  worth mentioning the fact
that the effectiveness of  these systems depends on the
way the industriaL units are managed. It  would be a good
idea, in  some casee, to  hand the management  of  such units
in  the ACP countries to foreign specialists  working in
association with nationals -  in  the early stages at
least.
Proper incentive measures for  foreign investors
ALmost all  the ACP countries have investment  codes
providing many incentives, most of  them to do with tax.
But they only help when the firm  is  making a profit,  i.e.
once all  the conditions for  proper operation and
development  have been met.  Few units  set up through
joint ventures -  or even direct  investmsnf, 
- 
in  the
ACP countries are yet profitable  enough to reap any benefit-roo-
from an investment code.  what the foreign businessmen
want is  more general conditions -  a climate'  that  is
to say -  that will  make it  possible to produce, sell
and earn noney with as few snags as possible'  The
ACPs have to find  a reasonable comfrromise  between a
risky  laisser-faire  attitude  and an intolerable  straight
.  jacket.
6.13 Encourage the develobrnent  of  industriAl  ?wareness
There are a number of recommendations to be made to  the ACP
authorities  and to the ACP businessmen in  eonnex.lon with the
cultural  constraints (most of which are dua to the ACPE not
being used to industry) mentioned earlier.  They are:
-  For the ACP authorities
.  Adopt a more Selective aPproach to industriallzatiqn
Projects must be approached, first  of all,  with realism,
i.e.  in the light  of the material and human resources that
are available.  It  is  genbrally true to say that  cooperation
between firms has a good chance of success when the projects
are small and the technology involved is  rel,atively'simple.
Size and sophistication are pitfalls  to be avoided in  the
ACP countries where material constraints are considerable
and resources rare.  This means that  civil  servants must
have abetter grasp of what industry involves and forget
some of their  grandiose but unrealistic  ideas.  In other
words, projects should;
..  be studied properly i
..  reflect  a genuine need of  the local  or export market;
..  be the right  size for  the market and the resources;-rol-
..  be put in  the hands of  (tocal  and/or foreign)
businessmen who are capable of making a "tr""u"" of  them.
. Aqmit the need for  the forei businessmen to make a profit
This is  the only real  reason for  their  commitment to industrial  cooperation.  Acp orriciars  shour.d make a crear distinction  between socio-economic  projects of  national- and often long-term interest  that  are not necessarily expected to be profitable  and cooperation between firms,  which demands stringent management  and concrete financial  resurts.  rn reality,  dny profit-making industridrL firm  set up in  an
ACP country of necessity gives something to the host country,
even if  it  is  only jobs and tax earnings.
.  Understand that  indus depends more on men than means
All  too often,  the ACp authorlties  insist  on their  shortage :of financiaL and materiar means when what they are rearly
shor.t of  is  businessmen. rt  wirr- take time and a. tralning drive to produce them.  Industry, ultimately,  is  a question
of people.  But until  there are enough of  them to take over from the foreign partners, those who know how to run thriving
businesses  must be allowed to set them up and obstacres should not be put in  their  path.
similarry,  it  wourd be as well  to  recommend that  the ACp countries be more flexible  in  the riatter  of  non-tangible contributions (patents, ricences and know-how) which are often as important to industry as machinery  and capital.
Do not. i.nterfere
16e authorities  must ensure that  the firms can operate freety
and avoid interfering  in  their  internal  affairs.  Firms are very keen on this  and the civir  servants should learn the difference between control  and interference.-LOz_
-  For national businessmen
The industrial  awareness of  ACP businessmen will  take
time to develop.  The Governments could concen.trate on
two sorts of  scheme -  training  and information - 
to
hclp:
. develop a long-term view by making national businessmen
iealize  that  industry involves short-term sa.crifices for
long-term profits  unlike what happens i:n trade.
A campaign to get this  across could well bring home to
,the businessmen what industry really  is;
.  train  managers, putting particular  emphasis on turning
out competent industrial  managers  who can ta.ke ovdr from
the foreign partners in  the long run.  Cooperation between
firms will  leap forward the day there are real  ACP
businessmen to associate with the European o,nes.  This
means makinq, a real  effont  in  secondary teaching and
offering  tha theory and practice of  company management in
higher education.
6.14  Adapt the legal  framework
The emergence of genuine industrial  awareness strould also
resul-t, practically  speaking, in  the legal  framework of
industrial  cooperation  between firms being harmonized with
the actual situation  in  industny.  There are three
recommendations here:
-  Make the laws generally more flexible
This means allowing thern to adapt to  the condj"tions  of
cooperation  between firms,  whieh often change wlth the '  economic situation  or technological progress.' Allowing imports
of  second-hand  equipment (often warranted), extendifig the
advantages of the investment code to para-industrial  activities
and maybe even services and authorizing forei€ln curreney accounts
are exampl"es of what can often bevital  flexibi.tlty.-r03-
Protect foreign property
It  is  vlta1  for  the ACP countrtes to realize
the importance of protecting investrnents for
the foreign firms.  ACP Governments can only
be encouraged  to  adopt clear provisions  along
these linee laying down fair  procedures for  the
settling  of  differences  and agreeing to the
principle  of  indemnification of  the injured
parties.  ACP acceptance of  a European
investment protect'ion clause in  the next Lom6
Convention  would be a great step forward and
calm a lot  of  the European SMEsr fears.
Agree to foreign arbitration
The ACP Governments should be invited  to
recognize the competenee of foreign tribunals
and arbitrators  ln  the field  of  industrial-
cooperation.  The fact  that  some of  them refuse
to do so can only lead to a certain wariness on
the part of  the investors.  A Government that
is  sure of  its  rights  cannot fear the judgement
of  an arbitrator,  even if  he is  beyond the frontiers
of  the country in  question.  Firms, and SMEs
especially,  are very sensitive on this  issue.
6.2 For the European partners
11-1is study only deals with the constraints to industrial
cooperation between firms that have been found in  the ACP
countries thernselves - 
so it  is  up to  them to take the
necessary steps to eliminate them.  However, here are one
or two suggested li.nes of  conduct for  the European partners.
6.21 The European Community
-  Co.tinJs_llith ard-e*pand t
.  The Centre for  Industrial  DeveLopment  (CID)
The CID is  a sign of  the EEC's desire to make a
practical  contribution to the industrial
development of  the ACP Group.  Its  achievements
are undeniable.  The common complaints are-I04-
about a certain adrninistrative  unwieldiness
due to joint  ACP-EEC management.  It  might
be a good idea to see what can be done to
make the CID more operational and cut down
on the red taPe.
One practical  step would be to  enatrle a
(private on public)  European organi.zation to
appty to the CID for  fi,nancing for  a feasibility
study (as is  already the case for  1;he ACPs) '
The CID study fund should also be easier to
mobilize and the ceilings  on advances substantially
raised (to,  say, 50 OOO ECU from around 25 OOO ECU
as it  is  at present)
. Financing for  i.4dustrial promo-lion gff,ices in  Europe
This aid should be,maintained  and increased if
possible.  The absence of reception structures
for  industrial  projects  in the ACP countries  makes
the. European promotion organizati'ons to which
the businessmen can apply essential.  Ag things
standn they are irreplaceable  and A6sistance  from
public national or international  funds is  the only
thing that wiII  ensure they are there.
.  Financing forj]re-off  schemesr such as promotional
iorums.  Many operators criticize  the way Such
events are run at  the moment, a'lthough they do
recognize the usefulness of  the idqa.  Changes wiII
no doubt have to'be made to make these meetings
(particularly  the Dakar forum) more operatlonal - i.e.  geared more to practical  resurlts.  This means:
..  better selection of participants,and the ACP
representatives in particular,  so there are
fewer civil  servants and more trusinessmen;-105-
..  at  least as big an effort  after  the forum
as before.  The lack of continuity  tends
to be deplored by the European businessrnen
whose proposals are usually left  without an
answer.
Set up a study fund
The need for  financing for  studies was clearly
expressed earlier  ($ a.j_6), as existing  funds are
inadequate or subject to  too many restrictions.  So
the Community  is  recommended to set up a fund to
finance the pre-feasibility  and feasibility  studies
that  are vital  to the flourishing  of  lndustrial
cooperation projects.  This fund should be:
.  autonomousri.e.  independent  of  existing  organizations (the CID, the EIB, the EDF and so on) so it  can play
its  part  fully,  freely  and with greater efficiency.
It  should be managed flexibly  and non-bureaucratically
by a small but experienced staff  and it  could receive
applications from official  and private organizations
in both the ACp Group and the EEC;
.  Iarge, i.e.  around 2 million  ECU (at  least)  so as ro
be able to  finance 20 or 30 studies a year.once
functi oni ng,,normal ly ;
.  renewable, i.e.  the financing would be reimbursable
where a project  was actually  implemented. The Member
States could also undertake to replenish 10-20% of  the
total  initiat  amount every year to make up for  any
advances that were not paid back.
Work mole closely with the financial  institutions
This means the EIB first  and foremost, but it  also
neans the developrnent  banks in  the Member States (i.e.
the  DEG, CCCE, CDC, IFU and FMO).  Collaboration
between the EEC and the financial  institutions  in  the
matter of  industrial  cooperation should make for
substantial developments with:-l06-
project identification'  uaing' among other things,  the
fund mentioned above;
study financing in collaboration with this  fuhd;
project financing, sometimes using criteria  other than
sofvenCy oi  the promoter  his  management  irbility  or
the potential  of  the rnarket, saY
6.22 The Member States
This study, which is  confined to the constraints found in  the ACP
countries themselves, is.not  the place for  many recommendations
on the Member States of  the EEC.  However, it  would be reaeonable
to  necommend that  these States consolldate Comnunity action,  in
three areas in particular:
-  Industrial- promotion organizations working for  the ACP countries
should be set up in  any Member State of  the Commun:Lty which has
none at present.  France set the example by open:Lng  CEPIA (the
centre for  industrial  promotion in Africa)  back in  1972.  This
organization  has certainly  developed a veritable  t<-'chnology of
industrial  promotion and has quite outstanding expt-'rience in  the
field.  The CEPIA formula is  particularly  interesting  in  that  it
combines the private sector (with the support of  its  employers'
organization), the French GoVernment and the Community,  which
gives it  study and promotion contracts. The idea could be
adapted and extended to other EEC countries which are currently
using private consultancies and development banks to do this  job.
-  Study and participation  funds, which are already ptrrtly  in
exietence but could be boosted, particularly.  as re6gards the
finanoing of studies (DEG, PRoPARCO, CCCE, CDC, IFU, FMO and SBI)
-  Technical assistance for  Governments and firms in  1;he ACP countries
to help identify  projects and ensure the continuitlr  of promotion
schemes.-LO7-
6.23 The firms
An important conference under Professor A.Huybrechts* in
Brussels in  1982 was an opportunity for  some hard thinking
about what attitude  European firms ought to adopt to  the
problems of  setting  up in  the developing  countries.  The
main recommendations  from this  conference can be repeated
here.  Firms should:
-  set up a structure that  is  suited to their  action.
This does not necessarily mean a dlstinct  unit,
although it  should have:
.  at least  one person in  charge;
. a budget to alLow,for a minimum of  training,  information,
contacts aod travel  abroad;
-  be aware of  the vast effort  involved in  obtaining j-nfornation,
particurarJ-y  about the soclo-political  environment in  the host
countries.  The possibility  of grouping the firrns involved
together in  a joint  organization that would cut costs should
be investigated;
-  call  6n expert advice to draw up the cooperation contract.
This person may be an outside adviser or a bankerl
-  keep up regular,  personal contact with the partners and
Government  of the host country;
-  send the best staff  avaj,lable to the developing countries,
as the job is  a hard one;
-  provide financial  structures that are both resistant  and flexible
so as to be able to cope with teething troubles.  This means
adequate capital  and plenty of  funds;
-  decentralize management and keep it  closely under control
- 
which also means having reliable,  experienced staff  who are
properly integrated in  the host country.
"  A conference on Belgian firms in  the Third World ("Au deld de
1'exportation,  J-a pr6sence des entreprises belges dans le  Tiers
Monderr) run by the International- economics  department of  the
rnstitut  catholique des hautes 6tudes commerciales  (rcHEC), June
1982.-108-
6.3 For the promotion_:g!]@
Recommendations under this  heading can be more precise.
There are five  lines of action.
6.31  Discard  ba4- proie'cts
Industrial  promotion often gives the  impression that  the
bad projects are hiding or replacing the good ones.
Practically  all  the industrial  promotion organizlations
get old,  oft-rejected  dossiers on proJecti that  have no
chance of  impJ.ementation  from time-to time.  It  would be
useful to list  them, by country - 
and by sector -and to send the list  to the relevant authorities  ancl organLzations.
This would save a lot  of tlme and money, to the benefit of
viabl,e projects.  This means, once again,  proper pre-feasibility
and  feasibility  studies and, in particular,  a serious
assessment of the msrlasf, -  which is  often overlooked.
The idea of a good project should, however, be sieen in
perspective, according to the criterion  (market, standard of  the
promoter, bank guarantees, host country).  A project  that  is
good in  one respect may be bad in  another.
6.g2  Develop project continuity
Experience  shows that  industrial  promotion demarrds a continuous
effort,  usually over a long period, if  projects are to be
completed successfully.  Because of all  the constraints listed -  in  this  study, promotion also means many' repeat;ed interventions
to go into  detai'ls which nay appear superfluDrrs in  an
industrialized  country.
All  commercial, financial,  technical,  legal and administrative
aspects of projects should be the subject of prercise information
and what can easil-y be long and difficult  negotiations.-109-
Ideally,  the foilow-up should go beyond the setting-up
of  the industrial- unit,  bearing in  mind the number of
problems that  crop up during exploitation.  What is
needed in reality  is  a continuous assistance service
for  firms,  particularly  SMEs, attracted by industrial
cooperation.
6.33 Go for  rehabilitation  nathel ttran promotion
Most of the ACP countries have completed their  import
substitution  programmes. Export, as we have seen, is
the concern of only a very small number of  them.
Few new projects can be introduced and there are many
industrd-,al  wrecks, particularly  in Afrlca,  so the time
has come to rehabilitate  old projects rather than seek
new ones.
The World Bank recently opened a department which
special.izes in  rehabil-itating  public companies in
Western Africa.  The EEC could follow this  example and
stress the rehabilitation  of  defective indugtrial  units.
Interventlon brigades of  experienced specialists  could
be envisaged. They could contain at least:
-  one industrial  economist;
-  one technici-an  from the relevant branch;
-  one representative from a financial  institution.
IdeaIIyr  the technician should represent an industrial
partner potentially  interested in  taklng over the unit
to be rehabilitated  in  a way to be determined once the
diagnosis  has been made (management contract, share-holding
etc).
6.:14 Keep up with technologj.cal changeq
Technica-l-  progress can someti es alter  North-South  investment
patterns unexpectedly.  WhiIe developing countries, Iow wages
and repetitive  production with low added val,ue seem to be
inseparabJ"y  linked,  what looks like  the opposite phenomenon is
apparent today, as two sectors of  industry show.  The arrival-110-
of the laser beam in  the textile  induetry means.that
products at  the bottom of  the range can .be cut more
cheaply .than in the most competitive  of the developing
countries.  And industrial  robots are bringing the
spinning mills  back to the devefoped countries.  As
thlngs stand, it  is  the textile  products at  the top
end of the range that are  being produced in  the low-income
countries.  A similar  trend is  apparent in  electronics
highly mechanized production  is  now going back to
California and the more elaborate products are being
sub-contracted in  the developing countries
Although it  ls  generally agreed that capital  intensive
industries stay in  the countries of the North and the
labour-intensive  ones in  the South, technical progress can
upset certain accepted ideas of  the South-eqtrals-textiles
kind.
6.35  Devize new promotion strategies
Industrial  prornotion is  still  in  its  lnfancy.  Necessity
and not deliberate desire was the mother of this  inventlon
which'is still  seeking its  way.  New promotjlon tactics
have still  to be defined and shoufd be the subject of
thoroughgoing'reflexion  over the coming years.  An
intereting  starting-point  might be the recommendations of
the ICHEC conference mentioned above ($ 6.23).  'Ihese
proposafs would no doubt need to be expanded to  include the
ACP countries and their  industrial  promoters.
In fact,  a proper industrial  cooperation technol,cgy has  l
still  to be invented and applied.  This coutd b'e the
ambition of  Lom6 III.
tt  .tt  lf  *ffl
(.:OOPURATTON'BETWEEN  FIRIIIS .  CASE NO 1
-  Nationalizati"on, followed by re-assignment of  4e% but loss of
60% without compensation.
-  Impossible to pay for  transfers of  technology.
-  Very difficult  to obtain work permits for  the expatriates.
Pressu'c bo take on nationals who, in  spite of having the
qualifications,  were not experienced.
-  Heavy taxation.  AII  benefits  (which were in  fact  compulsory)
to staff  -  food aid,  payment in kind etc - 
were
taxed.
-  Administrative delays.
- .Large-scale corrupti.on.
-  Heavy losses drre to clandestine  rnining concerns established  on
ther <;onccssi.on with a certain amount of  connivance on the part
o{' l.ho autholi ties.  T}re investor puts cl-andestine production  on
his  own c:oncession at  3 million  carats, as against official
produt:t.ion o1' 5.6 milli on ( l9B2/83) .  It  is  only the difficu_Lt
depcrsi-ts  (which call  for,  say, rivers  to be dragged) that  are
safe from clandestine oDerators.
ACTIVITY
TYPE OF IIIDUSTRITL. COOPERATION PROJR TED OR IMPLEMENTED
,Direct investment
OBSTACLES  OR CONSTRATNTS ENCOUNTERED
- Nabionalization  -  Employment  of  eipaEFiaEes  -
- Jransport blockage -  Tax -  Corruption8t?
coopERATroN BETwEEN FIRMS -  cRsd no 2
COUNTRY ACTIVIfY
Braz:i I Diamond mining
TYPE OF INDUSTRIIL  COQPERATION PROJSSTED  OR IMPLEMENTED
Direct investment
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTEITED
See summary
-  Transfers blocked.
Protectionist  measures preventing  equipmLent from being imported,
in 'spite, of  the fact  that  local  equipment does not meet the
demnrrds of the European partner.
-  Considerable losses due to clandestine mining on the
concess i on .I r? qt;
CoOPERAIION  BETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE No 3
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Cameroon
'Ihc
cocoa industry
TYPE OP INDUSTRIIL,  COQPERATION PROJSCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ST.ICOUNTENSO
Lack of coordination between the differ:ent authorities
Ther Ministry of  Industry is promoting a cocoa bean
processing project,  but  the Marketing Office has
already disposed of  the beans.  The project  has
therefore been unable to get off  the ground for
lack of  raw materials.f {,1
(JOOPERATION  BETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE NO 4
COUN'TRY ACTIVITY
Rwernda Quinquina
extraction
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Lack of r:oordination between the different  authorities
The Governrnent presented UNIDO and
quinquina extraction project'  while
which has been in  Rwanda for  years,
this  activity  because the trees are
th,e CID with  a
a Dutch firm  (AMF),
h,as had to  stop
d[i seased.
TYPE OF II(DUSTRIIL COOPERATION PROJECTED OR IMPLEMENTEDCOOPERATION BETWEEN FIRttS -  CASE No 5
lt*d iri
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Chile Forestry
TYPE OF INDUSTRIIL  COOPERATION PROJBCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture, followed by direct  investment
'I'he European partner rented a forestry  concession f'rom
the Chi lean authorities  and developed the infrastructure
(at  the Government's request) before making an offer  to
purchase.  The foreign i-nvestor did work (installing
roads, bridges, a sawmiJ-1, offj_ces, housing, machinery,
tel-ecommunications and vehicles) worth $ S million  and
l4O staff  work on the concession. He then suggested
buying the concession (ZZ OOO ha) at g 10 per ha, a far
larger figure  than the one the authorities  used (g a per
ha) to assess the rent in  the first  place.
The authorities  then valued the concession at g 40 per ha,
in  view of  the investments the tenant had made, and
expect-ed hi.m to pay the cost of  them (in  spite  of  the fact
that, he trad nlready paid for  them onte).  As the tenant
coulcl rrot afford  this,  the concession was auctioned off  at
$ 50 per ha, only  $ 1O of which was in  fact  paid as the
purchaser was arrested shortJ_y afterwards for  fraudul-ent
bankruptcy.  No lndemnity has been paid to the European
i nvesl-ors.
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ST,ICOUNTENSIi
Attack on propertyI ttr
COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRl,lS -  CASE No 6
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Tuni si i a Electricals
TYPE OF IIIDUSTRI[L. COSPERATION PROJSSTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Restrictions on foreign share-holdin6l
The expansion of a local  firm  was herld back by
a Tunisian Government decision  to nake the
percentage  of  foreign-held shares in  a company
outside the free zone no greater than the
percentage of theproduction exportecl.
The European partner was therefore unable to  buy
out a Tunisian firm.I f{7
COO-PERATION  BETWESN TIRMS -  CASE NO 7
COUNTRY ACTIVIIY
Cameroon Oil  mi11
TYPE OF' INDUSTRIAL. COOPERATION PROJBCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
The local  banks wanted a total_ guarantee from the
European partner  i.e.  a sum covering more than
his own holding and including buyer credits.  The
investor was unable to give guarantees in  excess of
the amount of his  holding.
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS ENCOUNTERED
Unacceptable  demands from the banktl'0 I
COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRI,IS -  CASE NO 8
TYPE qF TNDUSTRTIL.  COOPERATTON  PROJECTED OR TMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Cost of input
A feasibility  study of a factory turning out small
household articles  (broom handles and clothes pegs)
made from off-cuts  of  wood showed that  prices would
be two and a half  times those of  irnported articles.
For example, broom handles would cost CFAF 125' as
agai-nst CFAF 50 for  imports from Brazil'  largely
be'cause transport and labour are chreaper in  that
country and because taxes are higherr in  Gabon.'
ACTIVITYtt?
COOPIiRATION  BETWEEN  FIRMS -  CASE NO 9
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Gabon Metal drums
TYPts OF INDUSTRIIL  COOPERATION PROJSCTED OR IMPLEI4ENTED
Jolnt  venture
OBSTACLES  OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
4 project  to manufacture  metaL oil  drums
failed  because local  production could not
compete with exports.Its
COOPERATION  BET',JEEN FIRiIS -  CASE NO 10
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Jamaicia Pre-fabricated
panels for
buildi.ne trade
TYPE OF INDUSTRIIT.  COQPSRATTON  PROJSCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Irrstabitity  of  institutions
A German firm,  together with the CID' studied a
project to manufacture panels for  construction.
After a positive  study; long-term f:Lnancing of
DM '15 million  was obtained and the lLocal partner
was to be a State company.
The changc of policy  that  occurred after  the elections
led the Government to get rid  of  its  industrial
holdings - 
which put an end to the project.fa''
COOPERATION.BETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE No r r
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Gabon Pre-fabricated
bui Idings
TYPE O.F INDUSTRIIL,COSPERAIION  PROJrc?ED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint venture
The factory that has been built  can turn out 1OOO
units of  accommodation per year, which is  the slze
of  the Gabonese market.  Sales in  fact  reached  5OO
units  in  1976 and 7OO in  1977.  But the scheme cannot
get proper returns on an investment of  some CFAF 1 billion
with such a small market.  It  would take a market 10 times
the size to make this  kind of  investment viab]e.
OBSTACLES  OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTEREb
Narrowness of  the market|.a"*
COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE NO 12
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Gabc,n Dairy
TYPE OF INDUS?RI"TL.  COOPERATION PROJFCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint venture
0TJSTACLES  OR CONSTRAINTS ENCOUNTEF:ED
Incoherent administrrtive decisions
Authorization was given for  a dairy project  in, the
form of a joint  venture between two Gabonese
individuafs  (60%) and a French company (4O%). Shortly
after  the authorization  was issued, a competing project'
this  one IOO% Gabonese, also obtained an authorization
from the authorities.  But the manket is  too small
to support two industrlal  dairies.
The arrthoribies refusdto  make any decision and dismissed
both sets of  investors  non-suited.t
l?5
(JOOPERATION  BETWEEN FIRMS .  CASE NO 13
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Ivory Coast Pig raising
TYPE OF INDUSTRIIL,  COO?ERATION  PROJECTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS ENCOUNTERED
Governmentrs  failure  to respect commitments
A protocol was signed between the company ...  and four
Ivorian Ministers (of  Economic Affairs,  Planning,  Anj-mal
Production and Agriculture)  on running a pig raising
project  (15O sows).  The four Ministers undertook, in
particular,  to detax i.mported genetic capital  and special
elements and agreed not to authorize any competing projects
for  two years.
None of  these commitments was respected.  ?he imports were
taxed and a competitor authorized to set up.  The first
company was unable to carry on and wound up the business
and the cornpetitor also failed.  The genetic capital
(which was extremely valuable) was ultimately  sold to
the pork butchery trade.fiil
(:OOPIiRATION  BETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE NO ]4
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Ivory Coast Printing
TYPE OF II{DUSTRIAL  COOPERATION PROJECTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Management  contract
OBSTACLSS OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Value of  industrial/intellectual  prop'3rty not recognrzecl
An Ivorian promoter wanted to set up a speci-alized
printing  wonks (producing Iabels to substitute  for
imports) and asked for  help from the French company
which has BO% of the market.  The French company
found ft  impossible to make its  partner understand
that  it  had to buy the market j-t  (the French company)
had.  However, the ivorian partner was willing  to
pay for  technical assistance.
a-.
II frS*
.t COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS .  CASE NO 15
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Cameroon Children's
furni ture
TYPE OI' INDUSTRIAL. COOPERATION PROJRCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
ti
This project was refused authorization  because the
French partner wanted the firm's  accountant to be
European (as it  happened, the wife of  the General
Director).{lt,
coopb:RATroN BETwEEN FrRMs -  a45g 1i1o16
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Ivory Coast Chocolate
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRATNTS  ENCOUNTERET)
Regular supplies.of raw materials
SuppIy  of  the locally-produced cocoa beans depends
on the rates on the international  market.  If  they are
high, the factory can no longOr get its  supplies in
Ivory Coast, as the whole yield  is  exp,orted. So the
factory works in a very irregular  manrLer and the
volume of productlon  is  unpr.edictable.
a-
TYPE OF ITIDUSTRIIL COOPERATION PROJSCTED OR IMPLEMENTED,?ry
coopERATroN  BETwEEN FrRMS -  cASE No 17
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Gabon Sack-making
TYPE OF INDUSTRIAT,,  COOPERATION PROJECTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joi.nt venture
OBSTACLES  OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
-  r\o prorectron t'or nationa] production
-  Refusal to extehd investment code to second-hand uipment
A European investor was planning to manufacture  cement sacks, mainly
for  ciments du Gabon, but there was nothing in  the agreement  setting
up the company (which had links  with France's ciments Lafarge) to
say that  he had to buy his  suppli"es locally.  since Lafarge had a subsidiary making packaging, the fi-ee market was non-existent,  but
the Gabonese Government had let  it  be understood that  an answer to
this  problem might be found.
llence an  application for  authorization  from the lnysslep 
- whi.ch was ref'used because he was planning to  import second-hand
equipment (which is  not prohibited by the rnvestment code) as
being the only way he felt  he could make the project a paying
proposition.  The European partner also guaranteed  maintenance of
this  equipment and hefd shares in  the Gabonese company. The project  (20 jobs planned, rising  ultimately  to 3O-4O, only three
of them for  expatriates) is  currently  blocked.l'r8
cooPERATIoN  BETWEEN FIRUE- --!qSJ- xj--IE
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Gabon  &
Cameroon Tarred felt
TYPE OT INDUSTRIIL COQPERATION PROJR TED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OESTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERIID
No regional integration
A businessman wanted to make tarred felt  p6,ofing sheets in  Gabon
from  by-products of the soci6t6 Gabonaise de Raffinage.  If  this
was to be a profitable  proposition, the production  unit  had to  be
able to turn out at  least a million  sheets P.3.,  for  a market of
600 OOO sheets.
A study showed that  Gabonese sheets could c:ompete with Japanese
corrugated iron on the cameroonian  market, in  view of  a certain
regional preference (CFAF 55O per sheet to Douala, as against
CFAF 44O).  Al-riminium  sheets made in  Cameroon by Alucam were being
sold at  CFAF l34O
Brrt, Alucam stopped the project  by objectirrg to a competitor
entering the markeb.
'l'he project  (25 jobs and an investment of  FF 35 miilion)  had to
be droppeci.
tl?4
COOPERATIoN  BETWEEN FIRttS -  CASE po 19
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Mali Hotel
TYPE qF INDUSTRIAL..  COQPERATION PROJSCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Management  contract
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
None of  the accompanying investments due to be made by the Government
In spite of making written  commitments, the Government failed  to provide the air,  river  and road infrastructure
that would ensure the project was aprofitabl_e one.
The rate of occupation of  the hoter i.s extremery low and there are no prospects of  improvements  in  the short term.\?D
COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE NO2O
COUN:TRY ACTIVITY
Western Afric Textiles
TYPE OT INDUSTRIIL,  COOPERATION PROJECTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBSTACLES  OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
No accompanying infrastructure
In  the  absence of
only  turning  over
any electricity  supplies, the factory  is
at  IO-2O% capacityllr
(looPtiRATION IIETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE No zr
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
West Africa Sugar J-ndustry
TYPE OIT INDUS?RIAL,  COOPERATION PROJRCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
OBSTACLES  OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
: BSYti"Ts'.\i,F"5g+*E"gr.,t""EgtBf;EtplIs"comrni  tments
Govei^nments  have undertaken to ensure the financial  balance of
firms,  in  three cases, by approving domestic prices of  an
adequate level.  These commitments were made vis-ir-vis  the
f-inancing organiz.ation (an internationar  developrnent  bank) and
they were guaranteed by a contract between the firms and their
respective Governments.
In spite of  these undertakings,  there has been no reply to the
approval dossiers and the firms'  losses are mounting.f??
COOPERATION  BETWEEN FIRMS .  CASE NO 22
COUN"t'RY ACT IV tTY
K-en1t6 Tyres
TYPS OI.' II{DUSTRITL. COOPERATION PROJECTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Direct investment
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
No transitional  period after  the establishment agreement
The foreign company had a monopoly on tyre manufacturing  in
Kenya.  At the end of the period in  which the company was
protected, a competitor was authorized to set up in  the country
and the sudden change to a competitive  market caused the first
company problems of  adaptation.'aq
COOPERATION BETWEEN  FIRMS -  CASE NO 23
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Nigeria Accumulators
TYPS OI.- INDUSTRIAL COOPERAIION  PROJESTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBS'TACLI|S OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Refusal of  import licences
As l-ead import licences stopped being issued,
production had to cease.  This brought a
4O-man firm  to a halt,  in  spite  of the fact  that
the imported  l_ead in  question cost no more than
DM 20 000-!?'f
COOPERATION  BETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE NO 24
COUNTRY ACTlV ITY
Nigeria Ti 1es
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERIID
Failure to respect Government commitments
Iems
A Eunopean firm  signed establishment contracts with
eight Nigerian states whereby they guaranteed to buy
his production.  Each production unit  employed about
12O people - 
giving  IOOO in  all'  with only 5O
expatriates.'
Not all  the State commitments were f'ulfilled  and the
private market (as the feasibility  srtudy suggested)
proved too narrow because of  competj.tion from craft-
made tiles,  The production had to be sold at a loss.
The techni cal partner had also trained 20 workers  in
Germany. When they went back to Nig,eria'  only two
stayed with the firrn and the other.LB refused to  do the
work for  which thev had been trainerl.
TYPE O}' IIIDUSTRI,AL  COOPERATION PROJSCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
venturef ?,f
COOPI.;RATION  BETWESN FIRMS -  CASE NO 25
COUNTRY ACTIVIIY
Nigeria Refrigerators
TYPE OT' INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION PROJECTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBSTACLES OR, CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Import restrictions
Import "Licences for  pre-fabricated  parts and basic
equipment not available Locally were refused and
these parts have to be brought in under other names
to get round the customs regulations.  Hence
pointless complications and a permanent rlsk  of
these things getting bLocked at the frontier.\,3e
COOPERATION  BETI'EEN FIRI4S -  CASE NO 26
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
CAR Food and
asriculture
TYPb OF IT{DUSTRIAL  COOPERATION PROJECTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint venture (with the Stabe)
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERIID
Delays with price approval
After rehabj"litation of  the company j-n l98O (by boosting
the capital  and investing CFAF 3OO nillion),  the Secretary
of State for  Financial Affairs  undertook, in  June 1981' to:
-  protect production from imports;
-  approve the prices the firm  sugger;ted.
l.n September 1981, the company ran into difficulties,  as the
Governrnent  failed  to respect its  prrlvious commitments about
protection.  A parallel  trade in  srcap, oil- and flour
was developed on the basis of  the n,eighbouring  countries
and the requested prices were not approved.  The company
gives the following figures:
(CFAF)  market price
soap (kg)  31,7 -  507
oil  (litre)  75O -  760
approved pricq
florr  (5O kg)  9 19O
oi1 (1itre)  5OOO
ex-works price
47A
590 -  691
cost price
I1  440
557i url
COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE NO 27
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Mali Brewing
TYPE OI' INDUSTRIIL  COOPERATION PROJBCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Infrastructure  not provided by the Government
This important project  for  MaIi (the first  brewery
to make beer locally)  was approved in  early 1980, but
has not been implemented  because the Government has
failed  to supply a site  that  meets afl  the brewer's
requirenrents (particularly  in  the matter of water
supplies).
Meanwhile, the three-year period which the Governrnent
lai.d down for  implementation has expired and the i-nvestor
has to make a further  application for  approval.
The European investors have had to delay their  COFACE
(French credit  insurance) guarantee, for  which
reactual-ization of the project  is  necessary, three times.r}ti
COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS .  CASE NO 28
COUNI'RY ACTIVITY
Mor,ccco Sugar plant
In order to reduce ttre global offer  rnade to Morocco
without attering  the price of  the equipmentr an agreement
was concluded with the Government.  'Ihis  involved the
Moroccan Government undertaking to bury al-most all  the
foreign-held shares after  26 months at  50% of  the
subscribed price  (20 million  Dirhams instead of  40 million).
After  two requests to purchase, Morocco made the first
two payments in  September 1982, but,  in  spite  of  many
reminders, no further  payments have been received since.
TYPE OT'INDUSTRIIL  COOPERATION PROJECTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint venture with guaranteed  puichase of the I'oreign holding
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  IINCOUNTERED
Government's failure  to respect its  commitments{
:Ta
COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE NO 29
TYPE OF INDUSTRIIL  COOPERATION PROJECTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint v
OBSTACLES  OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Preconceived  ideas about the nature of  an industrial  project
Pressure from local  importers
Lengthy negotidiona were needed to convince the
Gabonese Government that  pork butchery could be
carried out on an industrial  scale.
Once this  was done, the European promoter had to
cope with opposition from a powerful expatriate
importtng group and it  took high-level- intervention
to get the project moving at  the level of  the
aubtborization  from the Ministry.
z.
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Gabon Industri al
pork butcheryq$fF
COOPERATION BETWEEN  FIRMS --  CASE NO 30-
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Cameroor Pre-stressed
.  canr:rete
TYPE Of .IllDusTRl[L  COQPERATIOT{  PROJRC?ED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OSSTNCLSS OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Pre-conceived ideas as to the nature of,anr industrial  project
It  took six  months of negotiating to persuade the
Cameroon Government that .pre-fabrication  (pre-stressed
concrete in this  case) was in  fact  industry.  This
recognition of  the industriaL nature of  the project  ls
vital  if  it  is  to obtain the advantages of  the
Investment Code - 
without which it  cannot go atread.rq{
CC)OPETIATION BETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE NO 31
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
cameroon Soap making
TYPE OF' INDUSTRIIL.COQPERArION PROJRCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Restrictions on management  powers
This Cameroonian company, which is  very sound,
makes an annual profit  of  CFAF I  billion,  but
it  is  still  forced to get the euthorization  of
its  local  (minority)  shareholders to reinvest
art-modernize its  installations.t,l7'
COOPERATION BETWEEN
.?^
FIRMS -  CASE NO JZ
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Cameroon ilooden furniture
TYPB OI' INDUSTRIAL COOPERA?ION  PROJFCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERIID
State demands that are incompatible with profitability
A major French furniture  manufacturerr wanted to
set up in  Cameroon. The local partner selected
was SNI, a State company, and authorization  was
applied for.
But when the timber supply conti^act was being drawn
up, SNI bried to i.nsist on small foreisters, who were
unacceptable to the French partner because he felt
the risk  was too great.
In face of  the intransigeance of  SNI '  the French
company pulled out and went to set up in  Canada.fr{b
coopERATrON  BETWEqN  FIRMS _ CASE No 33
COUNTRY AC?IVITY
Kenya Texti les
J
A poplin shirt  manufacturer obtained assurances
as to  custons protection from the Kenyan authorities.
However, the local  irnporters got the custorns
administration to cLassify their  imported shirts  in a different  category, on the grounds that  they were no competition for  the poplin ones.  The Kenyan
manufacturer is  now in  difficulties  because of  these imports.
{
TYPE OF INDUS?RIAL  COOPERATION PROJECTED OR IMPLEI\,IENTED
Joint  investment
OBSTACLES OR CONSM
Pressure rrorn roEEr-ffiFtffi
Corruptionf{t
COOPSRATION BETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE Noaa
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Burundi Tanning
TYPE OF INDUS?RIAL COOPERATION PROJECTED OR IMPTEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  SNCOUNTERED
Red tape
The Government  of Burundi wants to sell  a tanning
plant to a private group.  The studies have
al.ready been run by the European investor,  but the
Government is  denanding they be done again, as a check,
and this  wi.ll  involve extra cost and a considerable
delay.
SUMUARYi
t
j
l{5
COOPEIIATION  BSTWEEN  FIRMS -  CASE No  ?R
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Kenya Tanning
TYPE ON INDUSTRITL.  COQPERATIOI{  PROJSCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  ventut e
OBSTACLES  OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Opposition from the local. tradesmen
In spite of  assurances from the Government, the
tannery has not been properly supplied with skins.
Under pressure from local  tradesnen interested in
exporting untreated skins,  the slaughterhouse staff,
who are supposed to keep the tannery supplied, are
still  selling  the skins to  them.
The tannery has had to close because it  has no
skinsle$ln
COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE No  gn
COUNl'RY ACTIVITY
Burundi Electric  batterie
TYPS OF INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION PROJECTED OR IMPLEMENTED
'  Joi.nt venture
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Nationalistic  attitude  on the piart of the Government
A French company wanted to set up an electric  battery
manufacturing unit,  in association with a local  partner
of Asian origins,  who, because of his  nationality'  got
no support from either  the Government or the local  banks'
Tha project had to be droPPed.
SUMMARYN1
I
t
COOPRRAI'ION  BETWEEN  FIRMS -  CASE NO 37
COUNTRY ACT I V ITY
Cameroon Oil  mi11
TYPE OF IIIDUSTRIAL COOPERATION PROJSCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBSTACLES  OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
No fol-low-up by focal partners
The European company wanted to set up a palm
oil  processi.ng unit  to  serve the domestic
market and produce margarine for  export.  As
SNI failed  to react,  the foreign investor
decided to set up in  Malaysla instead.
*{'ts
t-1,.
COOPERATION  BETWEEN TIRMS -  CASS 1O 38
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Sudan ialt  refinery
TYPE OF INDUSTRIAL. COOPERATION PROJSCTED ICR IMPLEMENTED
Joint venture
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Unstable taxation
Customs duties and taxes suddenly soa:red to
35% from less than 15%.  Th{s was du,e' in
particular,  to the introduction of  th,e
national defence tax in  1982 and it  put the
f i rm in  di f'f icu1ty.f{1
COOPERATION BETT"EEN  FIRMS -  CASE NO 39
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Congo Sawmi I l
TYPE OT INDUSTRITL.  COOPERATION PROJEE?ED OR IMPLEMENTED
Management  contract
OBSTACLES  OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Incoherent industrial  PoIicY
A sawmill, which also produced. veneer'  was
nationalized.  The firm was forced to buy
its  logs at the Congolese timber board at  a
high price  and so was no longer competitive.
A rehabilitation  project was launched by a
German company with good standing in  Congo.
It  agreed to manage the sawmill' provided it
had its  own forestry  concession to  ensure
regular supplies at  competitive prices.  In
spite  of a positive  study on the chances of
success of  a sawing-veneer  producing unit'  the
Government replied  (after  a year of  silence)
that  the proposals (made by the Centre for
lndustrial  Development) were unacceptable.
However, these proposals exactly rnatched Congo's
original  request.I t,)
COOPF]RA'I'TON  tsE'TWEEN FIRMS .  CASE NO 40
COUNTRY ACTIV ITY
Papua-
New Guinea
Furniture
TYPE OF TNDUSTRIIL  COqPEXA.rION  PROJTCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Direct investment
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
tlnacceptable demands from the host Gcrvernment
A French company was willing  to take over a
forestry  concern that had gone bankrupt because
it  was under-capi.talizedr  there were no access
roads and operation was very difficul-t  as a
result.  A thoroughgoing study by the CID
showed that the business would be vieible if  a
2Okm road were built.  Then the Government asked
the investor to take over the bankrupt company's
Iiabitities,  in  exchange foi  an authclrization.
As this  condition was unacceptable, the project
was abandoned.t
COOPERATION BETWEEN  FIRMS -  CASE No 41
f5f
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Gabon Plastic injection
SUMMARY
The management  of  a Gabonese company in  difficuJ-ty
(on the point of going bankrupt, in  fact)  was taken
over by a European firm  at the request of the creditors
and banks concerned.  SeveraL highly-placed civj.1
servants made an unheralded visit  to the directors of
the company.
They called for  a meeting of  the managerial staff  and
strongly criticized  the European firm's  financial_ and
technical management.
This worried the hanks and the creditors,  who strongly
denounced it,  particularly  since, in  case of a difference
between the stafF and the company chairman, the
management  contract provided for  the banks to arbitrate.
.I'YPE OF' INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION PROJECTED OR IMPLEMSNTED
Management  contract
OESTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUMERED
Interference by the authoritiesl51r
coopERATION BETWEEN FIRMS -  CA!iE No 4?
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Nigeria 4,gricuItural
manh  i nanrr
TYPE OF II{DUSTRITL  COOPERATION PROJtrCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERIED
-  No fndustrlar  partner -  No technical structures
-  No financing
This firm tried  to set up i.n Nigeria
It  had to abandon the idea because of
obstacles ]isted  above.
11-
!,53
,
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Mali Agricultural
machinery
TYPE OF INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION PROJRCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint venture or managernent contract
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
No reaction from local  partners
Following a request from Mali,  which UNIDO
transmitted, an offer  to cooperate with
the manufacture of  a rice  thresher was made
May 1983.  There has  not so far  been anv reply
1n!${
\ (:OOPERATION  llE'tWEEN  FIRMS -  CASE N'aa
COUNfRY ACTIVITY
EgyiPt Tractors
TYPE OF INDUSTRIIL.  COOPERAIION  PROJECTED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
Bureaucracy and red taPe
This German firm has been making engines in  Egypt'
in spite of  many difficulties'  for  ilO years now.
For the past more than six yearsr it  has been.
negotiating to extend its  industrial  activities
to inctude tractor  manufacture, but the lengthy
procedures  and the inefficiency  of  the authorities
have prevented the project  from seeing the light  of
day.C0oPERATIqN  BETWEEN FIRMS _ CASE NO 45
Itr
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Western Africe
TYPE OF INDUSTRIST. COOPERATION PROJRC?ED OR IMPLEMENTED
OBSTACLES OR CONM
Lack of coordination between the authorities
Two authorities  (the Ministry for  planning and the Ministry for  State Companies) have been against an industrial  project  for  the past five years.  The former wants an existing project  to be extended and the latter  a new factory to Oe built.
H 
.f,s'
'.",: /Itt,
COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE NO 46
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Tanzani.a Plantation
TYPE OF INDUSTRIAI, COOPERATION PROJSCTSD OR IMPLEMENTED
Direct investment (I0O%)
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERE:D
Shortage of foreign  exchange
Loans b.y the Tanzanian subsidiary are paid
back to the central bank regularly.  But
the bank blocks the transfers to.the  parent
company and refuses to pay any interest  on
sums deposited, considering the debt to  be
settled  in  this  way.
'  ,'iCOOPIRAT-ION  EETWEEN FIRMS -  CASE No 47
l rrf
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Tanzania Spinning rnill
TYPE OF IT{DUSTRIAL  COOPERA?ION PROJEC1ED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint venture (50160)
OBSTACLES  OR CONSTRITNTS ENCOUNTENSD
Shortage of  foreign exchange
fG has not been possible to repatriate  any
dividends since 1976.  The depreciation of
the local  currency has made aI1 the assets
in  Tanzania virtually  disappear.
rl
,{t5s
COOPERATION BETUEEN FIRMS -  CASE NO 48
COUNTRY ACTIVITY
Mozambique Plantation
TYPE OF INDUSTRIIL  COOPERATION'PROJECTED  OR IMPLEMENTED
Direct investment ( 1OO7;)
OBSTACLES OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
-  instabilit.v  and lack of  transparency  of  institutions
-  nati onalizbtion
The Government seems to have nationalized this
business, although it  is  not possible to find
out exactly what the situation  is.  The investor
is  asking for  an indemnity -  for  which there seems
to be no provision.s /q
coopERATroN  BETwEEN FrRMs -  cASE go 49
COUNTRY AOTIV ITY
Ivory Coast Ferti I i zer
TYPS OF 'It'lDUSTRllL. COO.PERAIION PROJEC?ED OR IMPLEMENTED
Joint  venture (rninority)
OBSTACLES  OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTERED
-  Slow, arbitrary  decision-making
-  Failtrre to respect commitments
Since 1981,, the Government has not paid any of
the subsidies it  had promised to ensure the
firm's  books balanced (CFAF 6.6 billion  have not
been paid).  The firm has considerable financial
problens to cope with and could be forced to stop
production.
The l-ack of any Government agricultural  policy
(incentives,  fertilizer  etc)  also prevents the
firm  from making a proper asseesment of the market.lltli
(]OOPERAI'ION  BITWEEN  FIRMS -  CASF: NO 50
COUNTRY AcTIVTTY
West Africa 3i1 mill
.TYPE OI.' INDUSTRIIL  COOPERATION PROJBCTED OR IMPLEMENTED
OBSTACLES  OR CONSTRAINTS  ENCOUNTEI1ED
No basic information
I'he Government  agency that promotes  inv'estments
and jointventures invited  European producers of
thj.ngs derived from vegetable oils  and fats  to
join  in a local project  to make gher: from local
groundnuts.
Previous studies by bilateral  and mruftil-ateraf
technical assistance experts (FAO) had in  fact
warned the Government that  the locally-produced
groundnuts  were not of the right  quality  for
this  purpose.
So a study was run on producing ghee from the much
more expensive imported soya.  When this  study was
we]I under way, it  was realized that  there was
already a small local  producer who was forced to
work with imported soya, as the national market is
narrow and the high cost rules export out.  The
authorities  seem not to know about this  producer.
Four man/months of  expert inp.ut have thus been
wasted.
SUMMARYfw$
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COUNTRIES POPULATION
COUNTRY POPULATION
' 000
GNP  Per capita
GNP
$ million  $
Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas
lJarbados
tjelize
fleni n
IJotswana
Btrrki na
Ilunlrrdi
(lirmt: noon
Cape Verde
CAR
Comoros
Congo
Ivory Coast
Dj i bouti
Dominica
Ethiopia
F'i j i
Gab<;n
Gambi a
Ghana
Gren;rda
Cui nea
Guinea Bissau
L-quatoriaL  Guinea
Guyana
.lamai ca
Kenya
Ki ri bati  & Tuvie l u
Lc:s o ttro
Liberia
Madagar.;car
M;r law i
Marl i
Marrr  i, tius
Marrritania
N i g<l'
N ig,r:r'i a
Ugarnclir
[)apua-New  Grrinea
220
27A
3 620
860
6 360
4 460
B B'7O
340
2 41,O
380
I  620
8 57O
110
90
32 7aO
660
560
640
L2 240
tlo
5 290
590
380
920
2 250
17 860
60
1 410
2 I10
9 230
6 270
7 340
950
I  730
5 650
82 390
r.4 060
3 090
780
880
I  140
940
I  500
990
7 630
100
770
110
I  A40
10 t_90
180
60
4 530
1 290
2 550
220
4 790
loo
1 660
r48
118
5BO
2 600
7 2AO
3O
740
1 010
2 970
1 390
L 340
T 23Q
7LO
1 890
76 L70
3 750
2 580
3 620
3 500
320
I  OtO
240
230
88O
340
JZU
320
I  100
1 200
48O
750
740
2 000
3 BOO
370
410
850
300
190
341
720
1 1BO
420
420
540
s20
330
200
200
I  270
7 27O
JJU
470
220
840bh?'
ANNEXE I
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cottN1'nY POPULATION
I oo0
GI\P
$ million
Por c:tJti ta
GNP
;D
Rwanda
St Christopher & Nevis
Saint Lucia
St Vincent & Grenadines
Solomon Islands
Western  Samoa
Sao Tom6 & PrinciPe
Senegal
Seyche l les
Sierra Leone
Somal ia
buoan
Suriname
Swazi land
Tanzania
Chad
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Vanuatu
Zaire
Zambia
Zimababwe
5 280
120
100
250
160
90
5 970
60
3 670
5 1-20
19 2so
4LO
590
19 t-10
4 640
2 250
100
I  200
130
?7 40Q
6 160
7 540
1, 340
r20
70
150
56
40
2 530
110
1 t_4O
L ?40
7 390
3 030
480
5 260
490
t_ o10
50
6 720
42
6 280
3 49Q
6 264
250
970
630
640
359
374
430
t Boo
5ZV
2AO
380
I  O70
760
280
r.10
380
530
5 67A
350
210
600
870
Source: EurostatFS?
ANNEXE 1I
STI'IJY OF' THE CONSTRAINTS  ON INDUS?RIAL  COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS
EXPERTS' MEETINGS  -  ATTENDANCE
Mp Pierre  Berthe,  Directeur  g6n6ral
Soci6t6 belge d'investissement  international  (SBI),  Bruxelles.
Professor Dr.  Hans-Gert Braun, Director
Deutsche Finanzierungsgesellschaft  ftir  Beteiligungen in
Entwicklungsldndern  (DEG), Cologne.
Ivl r Daldrup, Directeur,
Daldrup B.V-,  Vaals
Ml G6rard Egnell,  Directeur  g6n6ral SIASS, paris
Ml Andr6 Huybrechts, Chef de Division  a.i.
Commission des Communaut6es  europ6ennes  (Cnny, Bruxelles.
MJ Emmanuel Jahan, Directeur  du Centre Nord-Sud
Institut  de 1r Entreprise,  Paris.
Mr Claude Jeantils,  Secr6taire  g6n6ral -  Centre frangais  de
Promotion industrielle  en Afrique  (CEPIA), paris.
Mr Patrick  Sevaistre,  Charg6 de mission -  Centre frangais  de
Promotion industrielle  en Afrique  (CEPIA), Paris.
M1 Fhilippe  Queyrane, Directeur,  Bureau d'Etudes Philippe
Queyrane (BEPQ), France.
Mr. Christian  Pollak,  Institut  fiir  Wirtschaftsforschung,  (IFO),
Miinich
Mr Patrick  Thomas, Bangue europ6enne d'investj_ssement (BEI),
Luxembourg.
M.r'Jean Tilot,  Conseiller  principal,  Organisation des nati.ons
unies pour le  d6veloppement industriel  (ONUDI), Bruxelles.
Mr John Leech, Director  of  external  relations,  Commonwealth
Devel-opment Corporation  (CDC), Londres.ANNEXE III
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QISECT FOREIGN INVESTEMNTS (DTI PERCENTAGE  OF GNP
IN THE DEVELOPING  WORID. 1978
REGION & country GNP
($ roe)
DFI
q
($ ro")
DFI  DFI
?s'o/o of  as % af
total  GNP
AFRICA
ACP
Benin  Z4O
Botswana  490
Burkina-Faso (Upper Volta)  ggo
Burundi  650
Cqmeroon  3 95O
Cape Verde  - CAR  510
Comoros
Congo  85O
Ivory Coast  Z 4SO
D j ibouti  j,zO
Ethiopia  3 47A
Gabon  2 13O
Gambia  IOO
Ghana  4 160
Guinea  1 35O
Guinea Bissau
Equatorial Guinea
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberi a
Madgascar
Malawi
s ieo
390
790
2 100
1 040
34
q'7
20
26
370
70
]-70
530
10
lOO
780
15
280
200
20
520
4
1 230
r.90
100
o.o
o.L
o.o
o.o
o.4
o. t-
o.,
o.5
o.o
n1
o.8
o.0
0.3
o.2
o.o
o.o
1.J
o.2
n1
4.6
11 .6
3.3
4.O
2.4
1?'.7
eo. o
a1
tt. J
2.9
36. 6
t_5.0
R'7
':'"
l-o. o
1.0
r1-5.7
on
9.6llt't
MaIi
Mauritius
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Uganda
Rwanda
Sao Tom6 & Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Sqmalia
Sudan
bwazi land
Tanzania
Chad
Togo
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
810
850
420
1 t-80
48 100
3 470
870
r_ 930
80
740
5 900
3r_o
4 l_30
650
770
6 480
2 720
3 330
10
24
25
100
L r_30
IO
25
340
t2
82
100
60
.50
]-70
26
r00
I  250
330
too
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o.o
0._0
o.o
o.1
r.2
o.o
o.0
n?
0.o
o.1_
n1
0.r
o.1
o.2
o.o
n'l
't?
0.3
o.l
L.2
2.4
6.'O
RR
2.3
U.J
2.9
L7.6
15.0
11.1
I.O !
16. I
4.L
4.O
13. o
r9.3
T2.L
en
TOTAL ACP
OTHER COUNTRIES
r19 090
86 540
I  670
2 424
7.8
3.7
7.3
2.8
TOTAL AFRICA 205 630 1_1 090 1_1. 5 5.4!{p*
AMERICA
ACP
Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas
Barbados
Beli ze
Dominica
Grenada
Guyana
Jamaica
St Christopher & Nevis
St Lucia
St Vincent & Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad & Tobago
460
2 540
tuo
3 4L0
e ooo
r.80
230
:oo
iro
1 300
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i.r
0.2
nl
,.,
o.9
o.o
1.3
es6. z
5.+. O
62.5
so. o
35.4
qg.q
?R1
uto
520
yo
TOTAL ACP
OTHER COUNTRIES
8 420
459 830
5 165
45 385
5.2
47.2
61 .3
9.9
TOTAL AMERICA 464 250 50 550 52,4 10.8t40 a
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PACIFIC
ACP
Fi j j.  9oo  22o  o.2  24.4
Kiribati
Papua-New Guinea  1 82O  860  ll .9  47 .3
Solomon Isl-ands
Western  Samoa
Tonga
Tuval-u
Vanuatu  50  40  rf,. O  80. O
TOTAL ACP 2 770  r  L20  1.1  40.4
OTHER COUNTRIES  ]" 59O  19O  O.3  11.9
TOTAL PACTFTC  4 360  t- 31_O  1.4  30.0
ALL ACP  130 280  14 955  1_4.r  '11.5
---------i
OTHER  DEVELOPING
co  547 960  47 995  85.9  8.8
ryIgDEVg!9rrNG 1 454 sgo  e6 43o  roo.o  6.6 ,  COUNTRIES *
*  Including Europe and Asia;
Sourqe: .Weltwirtschafteinstitut,  Hambung, I982.a?
2
I I}.^,-jNIlril,;  (Lt,NlIl tl,s  ( 61 )" I NllrrMldi rAl'H-ilrmME c][xJlIlllIES (d])
tiahanas
Bafnain
Barbadm
Belize
Berruda
* Botsrlan
Bnnei
Canenrqr
Ctrile
Colcnlcia
C6tgo
Cod< Islards
Ccta Rica
C\rba
Clprus
Dcrninican R4ublic
Falkland Islands
Fiji
Gibraltar
A.ndelope
Guatenal-a
Frendr Aryarn
c{'ana
Israel
Ivory Coast
Janaica
Jordan
Kiribati
LSanon
Itlacao
!tralqysia
l;$
NlaLtar
!4art-iniqrre
l4aldives
lvlorocco
Nalru
Nethed"ands Antil-Ies
New Caledcnia
Nicarqgua
Niue
Onan
Pacific Islands(l,EA)
Panana
Pry.e+lew Qrinea
Paragury
Peru
. Philippines
Polyneeig (Fr)
Reuni{n
St Pierre & Miqrelcn
Seydrelles
Suri-nare
Swazil-and
Syria
thailard
lf inidad & Tcbago
I\.rrisia
I\.ukey
Uru.Eu4r
Wallis & Futtl-n
* Western Samca
West Indies 
3
Zinbabre
DEVEUJPIIIG  CU..I'IIRIES EY L[X/H, CF. IIUIE-
'r Al1')uuririt;ut
fugolat
+ Bargladesl't
|t t]enirr
+ Butan
tjolivia
Burrna
* Br-rrundi
+ Cape Verde
* CAR
* Chrad
r( Ccnprtx;
D.jib<ul.i
l'i.ytt.
l,il lialvixtrr
I'kpartrrrial (hilrea
)r lithiqpia
+ GanLria
&ranzl
)t G-rinea
't G-rinea Blssau
* ftaiti
Fbndt-u^as
lndia
harpuchea
Kenya
+ Laos
* Lesotho
Li.beria
I@dqgrdscar
)r lvlalawi
r lv!-tldive-.s
r ltrl-i
Ih-nitania
Ivbyotte
Ivlozarbiqle
* I{€pa-L
* Nigen
Palcistan
* Rtrrada
St tlelena
Src Tcne & hincipe
Serpgal
Sierra Leore
Solcmn lslands
* Scrnalia
Sri lanka
* S.rdan
* Tanzaria
Tqgo
Td<elau lslads
Taga
11^/a1u
* ugarda
" Upper Volta
Varuratr
Vietrsn
* Ygren
* Dsn: Ygnen
Tairp-
"/anbia
Ner^r industrial jptrrrtries( 1-1 )
Argentine
Brazil
Crreeee
Horg Kag
,'jotrth Konea
Mexicc,r
I'r>rtr41aI
S-ingapnre
Spain
Taiuan
Yqgoslavia
OPEC (Onganization of petrnler.n,  e><portirg mulntrlesX
Algeria
Ecuador
Gabst
Indonesia  ( lcr'ar-inccnre  couu'rtry )
kw
Iraq
Kuweit
Libya
Nigeria ( internrediate-inccrne  mwrtry)
QLratar
Saudi Arabia
tJnited Arab Ernirates
Venezrrcla
* l,ljCs = lea-stdr.veloped  ccuntries
I'  DAC I jst.  'lhe Pe.cple's Itepulclic of 0:rirm is rxrt j.ncluded.
"1 'lh,: ]..--incxlnr c<rurLri<-':; arc tlrcser wittr a 1r-r capita C${P of less ttran $ 600 irl l*il.
il'11,.'Wr,r,t.  lrxiir,.s irr:Itrje fur1+.rilla, Anti63.a, Urc. Ce4nrnn  Islal'rds,  Dcmili.ca,  l'lcrrtserrat, Nevis & St Kitts,
lit l,rr'irr, 1it Virrrxrrt,, 'ttrr:'I\rtc; & Ciriccrs Islarrrls itml Ure Britishr Virgin Tslards.
Source:  OE(X)1?&" ?
Risk vs OpportunitY, 1983-87
45  50
Hrqhet OPPOrtunrlYt
Source: B. f .
AI\ND(E VIII
Low Rrsk/
High OPPotlunltY
l. I ' 
NORTH AMERICA
larwan
Hrgh Risk/
High Oppotluni.ly
l-ow Rrskl
Low OpP()tluntlY
world Av€iage BalnOs  t983 ---  I  tgES
Wotld Avafage Rattngs  t98t ------ 
' 
l9a7
Hrgh Risk/
Low OPPorlunrlY
Il. ty'
Au$trta a
.-!..,"o"e
t-.oa,o,ro",r,a
. . Spain
t---..+a
Soutft Alnca f
a
I
I
9
6
a
J
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Rff;KS AI'ID OFrcRITIIIITII:;  FOR II{VESIIRS  AI\D EXPORIERS  T'RO{ GEM4AI\ry
Ifut 25 qperb rate ttre 53 npst inportant foreign narkets
Ccurtry Total'ratirg
(nrax 30)
Political
stability
(nn>< 1O)
Dcnestic
trade rating
(nnx I00)
Exte.nraf
b"ade ratirg
(ma( fO)
1. Japan
r Norrav
i wetheirands
f'Saudi Arabia
5. Hong Kong
5. Sw-i"tzerland
7. USA
g. fj i rrgapore
9. Austria
19. Carrada
11. Belgiurn
11 France
13. Denmark
14. Australia
t5. uK
16. Malaysia
17. Taiwan
gg. Fi;rland
t9. ir eland
29. Sw':den
2t. Ne'i, Zealand
22. Ch i ]e
23. Tu;risia
24. Arlgentina .
25.Itirly
26. dcrrador
27. Sotrth Africa
2& Me:<ico
29. All3eria
39. Ivr>ry Coast
31. For:tugal
32 Verlezuela
ti Sorrth Korea
Co.Lumbia
15. Britzl l
36. Nilleria
37. Grr:ece
38. Kertya
39. Sp;rin
rO. Inrlonesia
41. L itrya
'02 Eg1'pt
43. Morocco
,14. Zinrbabwe
45.Ptri lippines
46.'l'lt;r  i Iarrcl
f7. Yup;os1av.i a
4t. [)t'r'u
49. lncl iir
fl). {, iL:t-.ri;.r
51. I r'rrr
51 'l'rr l kr:.y
13'za i r'<t
26
?55 u
25'
zlj'l
6l
?fl,
25t
25t
25t
E2
251
EI
219
246
?fi
zu
24
211
2Q
87
82
231
7D
nt
2n'
r23
222
7n
2m
2r9
2rt
217
214
m9
2$
. 203
201
N
2m
t98
lm
t95
t9l
190
t90
tt7
I15
t80
157
ltl
r39
t36
n
94
9t
92
96
n
95
yt
96
EE
t?
t9
96
tt
il
t2
89
93
t5
t7
92
t6
?8
7t
76
EI
67
EI
tl
n
78
6t
E2
76
n
tb
76
76
67
63
64
70
61,
64
68 g
78
?0
62
q
11
12
'19
90.
n
&a
t5
t6
76
t6
&l
8l
t0
t3
fl
7t
t0
79
75
t0
7t
7S
75
7S
T2
T2
69
78
7t
7t
6t
I
73
72
70
76
67
70
69
7l
6l
70
u
69
69
6l
6
6
65
62
56
t9
{
$,
5l
4
t0
94
t2
t6
$
tt
79
t3
t0
u
t2
il
77
EI
t6
tt'
75
7l
tl
7E
70
75
t0
82
71
n
t3
7t
72
69
6t
t0
60
70
62
74
56
a
6t
7t
65
J7
5E
6l
56.
6l
n
59
59
n
5t
u
1t
lkrlrcl f igrrr*; sofl"n^ce  : "ltrrutct mrgda'-llodcncrt lgtpJly
AIINEXE X _.----x- pacje t
I)A7,'II,IN() GI.IOW'IH  PIiOSPI'JCTS  IN .IAPAN
'Itrc: r.'r:rxuriurlly  rrxxrt at.t,r,rr:t,ive cotnt ies
Co-ntry Total
ratirg
(nElX C5/
Pqt-
ulatim
(nex 8)
Rrchasing
po^,er
. (nax 10).
ftqrl*r
so far.
(rrax 7)
Grurtr
pncspects
(na>< 10)
Inport
potential
(nax 1O)
Export
pototial
(nex 10)
Japan
Sairdi Arabia
Hong Kong
USA
Taiwan
'liou t.h Kor'<ta 'l'rarrce
S i ngapore
50
48
47
46
6
44
44
u
t 5,*
4
E ". 5.
6
1
4
t0
t0
E
t0
6
6
l0
E
5
5
7
3
1
7
3
5
: --J
..9
l0
.9
9
8
9
9
t0
l0
l0
IO
t0
l0
t0
l0
Rorrd I'igrres So-lfce i"mrnegcr  magazia--Liodcncsr 1980
GI{rI4Y PTTCIjPEC'I5 FUII BTACK AFRTCA
The econcrnisrlly Ieast attractive cotntries
Ccruntry Tota-l-
rating
(ma< fO)
Pq
ulaticn
, (nax 8)
R.rch6ing
poriEr
(nra:< fO) .
ftqlrllt
so far
(nax 7)
Gnrurde
praspects
(nnx IO)
Itrpont
potantial
(nax 10) 
,
Elport
potantlal
(nrax 10)
Liberi a
Zaire
Z irnbabwe
lrarr
r ur  AsJ
Kenya
25
26
'2E
29
3l
3l
4 '6,
.5
,6.
_6
,.5
/t-
;1
4 ''E
"6.- 'f-4 ,
2
2
2 '3
,5,
..5
,,:;' 4 
..
i, :6'
::  3
i- r:'4  .
tj..t 6 .,;
6
.5
6
15
,.., 4 ".  6
6
6
t
4..
5  .;
q
I l-,ruror l'iRtres .  less attractior
"R<rrrd figure's
-1.,:..:.,.i,1:p,,'i,1j, 
".:.. ;:  .:::. .,.
Sor.rCe : l: -tnrnagrr  angazin"llndenec | 980
ATMINIS1RATIVE  PTIOBLEIUS  IN ZA]NE
Ilureatrcratic arxl ncr*-icurear.rcratic  countrles
I Br-ureaucratic Ratirg Non btrrea.rcratic Rabirg
Zaire
Turl<ey
Ihdonesia
Liberia
Nigeria
Phi I ippines
Libya- 
-
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
Australi"a
Denmark
Japan
Canada
New. Zealand
r\etnerlands
Swi tzerland
2
'|
7
7
,
1
)
Quclle  : -rnanagcr magazin"-Lindenst  I 9E0
liotrrcr: :  l,lM
PMI\4A|\H\'T  LABTXJR  MIFLIC-TS  ]N LIBMIA
Relatisrs between orployers  and orployees
{Yriclgru-rtic t*rting Nonprnbloratic Itatiry-
l, i b<lri rr
'l'r.r rl<e.y
t t.aJ.y
UK
Spain
I rtrrr Irel-and
3
3
4
4
I
E
t
Ho5rB KonB
r, r oya
Austri.a
Saudi Arabia
Swi tzerland
Singapore
l5
t5
t5
t5
l5
l5
l4
Quelle : -manager rnagazi n"-lJndertest  I gB0\?h
ANNT,]XF]  X1
GI4RMAN CRITERIA  F'OR SELECT1NG A HOST COUNTRY I]Y SECTOR
()F'ACT.IVI'TY
rating(1,2,3) glgglg
Rea.son^s fndiviclual ratirEr
r23
De.velcpiryl ,ffi|& 62.,9 21 ,8  1 5, 1
2o,3 26,6 5l,o hixports frcrn DCs
$pply of raw naterials  o,l  lo,8  gz,9
Collective  lhrrber of Place
?3,8  425  1
F'rcdr.rctist ccst.s
Infrastructure
PoliticcLl stability
14, I  44,4  21 ,f
16,5 49,6 ll,9
26,9 53,4  19 ,7
11  6
11 ,"1
56, 5
41 ,3
53, 5
45, 7
))ro
2011
394
181
199
381
JOO
388
10t
388
6
4
Policv tcruare investors 21,6 48,2 )o,2
Policy twarcts ilports  18,8 13,9 27,f
Incentive policy 8,5 23,2 68,3
(a) I -  very inportant, 2 = significant,  3 = neglig@le'
Sou-ce: lK) In^st..i hrtt3n
ANNEXE XIl t
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It'"
t'RlrlNCll l'IltMSr lNl)tJ51'RIAL  COOPERATION PREFERENCES
SIZti - 50 50- loo IOO - 5O0 5OO+
i
%of 
i
total
TVF)tr ntr
COOPERATION  ..
, .,.,  ---+,'
63 
",
I
'--i
Lal
)
'I
383
191
299
248
644
-...-.{
ls4  23b
109  778
1 AR  2A?
Total
t'-"'
2L4 9. 16
18.23
38. 01
I _.  r
j
OO4  :1lJ.42
ota  ?o  q,l
l
I
AO1  2q  4R
141 U  OU. J3
;
I
I
^1
Direct  investment 43 39
LI7
69
, J oint  velrturc
Sub-contracting
Licence
Sal-e of'  technology
Key- in*Lrand
nrzr'i  nnf  e
lirrpp l.y of'
c:11rr -[ pnten t.
109  185 r49
244  325  193
110
L27
186
203
888
I
I
Soqlt"i  French firms and industrial  cooperation  with the developing
'  corrntries,  UNIDO (Paris)'  1982.I
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FURVEY OF 154 FRENCH FIRMS -  NEASONS  FOR INVESTING
Total sample Minority
investments
, ?+
ANNEXE XIV
Majority
investments
Place %  Reasons
of
rqlies
Ioca-l narket
Dsnand or
incentlves
fnrn lrca]
auttrorities
8006t
presence rn
area
4tJr 12
Ist  38
I
4)
23 l}rd
3rd  27 IB
Place  %
of
replies
3rd
5tn
Reasons
liiz,r.r oI'
local nnrket
I
I
tjgrend or
ircentives
frcrn local  I
auttprities  I
i
I
Dsnand frcrn  I
l<ral  1
partrers  ;
1
L\-Et;crts  :
bariers
Boost
preserce ln'
alea
toa"I
:
cctrpeEltron
frcrn foreigl
-t Iirns  I
PIae  %
of
replies
Rerecns
I-aaf market
Dqnard frcrn
local
partners
Dernard or
irrcentives
frcrn lrcal
arttprities
C\tstcns
barriers
Local
coryetltion
frcrn foreign
firns
44 lst
25
t9
2nd
3rd
5t}i
16
14
I2
L2
IO
4\t'
4th
a'd '25
4tlr
5ttt
Platform for
elport to
third count^ies
. Geographical
diversification
. labour cosls
. Octain a
platforn for
elport to
France
Sioun:c: (harle;--Albert  Ntictralet & Ivticleel Delapierre -  'tl-€s nor-rvelles  fbrmes
d'invrstissgrrrt dars les pqys en voie de il6velcppe,rent:  fe cas
frangais -  A prelirninary shlff prod'pd for the CECD as part of a
nesearch project on ttre nerrr f-orns of investnent in the develcpirg
courltri.es.lEr n
ANNEXE XV
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT  BANK LENDING BY SECTOR 1967-I983
Bank Group Lending bY Sectora
(in milliopr of $)
1967-80  96 Sharo l98l  95 Share 1982  96 Share 1983 % Share
Number S Crrm.
of Lending
Total Loans Share
Agricultura, including
agric. lines6f credit 656.946 26.5e 207.311 32.62 252.881  33.02 261.945  28.16 1.379.083 (191) 2_97!  , il;#;..'...:'...  66.zrs 28.e5 r31.27e zo.oo rae.oo6 1e.o7 z3o.26e 24.75 1,148:6s lllll  21e-4 
' pubfic utifiries  649.958 26.30 132.044 20.78 212.164 27.7O 274.201 29.47 1.268.367 (181) 26'41 
:.
industrial  lines
of credit  s44.O42 13.92 95.795 1 5.07 51 . 185 6'68 53.4'15 ' 5.74 54.437- l99l 
1 I :1 i il;#;  il  ilih .  iu e.soc 7.24 6e. ros ro.ez ro3.sg3 13.83 r 10,s37  1 t.88 402.127 (63) e g? i
,^^^rh  iM  M  - ?liji'::'::':::'::':':  . z,.iii.o6i roo.oo oii.iSi roo.oo 765.81s loo.oo  e30.367 roolo +,e02.?83 (6e2 
1
" All th" fir**rh tht" ,.ble refer to approved lo"nJTlttr*nd  of 1gA3 tn" total amount of cancellations was $98'76
mitlion.  i,'(. .'
b Thie figure lncludee  1 2 cancelled  loans amounting to $57.97  million. 
^ -- Noro: Dars qn induorry  and lines of credit were reclissified es fotlows: dOB, 1982 and 1983; ADF, 1977-83; and NTF
Industry, including
1977-83.
liource:  Afri c:arr Developmertt Bank.flff{
? ANNEXE XVI
CONSTRAIN'I'IJ ENCOUNTERED BY
(in  clecreasing oiCer of rmpor
FIRMS INVESTING IN AFRICA*
t.
2.
l\
R
o
ln
ll
I'
l"
1A
J.O.
Relations with the authori.ties.
LegaL instability1,
Transfer of  earnings.
Supplies of raw mpterials.
Price fixing.
l,abour l-aws.
Local share-ho1ding.
Financ ing.
Outlets & export.
Taxation.
Wage policy.
General restrictrons.
Risk of nationalization.
Regulation of products.
Cl'roice of  nranufactr-rriitg  process.
Choice of  site.
Environmental constraints.
It 26 firnx;  itr i.r.nv iewcd in  12
ACP Grorrtrl (Nigeria,  Zaire,
Tanzania, Togo and Uganda)
Source: IFO, Munich.
countries, including nine fronr the
fvory Coast, Cameroon, Kenya, Senegal,
plus Egypt, Tunisi.a and Monocco.ANNEXE XVl1
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ANNEXE XVIII
UNTCE PROPOSALS  ON INVESTME
Flach t:ontractirig perrty asserts the need to promote and
protect investments which  nationafs or cQmpanies  of
the other conl-,rar:ting party make, directly  or  through
subsidiaries,  on its  territorY'
Each contracting party recognizes the need to  ensure
that  investments which nationals or conpanies of  the
other contractlng party make on its  territory  receive
treatment that  is no less favourable than tha'b applied
to its  own natit.rnals and companies or to  investments  by
rral.iortals;  anrl ()()fllpanies of  third  countries, i{ the latter
i,"; nrorc i'rtlvitrtt,itP,t:otts.
lllrt'tr colrLra(j t. I Irl,, partv recogrrizes the need Lo respect
anyspecialagreementsconcludedortobecon.:fudedwith
national-s or companies from the other contracting  party_
orwithanylocalsubsidiarywithwhichtheyareinvolved.
These agreements shall  provide for  the settling  of  any
disputes by means of . international  arbitrationmachinery'
such as the convention on'the settlement of  Investment
Dj sputes
Sourcc: llnic>n oI' 11<lustries of  t;he European C,:mmunities (UNICE).
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ANNEXE XX
Distrrbution of OwnershiP Plttcrns'of l '275 f'l tr:uflclurrng Affilirrcsb
of J9l Tnnsnetional  Coq,roreiion:  Estrblithctl  in Dc*cloPing Countrics''
by Periol of.Estrblishmen(, 195 I to 197-i I ttrcen()
Number EstublithtJ at P,'rtent  olTot'tl
Home CountrY andT;9c
ol OrntrshiP Bcforc /,95 I ,gil-tg& !s6l -t96t tgaJ't970  t97t -1975
Affilietis of lE0
U.S.-brrd  corPootionl
WhollY o*ncd
Mriority owncd
(s,o*ncd'
MinorirY owncd
Unklown
Toul
Affiti:tcr of I lJ
F,rropcan-  end U.K.'
ber:d corgorationr
Wholly o*ncd
MijoritY  owncd
q64wncd
MinoritY  owncd
Unknown
Total
Affiliarcr  bl 76 othct
!nnsnational  corPontions'
$fholly owncd
MajoritY owncd
Co-osncd
MinodtY  owncd
Unlnosn
Tot:l
58.4
t?.2
J.6
lt.2
t2.6
tm.0
+r.5
2t.4
1.9
I E.8
.7.1
tm.0
t7.1
t9.2'
I 1.4
21 .1
t0.l
100.0
t,?.8  l7.l
I1.2  10.4
:1r.5  2t.1.
l.l  0.4
tm.o  tm.o
39. r
15.4
t.3
9.8
30.5
t00.0
I t.6
20. I
6.6
n.9
ll.9
t00.0
m.9  lE.9
15.6,  t6.4
It.t  6.5
35.E  42. I
16.6  16.0
tm.o  100.0
10.7  6. I
t2"6  t.2
6.3  7.5
66.?  14.2
l.r  3.9
tm.o  lm.o
n.4
t.2
t2.l
16.4
tJ.6,
lm.0
16.7
262
7.r
42.9
7.1
t00 0
SouRcEs Unitctl.Nrtionr. Traatmtioaa!  Corpororiont  in World pet<lopaent:  A Reqtaminunon
(Nc_ yort: unirerl Narions, lgTE). T.rblc lll-25. p. 239, anrldera  rupglicrJ  by rhc Hrn'.nl llulftnr'
tional EnterPrisc  Rolcct-
. Afhlrrrc>  of which Uc p&cnt  6rm of rhc syltcm  ownr 9J Pcrcent or murc lrc chssificd 13 wholly
"-;J".  "*t:o 
p-rccnl. rs majonty owncrt: cqurl ptn'cn(rg€t' 
'5 
c(>owncrd:5  to un'lcr 50 p<*cnt'
as mrnorily owncd.
rThc;rffilrltelofU.S'bascdcorpo'rtiontlrelho!'inwhichthcU'S"bar:dprrcntrj)fthcnrultinr'
tiocrl cnrcrprirc hctd a dirrct cqui(y in(crcsl: thc rffil;f,ter ofco(po.rioni  bu'cd  rn rhe unitcd King'
dom, Wc:tcm  Europ..  u.tr l:p.n ine lu'lc rhurc in uhich prrcnt conrprnic: hcld cquity intcart indi'
r€ctly lhruugh othcr rffilietcs
. Of ricrc 76 ctrcF;ntionr. 6l rc ba:cd in Japrnl8t a
:'*
ANNEXE XXI
I
i
l,:xPRopR  I A't I oNS ()t' AMEHICAN  COMPANTES ,  By SECTOR ,  1960_1974
Exhiblt lll
Apropfiatio.r  by i.rdEtry group, 1 96(F t974
Nunrbard  PJcantot
arprop'rlaiorla  ldd
Oil  I  !.  12.ffi
€rtraction  3lt  16.0
Utifili.s and [anlpodrtion  :  l7  4,0
Inrqnnca rrd b.r!tj.!g  4.0
Mrnur|cllring  30  1.2
Agriornr''  '19
Sela!  and sarrEa  ttt  '
Uttd.prop.rty.Jdconrtrueio,r  27
'oatr urrvail.bL.
ll()rrr'cc): lllrrvilrtl  IJusiness Ilevie_'w, July-August, lg7'/.